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The Colonising Ethic and Modem International Society
A Reconstruction of the Grotian Tradition of International Theory
Abstract
This thesis develops a new ideal type of modern international society by exploring 
the affinities between certain solidarist features of the order that exists in 
contemporary world politics and the 'colonising ethic'. The purpose of this 
analysis is to reconstruct the Grotian tradition of international theory, by 
challenging Hedley Bull's representation of modern international society as an 
anarchical society of states, which has contributed to the view that the solidarist 
elements of Grotian thought are nostalgic 'neo-medievalism' or utopian 
prescriptions for the future. Bull's description of modern international society has 
three principal components: an absolutist interpretation of Hugo Grotius's 
international political theory; a 'Westphalian' account of the origins of modern 
international society; and an account of the expansion of international society 
through the imposition of the 'standard of civilisation' on non-European states. 
The thesis develops a different ideal type of modern international society by re­
appraising these elements of Bull's argument. It offers a non-absolutist 
interpretation of Grotius's conception of the law of nations, highlighting his ideas 
of appropriation and divisible sovereignty. Then, to explain the origins of modern 
international society, the thesis demonstrates the affinity between these concepts 
and colonisation in the Netherlands, the Dutch East Indies and North America. 
This illustrates the ethical system embedded in the practice of colonisation: the 
'colonising ethic'.-To explain how this international society expanded to global 
extension, the thesis then shows how the Grotian concepts of appropriation and 
divisible sovereignty formed important parts of Dutch colonial administration in 
Indonesia and the westward expansion of the American states-union. This 
provides the basis for a novel interpretation of three elements of order in 
contemporary world politics: the apparent tension between state sovereignty and 
human rights; the partial centralisation of authority in international society; and 
the justification of resistance through international norms.
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Chapter 1
Solidarism in the 'Grotian Tradition' of International Theory
All reasoning takes place within the context of some 
traditional mode of thought, transcending through 
criticism and invention the limitations of what had 
hitherto been reasoned in that tradition.
- Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 222.
International relations are anarchic, but they are neither asocial nor chaotic. This 
proposition is the starting-point for a tradition of theoretical speculation about 
international relations that tries to uncover the character of the special kind of 
sociability and order that exists in world politics, in spite of international anarchy. 
It is sometimes known as the 'Grotian tradition' of international law or 
international theory.(Lauterpacht, 1946; Bull, 1977: 24 & 1991) In recent years, 
the Grotian tradition has come to be rather narrowly constructed, and the 
'solidarist' elements of the tradition have come to be treated either as nostalgic 
expressions of 'neo-medievalism' or as utopian prescriptions for the future. The 
central purpose of this thesis is to recover these solidarist themes in the Grotian 
tradition, elucidate their meaning and illustrate their practical relevance to modern 
and contemporary world politics. Thus, the thesis w ill work within the context of 
the Grotian tradition, while trying to transcend through 'criticism and invention' 
some of the limitations that restrict attempts to think about international relations 
in the terms currently in vogue among members of the tradition.
The thesis w ill argue that the liberal idea that individuals have a right to 
resist the arbitrary exercise of power by the state, and the classical republican 
notion that sovereignty should be divided between different institutions or people 
within apolitical community, are important elements of the society and order that 
have existed in world politics since the seventeenth century. They were expressed 
in Hugo Grotius's original conception of the law of nations, and were developed 
internationally through the European (and latterly North American) practice of 
colonising 'vacant' lands. They thus constituted a 'colonising ethic' within the
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broader normative framework and institutionalised practices of modern 
international society.1 A proper grasp of the historical development of this ethic 
is essential to an understanding of the significance of individual rights, forms of 
international organisation and justification of resistance movements in 
contemporary world politics. However, this conception of modern international 
society contradicts the current orthodoxy that international society is composed 
of states that possess an externally absolute form of territorially-defined 
sovereignty, and within which "The basic compact of co-existence between states, 
expressed in the exchange of recognition of sovereign jurisdictions, implies a 
conspiracy of silence entered into by governments about the rights and duties of 
their respective citizens."(Bull, 1977: 83)
By way of an introduction, this Chapter w ill undertake three main tasks. 
First, it w ill pose the general question of the nature of international society, which 
is the focus of theorists working in the Grotian tradition. Secondly, it w ill argue 
that there are—or were—several different answers to this question within the 
Grotian tradition. Thirdly, it w ill identify an important respect in which the 
currently dominant formulation of Grotian international theory is relatively 
narrow. Thus, the Chapter w ill set out the purpose, context and area of enquiry
1. In using the idea of an 'ethic' I am deliberately recalling Max Weber's 'Protestant ethic' thesis. 
W eber understands an 'ethic' to be more than 'simply a means of making one's way in the world', by 
virtue of the fact that "The infraction of [an ethic's] rules is treated not as foolishness but as 
forgetfulness of duty."(Weber, 1930: 51) An ethic is therefore not simply a set of moral principles or 
a way of acting. Rather, it implies a distinct code of conduct, and therefore, I believe, captures the 
various components that are usually seen as comprising the 'element of society in world politics', 
including normative principles, legal rules and institutionalised practices.(see Bull, 1977: 13) Thus, to 
identify an ethic is to identify a broad constellation of values, rules and institutions expressive of the 
character of international society and order. It is worth mentioning that when I speak of a particular 
ethic as 'embedded' in a practice, I mean that the ethic describes the code of conduct of that particular 
practice; it describes what 'right' behaviour is in the context of that practice. This does not mean that 
ethics precede practices, or are sets of ideas that are somehow external to practices and enforced 
against practitioners. Not all Protestants, for example, actually live their lives in strict observance of 
the 'Protestant ethic', and are punished for their lapses or moments of non-observance. However, one 
would have to question whether someone could properly be called a Protestant if they lived their life 
in complete and wilful disregard of the main ethical principles of their faith. In this sense, to participate 
in a practice means submitting oneself to the ethical code that governs that particular practice, even 
if only to the extent that one has to provide reasons to explain breaches of the ethic. Thus, I am 
supposing that when individuals, states or non-governmental organisations participate in international 
society they are taking part in practices and hence submitting themselves to particular ethics and 
recognising that this imposes duties on them to behave in particular ways.
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of the thesis argument. Section 1 explains what the question of international 
society means and the issues that it raises. Section 2 provides a preliminary 
account of the diversity of the Grotian tradition in answering the question of 
international society, anticipating an argument that is made more extensively and 
in more detail in Chapter 3 of the thesis. Then, section 3 contends that the 
Grotian tradition is currently locked into a rather unequivocal and narrow 
understanding of the nature of modern international society, since one particular 
answer to the question of international society has been treated as ontologically 
prior to others. The Chapter concludes by outlining the structure of the argument 
as a whole that w ill seek to remedy this situation.
§1. The question of international society
Hedley Bull asserts that "the central question of the Theory of International 
Relations [is] 'What is the nature of international society?'"(Bull, 1991: xi) Here, 
he is echoing Martin Wight's view that "The primary questions of international 
theory concern the nature of international society and international law."(Wight, 
1966b: 92) Although the question of international society is not the only question 
that can be asked about international relations, it is undeniably important, in the 
sense that it frames key background assumptions about the essential features of 
world politics and raises issues that are widely regarded as central to any proper 
grasp of the character of international relations. The literature that addresses this 
question w ill be the basic material of this thesis.
The question about the nature of international society and law can be 
taken to be the central, and indeed defining, concern of theorists working within 
the Grotian tradition. It demarcates an area of speculation about the character of 
order in world politics, and the way in which social institutions and practices 
uphold that order. As was mentioned earlier, the question of international society 
is primarily informed by the realisation that the condition of international anarchy 
does not necessarily imply that international relations are asocial or chaotic. 
Anarchy is simply the formal condition of international relations, in the sense that,
8
while orthodox political theory is concerned with politics within a state, "The 
central purpose of the political theory of international relations is the presentation 
of a philosophical account of the experience of living in and among a world of 
separate, sovereign states."(Unklater, 1990a: 3) The lack of a world government 
or international state thus both defines the difference between orthodox political 
theory and international relations theory, and establishes the centrality of the 
problem of anarchy in the latter.
Now, it is sometimes argued that the condition of anarchy implies that 
international relations lack any kind of sociability or order, and that this renders 
a political theory of international relations unthinkable. As Wight, for example, 
observed, there is
a kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorized 
about. The reason is that the theorizing has to be done in the 
language of political theory and law. But this is the language 
appropriate to man's control of his social life. Political theory and 
law are maps of experience or systems of action within the realm 
of normal relationships and calculable results. They are the theory 
of the good life. International theory is the theory of survival. What 
for political theory is the extreme case (as revolution, or civil war) 
is for international theory the regular case.(Wight, 1966a: 33)
Thus, Wight identifies the crucial difference between political theory and 
international theory in terms of man's lack of 'control of his social life' in the 
extreme conditions of international anarchy. This is the view of international 
relations against which the Grotian tradition sets itself.
In light of the above comment it is perhaps not surprising that W ight is 
often associated with the provocative claim that international theory "does not, 
at first sight, exist."(Wight, 1966a: 18) This is because, in comparison with 
political theory, international theory is incapable of offering any prescriptions for 
living a morally valuable life. However, in the same essay, Wight made two other 
points about the 'paucity' of international theory that suggest a somewhat more 
programmatic understanding of the tasks facing international theorists: the lack of
international theory is the result of a questionable fixation on the state as the 
particular form of political community; and it is the result of an inadequate 
characterisation of different political theoretical constructions of the state of 
nature. These two points w ill serve as a useful introduction to the Grotian 
tradition.
First, Wight observed that attempts to develop a theory of international 
relations are bedevilled not simply by the condition of anarchy, but also by "the 
intellectual prejudice imposed by the sovereign state".(Wight, 1966a: 20) What 
Wight meant by this was that "Practical problems of international politics are often 
described in terms of building a bigger and better state.... Few political thinkers 
have made it their business to study the states-system, the diplomatic community 
itself."(Wight, 1966a: 22, emphasis original) Thus, there is no international theory 
because political thinkers have not, by and large, appreciated the need to think 
about the distinct entity that would constitute the subject matter of such an 
enquiry: "the society of states, or the family of nations, or the international 
community."(Wight, 1966a: 18) In other words, most political theorists have not 
posed the question of international society. Wight's comments here recall Flerbert 
Butterfield's more sustained criticism of orthodox political theory.
Political Theory takes hold of man's duties to his fellows or to 
mankind and comprehends them in his duty to Society or the State.
It may not explicitly assert that there is only one Society or State, 
but it often argues as though only one existed. And the result is that 
thought tends to stop there.... In so far as this is true, I still have a 
sort of feeling that'Political Theory is the enemy'.(Butterfield, 1964:
2)
This obviously opens up a tremendous opportunity and challenge for international 
theorising, since, as Butterfield continues, "it would not be sufficient to make 
merely a few banal transpositions, with the idea of adapting such [Political]
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Theory to a world conceived as International."(Butterfield, 1964: 3)2 Thus, the 
main point here is that there is no international theory because of the tyranny of 
the categories of orthodox political theory and the inadequacies of scholars in 
thinking beyond those categories. To rectify this, W ight later declared his own 
interest in producing "a comparative study of states-systems".(Wight, 1977: 22) By 
posing for ourselves the question of international society, we have located our 
enquiry within a similar realm of theoretical speculation.
This leads on to the second interesting aspect of Wight's discussion of 
international theory. He observed that the kind of anarchy that exists in 
international relations
is theoretically odd. It introduces an ambiguity into the state of 
nature which becomes a persistent feature of international theory. 
For individuals, the state of nature...leads to the social contract. For 
sovereign states, it does no such thing. International anarchy is the 
one manifestation of the state of nature that is not 
intolerable.(Wight, 1966a: 31)
This line of argument was developed further by Hedley Bull, who described it as 
a criticism of the 'domestic analogy'.(Bull, 1977: 46-51) Bull observed that states 
are unlike individuals, in the important respect that they can provide for their self- 
defence without exhausting their energies to pursue the 'good life'. Consequently,
2. Butterfield's argument, which is perhaps more explicit than Wight's remark about the 'intellectual 
prejudice imposed by the sovereign state', has an affinity with a literature that has grown up recently 
criticising Wight's major (and apparently skeptical) claim that there is 'no' international theory. As 
Andrew Linklater puts it, "To many writing in a more contemporary idiom, Wight's position may be 
thought to reflect a misleading and indeed outdated appraisal of the dominant forces at work within 
the modern international system; to others it bears witness to what is permanent in the states-system, 
to what ultimately must be recorded in our experience of it."(Linklater, 1990a: 5) For example, R.B.J. 
Walker criticises Wight as the pre-eminent representative of the position that "international relations 
theory [is] marginal to political theory, marginal, that is, to the specific form of political community 
celebrated in claims about a tradition of properly political thought."(Walker, 1993: 33) I agree that this 
line of argument can be detected in Wight's essay, but I submit that on this point, as was so often the 
case, Wight's argument was highly ambiguous. He could alternatively be read as himself trying to 
criticise the form of political community made sacrosanct by orthodox political theory. In effect, then, 
one can perhaps see Walker's criticism already contained within Wight's essay itself, and certainly as 
consistent with Butterfield's more robust formulation. This is why I believe that Wight's essay can be 
taken as a starting-point for understanding the concerns of the Grotian tradition, rather than as a denial 
of the possibility of such a tradition of speculation about international relations.
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the order that exists in international relations is not simply a survivalist one, but 
one that contains certain moral principles, albeit in a less fully-developed way 
than the orders that exist within states.(Bull, 1977: 49-51) As John Vincent put it: 
order in the international anarchy should be seen as "a different moral order 
rather than an inferior one.... If the protection of the interests of individuals or 
groups is something which in general the state does more effectively than any 
more inclusive entity, then the interests of the state itself acquire thereby a moral 
dignity which is not automatically to be despised."(Vincent, 1978: 28, emphasis 
original) Robert Jackson explains why the international order of the society of 
states is morally valuable in terms of its role in protecting the state itself: "the 
point of the balance of power and similar arrangements among a plurality of 
Leviathans is to safeguard the civil and socio-economic goods of people organised 
into states."Gackson, 1990: 265) Furthermore, there may be no good reason to 
think of the state of nature as intolerable, even for individuals: "we may choose 
not Hobbes's description of that condition but Locke's."(Bull, 1977: 48) In other 
words, we might see the state of nature not as a state of war, but as a quasi-social 
arrangement governed by natural law, since "The state of nature has a law of 
nature to govern it...and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind...[that] no 
one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions".(Locke, 1924:
119) Bull argues that this might provide a more suitable analogy with international 
relations, in which "justice...is crude and uncertain. But there is nevertheless a 
great difference between such a rudimentary form of social life and none at. 
all."(Bull, 1977: 48)
One may summarise this line of argument in the following way. 
International relations are anarchic, since there is no world government. However, 
they are not asocial, since that is a misdescription of the international state of 
nature, which comprises a set of quasi-social arrangements; neither a fully- 
developed civil or political society, nor an ungoverned state of war of all against 
all. As this suggests, international relations are not chaotic. They exhibit their own 
special kind of order, which is not morally empty. Our task is to understand these 
phenomena by thinking about 'the society of states, or the family of nations, or
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the international community' itself. This is a demanding and intellectually distinct 
task, since we cannot simply make 'a few banal transpositions' from orthodox 
political theory. Instead, we need to pose the question of international society: 
what is the 'rudimentary form of social life' that exists in international relations, 
what kind of order does it sustain, and what special concepts do we need to use 
in order to make sense of it? The Grotian tradition is the tradition of speculation 
about the possible answers to this question.
§2. Conceptions of international society in the Grotian tradition
At this point, a reader with a grounding in international relations theory would 
probably expect to find a rehearsal of Bull's well-known argument that
international society is a society of states, and that there is a contrast between the 
fragile, minimal 'international order' of co-existence upheld by the institutions of 
the society of states and the morally prior, but less firm ly institutionalised, 
category of 'world order'.(Bull, 1977: 8-22) Certainly, Bull's work is an important 
answer to the question of international society. It should not be neglected and we 
w ill come to it in due course. However, it is also important to realise that Bull's 
idea of the 'anarchical society' of sovereign states is only one of many different 
possible answers to the question of international society within the Grotian 
tradition. He takes up a position within that tradition; he does not
comprehensively define its terms of reference.
Bull acknowledges as much, when he admits that he uses the term
'Grotian' in two different ways in his work: "(i)...to describe the broad doctrine
that there is a society of states; [and] (ii) to describe the solidarist form of this 
doctrine, which united Grotius himself and twentieth-century neo-Grotians, in 
opposition to the pluralist conception of international society entertained by Vattel 
and later positivist writers."(Bull, 1977: 322, n3; see also Bull, 1966c) The key 
point here is that, by identifying these conceptions as complementary elements 
of the 'broad doctrine' that there is an international society, Bull recognises that 
there are at least two possible answers to the question of international society
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within the Grotian tradition: a solidarist answer that is closely associated with 
Grotius himself; and a pluralist answer that is associated with Grotius's critics in 
the positivist school of international law such as Emerich de Vattel.
According to Bull, the primary distinguishing feature of the solidarist 
conception is the belief that the members of international society are capable of 
collective action in pursuit of shared purposes: "The central Grotian assumption 
is that of the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of the states comprising 
international society, with respect to the enforcement of the law."(Bull, 1966c: 52) 
The other main feature of the solidarist conception is its insistence that "the 
members of international society are ultimately not states but individuals."(Bull, 
1966c: 68) In other words, this conception of international society "places the 
rights and duties of individuals at the centre of its ethical code."(Wheeler & 
Dunne, 1996: 95) It is thus not only purposive action that distinguishes 
solidarism; it is also collective action by the members of international society 
towards the realisation of the interests and needs of individuals, who are the 
ultimate bearers of moral value. It w ill be argued later that these two elements of 
the solidarist conception illustrate the importance of a liberal conception of the 
person and a republican conception of political community in the Grotian 
tradition of international theory (see Chapter 4 below).
By contrast, the pluralist conception of international society comprises the 
view that states "are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum 
purposes".(Bull, 1966c: 52) Because of the limited nature of states' agreement in 
the pluralist conception, the rules and institutions of modern international society 
are "appropriate to the relations among persons who are not necessarily engaged 
in any common pursuit but who nevertheless have to get along with one another. 
They are the very essence of a way of life based on mutual restraint and the 
toleration of diversity."(Nardin, 1983: 12) Thus, the pluralist conception is 
primarily oriented towards the toleration of the various cultural and political goals 
that are pursued within different independent states, rather than the promotion of 
collective goals. It may even be the case that attempts to promote common
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purposes in international society run the risk of undermining the limited order of 
co-existence that exists in international society.(see Bull, 1966c: 70-71; 1977: 
152-53; & 1983: 13) Furthermore, by concentrating on the toleration of diversity, 
the pluralist conception can be seen as hostile to the rights and duties of 
individuals that are promoted in the solidarist conception of international society. 
The importance attached to state sovereignty and nonintervention as mechanisms 
for protecting cultural and political independence takes individual rights off the 
agenda of international society and insulates illiberal regimes from criticism: "The 
resulting dispensation might not be attractive to Western liberal democracies, but 
Beijing can always quote Hedley Bull to retort that the one drawback of liberalism 
is that one has to put up with the irritating habits of one's neighbours."(Hughes, 
1995: 442) Modern international society is thus held to be capable of recognising 
the rights of individuals "only in a selective and partial way".(Bull, 1977: 93)
We w ill return to the question of the diversity of the Grotian tradition in 
Chapter 3, where Bull's distinction between pluralist and solidarist conceptions 
w ill be criticised, in favour of the claim that there were at least three distinct 
answers to the question of international society within the Grotian tradition. For 
now, however, there is no need to make this further argument. Even on Bull's 
relatively narrow construction, we can see that there is no obviously correct single 
answer to the question of international society within the Grotian tradition. To be 
sure, Grotius himself can be associated with one particular answer, but this has 
always been part of an on-going argument about the proper way of answering the 
question of international society. Therefore, to work within the Grotian tradition 
is not to commit oneself unequivocally to a particular view of the nature of 
international society. It is a living tradition on Alasdair MacIntyre's terms: it 
embodies "continuities of conflict" around the question of international society, 
and it tells a "not-yet-completed narrative" about the rudimentary form of society 
and order that exists in international relations.(MacIntyre, 1985: 222, 223)
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§3. The ontological priority of the pluralist conception
Although in principle the Grotian tradition contains these different answers to the 
question of international society, at present there is an overwhelming tendency 
within the tradition to assert the ontological priority of rules and institutions 
consistent with the pluralist conception of a modus vivendi w ithin a society of 
sovereign states, even while many thinkers uphold the normative priority of the 
solidarist conception. In other words, Grotian thinkers often see the unity and 
individual rights described by the solidarist conception as a highly desirable state 
of affairs, but they see the pluralist conception as a more accurate description of 
the elements of society and order that actually exist in modern world politics. The 
values of the solidarist conception are then seen as potentially or actually 
'emerging', in a way that w ill either reform, transform or replace the pluralist rules 
and institutions of the already-existing modern international society. We thus live 
at a 'Grotian moment', in the sense that "statist arrangements are gradually being 
superseded, and...a new system of world order w ill come into existence at some 
time in the course of the next century."(Falk, Kratochwil & Mendlovitz, 1985: 7) 
This way of distinguishing the relative priority of the two conceptions of 
international society was forcefully articulated by Bull, and the ontological priority 
of the pluralist conception in the contemporary Grotian tradition can be illustrated 
through a brief discussion of the way that he used these two conceptions to think 
about order in world politics.
To begin with, it should be noted that commentators often argue that Bull's 
work traced a line of development from an early pluralism to a more solidarist 
position in his later writings, like The Hagey /.ectures.(Bull, 1983) For example, 
Nicholas Wheeler argues that, in The Anarchical Society,
Bull had said that states were able to agree on the need for 
international order despite competing conceptions of justice, 
expressing doubt that there were grounds for privileging one 
conception of justice over another. In The Hagey Lectures, Bull 
suggested that the moral value of the society of states has to be 
judged in terms of what it contributes to individual justice; the
16
implication being that if the society of states fails to protect 
individual justice, this would place in jeopardy its normative 
value.(Wheeler, 1992: 475)3
Andrew Linklater makes a similar point, arguing that Bull was increasingly 
sensitive in his later work to the requirement that international order be grounded 
in generally acceptable principles of justice, and that in this respect he "came 
nearer...to considering the rights and duties which might underpin a different form 
of universal political organisation."(Linklater, 1990b: 20; see also 1992: 81,85-86) 
Thus, according to Linklater, Bull's formulation poses "Intriguing questions about 
the possibility of a progressivist interpretation of international society".(Linklater, 
1996a: 104)
Certainly, it is true that in his later writings Bull began to express a stronger 
commitment to solidarist principles. In his earlier works, he had been keen to 
stress the positive contribution to international order made by the pluralist 
conception, and was outspoken in his worries about the ambitious demands of 
solidarism.
It may be argued of the [solidarist] conception...not merely that it 
is unworkable but that it is positively damaging to the international 
order; that by imposing upon international society a strain which it 
cannot bear, it has the effect of undermining those structures of the 
system which might otherwise be secure. And it may be said of the 
pluralist doctrine that so far from constituting a disguised form of 
Realpolitik, it presents a set of prescriptions more conducive to the 
working of the international order than those of the 
[solidarists].(BulI, 1966c: 70)
3. It should be noted that Wheeler does not see Bull's solidarist turn as being unqualified. W heeler 
continues: "it is not clear whether Bull was endorsing the idea of universal human rights—a position 
which seems to contradict his realist and pluralist comments on the lack of universal agreement on 
human rights—or whether he was suggesting that Western human rights standards reflect a particular 
viewpoint, but that the West should not apologise for this, or be afraid of making it the basis for 
action."(Wheeler, 1992: 475) I agree with Wheeler on this point. It is hard to tell precisely what is the 
audience to which Bull is appealing at this crucial point in the argument. Is he offering human rights 
as a morally valuable principle for the world as a whole? O r is he directing his comments at foreign 
policy-makers within Western states? I think that a similar ambiguity can be detected in John Vincent's 
discussion of human rights.(Vincent, 1986)
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While he never came to regard the pluralist conception as redundant or morally 
vacuous, nor to regard the promotion of solidarism as without risk, in his later 
work Bull nevertheless demonstrated a much stronger attachment to the normative 
goals of solidarism, for example in his view that, within international society in 
the twentieth century, "the idea of the rights and duties of the individual person 
has come to have a place, albeit an insecure one, and it is our responsibility to 
seek to extend it."(Bull, 1983: 12) It seems to have been the case that Bull 
became less sure about the value of the order achieved through pluralist 
agreement, although he certainly did not dismiss this hard-won order of-co- 
existence out of hand, and began to regard the promotion of solidarist principles 
as a necessary part of the role of the international theorist.
However, while his views on the relative normative standing of pluralist 
and solidarist moral principles may have developed in favour of the latter, Bull's 
idea of the ontological priority of the institutions of the pluralist conception of 
international society did not substantially change. In his early work, Bull depicted 
the solidarist conception as growing in importance in the twentieth century, but 
nevertheless as still "premature" in terms of the institutionalised practices on 
which it could depend.(Bull, 1966c: 73) Similarly, in The Hagey Lectures, he 
argued that "The cosmopolitan society which is implied and presupposed in our 
talk of human rights exists only as an ideal, and we court great dangers if we 
allow ourselves to proceed as if it were a political and social framework already 
in place."(Bull, 1983: 13) Bull contended that "states remain the chief agents or 
actors in world politics"(Bull, 1983: 13), reiterating a position that he had set out 
in The Anarchical Society: "The fact is that the form of universal political 
organisation which actually prevails in the world is that of the states system."(Bull, 
1977: 295-96) In other words, while the principles of solidarism may have 
appeared increasingly attractive to Bull, he still qualified his support for them by 
warning that the rules and institutions that actually uphold order in world politics 
are those which more closely conform to the pluralist conception.
Admittedly, Bull did canvass the possiblity that alternative rules and
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institutions might be emerging in international relations, including, most 
interestingly, "a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political 
organisation that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages."(Bull, 1977: 
254) This 'neo-medieval' order bears a strong resemblance to the solidarist 
conception of international society,4 and Bull acknowledged that one might see 
it to be emerging through processes of regional integration, the disintegration of 
states into smaller local units, challenges to the state's monopoly of legitimate 
international violence, the rise of transnational organisations and various 
technological developments like the communications revolution.(Bull, 1977:264- 
74) His reply to such a view was basically negative, arguing that "it would be 
going beyond the evidence to conclude that 'groups other than the state' have 
made such inroads on the sovereignty of states that the states system is now 
giving way to this alternative."(Bull, 1977: 275) Admittedly, this was not a telling 
criticism of the neo-medievalist idea, and it perhaps looks less compelling now 
than it did in the late 1970s. Indeed, as Linklater in particular has argued, the 
room that Bull's rather weak argument left for manoeuvre opens up an interesting 
line of enquiry into the nature of the rules and institutions of international society 
in contemporary world politics.(Linklater, 1996b)
We w ill return to Linklater's attempt to develop this line of enquiry in a 
moment. For now, the main point is that Bull himself consistently argued that 
order in modern world politics has historically been upheld by institutions 
consistent with the pluralist conception of international society. He therefore saw 
the pluralist conception as the best available description of the actually existing 
condition of world politics, in comparison with which the solidarist conception 
was either a nostalgic appeal to medieval Christendom or a utopian prescription 
for the future. Furthermore, as we w ill see later, he developed a profoundly
4. Bull frequently attributed the solidaristic elements of Hugo Grotius's conception of international 
relations to the lingering medieval aspects of the world in which Grotius lived.(Bull, 1966c: 66 & 
1992: 90; see also Cutler, 1991: 49 & Tadashi, 1993: 135) As is argued below, in Chapter 4 , 1 regard 
Bull's claim as a misinterpretation of the political theoretical context of Grotius's thought. Grotian 
solidarism should be interpreted as an attempt to re-work medieval concepts to describe certain 
modern international practices, and as part of a theory of property, obligation and resistance that is 
emblematically modern.
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influential synthesis of historical and theoretical analysis that made the pluralist 
conception seem like the only available answer to the question of international 
society in the modern period. Where Wight had kept up an ambiguous position 
to the effect that aspects of 'eclectic' or natural law thinking were not "entirely 
eclipsed by the orthodox doctrine of state-personality",(Wight, 1966b: 102) Bull 
held much more unequivocally that "natural law gave place to positive 
international law"(Bull, 1977: 33) and leant on an historical narrative that placed 
the system of territorial, externally sovereign states in continental Europe at the 
heart of modern history, systematically denying any international personality to 
individuals or to institutions above the state; a position with which, for a variety 
of reasons, nearly all his contemporaries agreed.(see Chapter 3 below)
Gradually, Bull's synthesis began to narrow down the options for thinking 
about international society within the Grotian tradition. Perhaps the most crucial 
moment in this process came when Bull equated the Grotian tradition as a whole 
w ith the pluralist idea of a society of states sustaining an international order of 
coexistence. Reasonably enough, he claimed that this tradition had developed in 
conscious opposition to a 'Hobbesian tradition' which denied the reality of 
international society. More importantly for our purposes, however, he also saw 
the Grotian tradition as arguing for the "acceptance of the requirements of 
coexistence and co-operation in a society of states", as against a 'Kantian tradition' 
offering a "universalist view of international morality" and demanding "the 
overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a universal community 
of mankind".(Bull; 1977: 26, 27) In other words, he tied the Grotian tradition to 
the minimalist modus vivendi suggested by pluralism and effectively excluded the 
solidarist themes of universalism and individualism from the Grotian tradition, 
causing as perspicuous a commentator as Vincent to present the tradition in the 
following way:
If all this amounted to what Bull conceded it was in the conclusion 
to The Anarchical Society—an implicit defence of the states- 
system—it was also a classical statement of the rationalist or Grotian 
position on world order. Against the realist deniers of international
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society, and the revolutionary destroyers of it, Bull argued that 
order in world politics was dependent on the survival of 
international society.(Vincent, 1990: 58)
By some subterfuge, which we w ill investigate more closely in Chapter 3, the 
'classical statement of the rationalist or Grotian position' has thus come to be 
bound up with 'an implicit defence of the states-system'. Suddenly, Grotianism 
is divorced from its concern with the communis societas generis humani; instead, 
at the ontological level, Bull offers an exceptionally pluralist and statist 
formulation of Grotian principles, which makes solidarism look like a nostalgic, 
idealistic and even antagonistic prescription. What we are left with, ironically, is 
a Grotian tradition which no longer has room for the Grotian conception of 
international society, except when it can be accomodated to the terms set down 
by the pluralists and positive international lawyers.
The reason for this commentary is not to suggest that Bull's answer to the 
question of international society was worthless, and that we need to return to 
some golden age of international theorising in the Grotian tradition. We cannot 
simply 'go back' to Wight, Lauterpacht or even Grotius himself. The force of 
Bull's argument, and especially his synthesis of international legal doctrine, 
historical analysis and state practice, must be conceded. Bull's is an exemplary 
account of the nature of modern international society. However, what we need 
is a version of the solidarist answer to the question of international society that 
can match the persuasiveness of Bull's defence of the ontological priority of the 
pluralist idea of a modus vivendi in a society of states. We need to show that the 
solidarist conception of international society (or something like it) is neither 
nostalgic nor utopian, but is a description of certain actually-existing elements of 
modern world politics. This is the project of the thesis: it w ill aim to demonstrate 
that modern international society has, since the seventeenth century, incorporated 
values, rules and institutions that embody those described by the solidarist 
conception of international society.
Before explaining how this is to be done, however, we need to clarify an
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important point. In the years since Bull articulated his defence of the ontological 
priority of the pluralist conception, some theorists have attempted to work aspects 
of solidarism back into our understanding of the nature of sociability and order 
in world politics. The two most sophisticated attempts to do this have been made 
by Vincent and Linklater (although they might not describe their projects in these 
terms themselves), and it w ill be helpful to consider their arguments briefly before 
outlining the proposed argument of this thesis.
Vincent's early work was more or less in line with the idea of the 
ontological priority of the pluralist conception, as is evidenced by his study of the 
evolution of the principle of non-intervention.(Vincent, 1974) However, in his 
later works, he developed a response to Bull's 'cheerful skepticism' about the 
promotion of human rights as a principle of international order. We have already 
seen that Bull was worried that promoting human rights might jeopardise the 
fragile order of coexistence in the society of states, and Vincent saw his task as 
demonstrating that human rights could be upheld in international society without 
damaging that order, and might even serve to strengthen it. His key proposition 
to this effect was that the idea of human rights does not have to presuppose the 
existence of the institutional framework of the 'cosmopolitan society' that Bull saw 
as an ideal, because the principle of human rights is already embedded in the 
institutions of international society, and has indeed become part of the 
mechanisms within that society that states can use to legitimate their own 
authority. There is not, therefore, a necessary contradiction between the assertion 
of human rights and the principle of state sovereignty as the basis for international 
order.5
Vincent agreed with Bull's skepticism about the existence or emergence 
of a cosmopolitan society, and he recognised that advocates of human rights 
frequently do appeal to such a society, "which might unsettle the stability of
5. Although his argument is quite different from Vincent's, Mervyn Frost defends a rather similar 
conclusion.(Frost, 1986) I will not discuss Frost's argument here, but the methodological approach of 
his 'constitutive theory' will be discussed and criticised in Chapter 2 below.
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international order."(Vincent, 1986: 150) Such appeals are made because 
advocates of human rights typically "do not find complete satisfaction at the state 
or inter-state level and...have established some form of non-state moral 
constituency in which they are considered legitimate."(Vincent, 1978: 29) Like 
Bull, Vincent was skeptical of the claim that such 'non-state moral constituencies' 
constitute an empirically demonstrable social and political framework for 
upholding world political order. To justify his own skepticism on this point, he 
used a number of arguments that echo Bull's earlier defence of the continuing 
significance of the states-system. For example, Vincent noted that protests about 
human rights abuses are typically still channelled through states, using the special 
authority of states to lend such protests weight, and that non-state organisations' 
visions of a new world society are often little more than a partisan defence of 
western values, against which state equality offers otherwise weak non-European 
societies the chance to defend their cultural integrity.(Vincent, 1986: 100-102, & 
see Bull, 1982) Overall, Vincent agreed with Bull that the current prominence of 
human rights cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of the emergence of a new 
world society.6
Where Vincent went further, however, was to indicate a way in which 
moral account was taken of human rights within the traditional {i.e., pluralist) 
international society of states itself. He thus came to occupy a sort of mid-way 
point between Bull and the world society perspective: "thinking that...world
6. Although I think that this general assessment stands, it is interesting to note that, in some of his last 
published pieces, Vincent seemed to oscillate between different positions on this issue. Sometimes, 
he took a skeptical line, arguing that "Individuals may now, for some purposes, be called subjects of 
international law, but they are hardly equal members with states in international society, and they 
cannot hope to enforce their rights in that society." (Vincent, 1992: 249, emphasis original). However, 
in one of his last pieces, published posthumously and edited and revised by Peter Wilson, he argued 
that "there is a need to go beyond non-intervention for the reason that the autonomous system of 
sovereign states...has now been replaced by a much more complex world."(Vincent & Wilson, 1993: 
128-29) A fair assessment would probably be that Vincent's attitude towards this crucial question was 
gradually developing beyond the qualified skepticism of Human Rights and International Relations, 
and that he might have developed a more enthusiastic account of the emergence of a world society 
but for his early death. Nevertheless, this would only be speculation, and it remains the case that 
Vincent's most fully developed statement on this issue adopted a skeptical position. Therefore, I prefer 
to treat Vincent's argument as an attempt to revise Bull's conception of the anarchical society of states, 
rather than as a defence of an altogether different conception of the element of society in 
contemporary world politics.
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society is not deeply entrenched, while not simply dismissing it."(Vincent, 1986: 
106) What grounds did Vincent find for taking this alternative conception of 
international society seriously? In the first place, he noted that states have taken 
up the language of human rights, partly as a rhetorical device, but also as part of 
their traditional and sincerely felt responsibility to provide security for their own 
subjects or as an unavoidable consequence of the inclusion of human rights issues 
in the business of international organisations.(Vincent, 1986: 106 & Chapter 8) In 
addition, international law has established certain minimum standards of treatment 
and a body of customary rules which impose widely-recognised obligations on 
states to uphold human rights.(Vincent, 1986:44-47) Thus, as Vincent concluded, 
international human rights law "does expose the internal regimes of all the 
members of international society to the legitimate appraisal of their peers. This 
may turn out not to have been a negligible change in international 
society."(Vincent, 1986: 152) However, the key point is that this opening up of 
internal regimes to international scrutiny does not, according to Vincent, 
jeopardise the order of co-existence in the society of states. To a degree, states 
control the process—they are not completely at the mercy of international human 
rights organisations—and states can use international humanitarianism as a further 
support for their claim to authority in international society.
Linklater's argument is quite different from Vincent's, and arguably more 
ambitious. W hile Vincent offered a novel account of contemporary international 
legal regimes in terms of the legitimation of state authority through international 
humanitarianism, Linklater tries to identify the conditions for the emergence of a 
new form of universal political organisation. In so doing, he defends an 
emancipatory agenda of human freedom through the reconstruction of history in 
terms of extensions of human community, "connecting a political theory of 
international relations with a theory of the history of human subjects."(Linklater, 
1990a: 201) Linklater describes this project as "a sociological analysis of moral 
development in international relations",(Linklater, 1990a: 212) which he develops 
through an account of "a scale of social and political forms" including tribal 
organisation, the modern state and states-system, and "a set of universalistic
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relations expressive of the human capacity to share the conditions of a free 
life."(Linklater, 1990a: 168) This project is related to a Marxist concern with the 
conditions of human emancipation, but Linklater regards conventional historical 
materialism as flawed and in need of reconstruction to respond to two specific 
requirements. First, Marxists should be more self-critical about the normative 
commitments behind their shared goal of emancipation. Secondly, instead of 
focusing overwhelmingly on changes in the mode of production, Marxists should 
pay more attention to a broader range of sociological, political and cultural 
developments.(Linklater, 1990b: 171)
The latter criticism of Marxism is one reason why Linklater finds Bull's and 
Wight's "comparative sociology of international systems" so interesting.(Linklater, 
1990b: 171) He believes that the main goal of the Rationalist tradition (which one 
can, for the moment and with reservations, treat as similar to the Grotian tradition 
described earlier) is to strike "a balance between universalisable norms and 
particular cultures and interests."(Linklater, 1996a: 104) This interpretation 
indicates Linklater's concern with the conditions for offering different answers to 
the question of international society within the Grotian tradition, including the 
solidaristic theme of the universalisation of the conditions for human freedom. For 
Linklater, in keeping with the argument of this Chapter, the central problem is 
how to effect a radicalisation of the version of the tradition given by Bull, and he 
claims that this may be accelerated through a "Closer analysis of Kant's 
cosmopolitan approach to the society of states".(Linklater, 1996a: 111) This 
therefore locates Linklater's work on the intersection between 'Grotian' 
Rationalism and Kantian Revolutionism, calling into question the stark and 
problematic separation that Bull made between these two traditions. What 
Linklater tries to do is show how Bull's account of the nature of modern 
international society can be directed towards an interest in human emancipation 
by arguing that the rules and institutions of international society contain certain 
normative principles—beyond those considered by Bull—which indicate the 
immanence of a morally more inclusive form of international order. To make this 
argument, Linklater re-describes the normative structure of modern European
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international society. His main point is that, in addition to the values, rules and 
institutions documented by Bull, one can detect a productive tension between 
two different conceptions of moral and political community. These are articulated 
in the internal and external theories of political obligation embedded in the 
modern state and in modern international society.
An 'internal' concept of political obligation describes the view that 
"members owe their most fundamental obligations to the society into which they 
were born, or to which they belong."(Linklater, 1990a: 39) Such a point of view 
denies or denigrates obligations to 'outsiders', who are not members of one's 
society. By contrast, an 'external' concept of political obligation affirms the 
existence of "a moral framework which extends beyond the one surrounding 
insiders, so necessitating ethical as opposed to merely pragmatic orientations 
towards relations with outsiders."(Linklater, 1990a: 40) The central proposition in 
Linklater's argument is that these two concepts of obligation have historically 
coexisted in modern European international society, "because the modern state 
recovered the values of political separateness and civic virtue while preserving the 
notion of a wider moral community to which men, as opposed to citizens, 
continued to owe obligations."(Linklater, 1990a: 41) According to Linklater, one 
can see this tension being expressed in theories of international ethics and law, 
which exhibit a development towards a better realisation of the universal political 
obligations inherent in the normative structure of the modern state and society of 
states. Linklater presents this as a progression from Samuel Pufendorf's excessive 
characterisation of the sovereign state's absolute independence, through Emerich 
de Vattel's argument that states are limited through their recognition of moral 
obligations to the society of states, towards Immanuel Kant's more fully developed 
articulation of the rationality of ethical universalism.7 The problem, for Linklater,
7. There is, alas, no extended discussion of the contrast between Grotius's and Pufendorf's different 
understandings of appropriation in the state of nature.(see Linklater, 1990a: 62-64 & Olivecrona, 1974a 
& 1974b) For reasons that will be outlined in Chapter 4 below, I regard this distinction as of the 
highest importance in understanding the principles of international personality and sovereignty in 
modern international law. Furthermore, Linklater notes that Vattel's "defence of the liberty of states 
ensures the prematureness of Grotius and the solidarist ideal",(Linklater, 1990a: 95) but he does not 
then investigate alternative eighteenth-century thinkers who might have more constructively developed
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is to show how this fully-developed version of international ethics and law can 
be defended against subsequent historicist objections about the contingent, plural 
and anarchic character of modern international relations: how can the human 
freedom contained in Kant's ethical universalism be regarded as an authentic 
product of human historical development?(Linklater, 1990a: Part 2) Given Bull's 
attachment to a Rankean form of historicism, and the lingering influence of E.H. 
Carr's anti-utopianism, Linklater's desire to protect the universalist rationalism of 
the Enlightenment from such historicist criticisms is an especially pertinent 
concern.(see Carr, 1946 & Chapter 3, §2 below)
Linklater answers this question by representing the historical development 
of freedom in international relations as a process involving two major 
transformative moments: first, the consolidation and unification of tribal societies 
into distinct political communities; and secondly, the emergence of a 
universalistic community, "overcoming estrangement and opposition between 
states".(Linklater, 1990a: 169) W ithin this development, the emergence of the 
rules governing the society of states is an important step on the road from political 
to universal community, since these rules codify our external obligations, and thus 
"make determinate a distinct realm of human obligation, an understanding of what 
each man owes the rest, albeit not as individuals but as citizens of different 
communities."(Linklater, 1990a: 193) Thus, the international society of states 
figures as an important part of Linklater's story of the historical development of 
freedom in international relations. However, the consolidation and expansion of 
the society of states is understood as part of a broader process of the development 
of a more universalistic form of international political organisation, which is still 
in the process of becoming fully-realised through appropriate institutionalised 
practices. Nevertheless, it has always been present because, in carrying on a 
legalistic, rights-based discourse as part of the negotiation of norms in 
international society, states are implicitly accepting and furthering the external 
concept of obligation which underpins a Kantian understanding of just order in
Grotius's ideas.
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world politics.(Linklater, 1990a: 196-97) W ith regard to the conventional 
understanding of the norms embedded in European international society, 
Linklater's argument thus exposes a deeper, internally contradictory and hence 
developing, ethical system that underlies the system of reciprocal sovereignty 
described by Bull. The particular interests of the pluralistic society of states can 
then be explained and justified in terms of the contribution they make to the 
subsequent development of an international society grounded in universalisable 
norms.
W hile Vincent and Linklater both develop inventive criticisms of Bull's 
conception of modern international society, there is an important respect in which 
their arguments are unsatisfactory. Neither looks closely enough at the way in 
which Bull's conception of modern international society, and his consequent 
marginalisation of the solidarist conception as 'premature', achieved its present 
dominant position in the Grotian tradition. Therefore, neither Vincent nor 
Linklater seeks to match Bull's argument with an equivalent defence of the 
ontological status of the values, rules and institutions of the solidarist conception 
of international society. In a way, their arguments are both parasitical on Bull's 
conception of international society as a pluralist society of states: their 
understandings of the historical development of modern international relations are 
refracted through the institution of territorial sovereignty and the idea of an 
international society divided into sovereign states, in which only states posess 
personality in international law. Because of this, neither Vincent nor Linklater 
mounts a serious challenge to the ontological priority of the pluralist conception 
of international society within the Grotian tradition. Their defences of the 
relevance of solidarist moral principles to modern international relations are 
consequently constrained by the need to demonstrate that these moral principles 
are consistent with (or, at least, not inconsistent with) the other moral principles 
that Bull shows are supported by the pluralist conception of international society, 
and, more importantly, that they are sustainable by the institutions of the pluralist 
conception of a society of states. Arguably, this is not a proper articulation of the 
relevance of the solidarist conception of international society to modern
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international relations; it is no more than a defence of solidarist values within the 
terms already laid down by the pluralist conception. It contains no account of the 
historical development of the institutionalised practices uniquely associated with 
the solidarist conception. Vincent's and Linklater's arguments therefore do not 
offer a proper opportunity to re-establish the original diversity of debate within the 
Grotian tradition. What they do is establish a more limited debate within the 
narrower kind of Grotian tradition constructed by Bull. Admittedly, this is not a 
negligible achievement, but it does not go far enough towards re-establishing the 
Grotian tradition as a site for debating the question of international society.
In other words, the problem that we face is how to illustrate the modern 
relevance of the solidarist conception of international society in a way that really 
does challenge the ontological priority attributed by Bull to the pluralist 
conception. Instead of showing how the society of states and positive international 
law can accommodate solidaristic normative principles, what is important is to 
show how the normative principles and institutional framework of the solidarist 
conception have developed independently of the pluralist society of states. 
Solidarist principles, rules and institutions are not simply, as Bull supposes, 
aspects of the medieval international order of Christendom, perhaps re-emerging 
today through regional integration and other factors, but otherwise more or less 
in abeyance between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries. Rather, one can 
identify the key elements of the solidarist conception of international society in 
certain modern practices and ideas completely outside of the rules and institutions 
of the pluralist conception of international society, and one can consequently 
trace their development and explain their current significance in contemporary 
world politics in a way that does not force them to be seen as 'emerging' out of 
pluralist practices, and hence risk being treated as 'premature'.
This is the task undertaken over the next six Chapters. First, we need to 
understand precisely how Bull's own argument about the nature of modern 
international society was put together. In other words, we need to examine the 
method that Bull used to develop his conception of international society, and we
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need to examine the debates within the 'English school' of international relations 
theory through which Bull established the ontological priority of the pluralist 
conception of international society. This part of the argument is developed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 deals with the methodological issues, explaining 
why Max Weber's theory of the ideal type is relevant to concept formation in 
international relations theory and especially to the concept of international 
society. The argument explains what is involved in Weber's ideas of evaluative 
and historical interpretation, and shows how these ideas rest upon a notion of 
'value-relevance' that is a useful contribution to current methodological debates 
in international relations theory. Some criticisms of Weber's theory are addressed, 
and one modification of Weber's approach is made, wherein his account of 
concept use is replaced by a less objectivist thesis of how to use concepts, 
derived from the theory of essentially contested concepts. Chapter 3 carries this 
analysis forward into an examination of the formation and use of the concept of 
international society, identifying the moments of evaluative and historical 
interpretation in the research programme of the British Committee on the Theory 
of International Relations, and showing how and why Bull's work was such a 
decisive intervention in this research programme. It w ill be argued there that 
Bull's work comprises three main components: an interpretation of the Grotian 
tradition, an account of the origins of modern international society, and an 
account of the expansion of modern international society.
The remainder of the thesis is devoted to offering an alternative treatment 
of each of these three issues, in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively. In Chapter 4, 
a reading of Grotius's work is given which identifies two normative or legal 
principles at the heart of Grotius's own understanding of the law of nations. First, 
he posited a property right based on individual occupation rather than social 
convention (in keeping with the subsequent liberal concept of appropriation); and 
secondly, he conceived of sovereignty as potentially divisible between different 
institutions (in keeping with previous and subsequent republican conceptions of 
political community). These two principles of appropriation and divisible 
sovereignty are therefore taken to be central to the 'Grotian conception of
30
international society', and they form the basis for the subsequent account of the 
'colonising ethic'. Chapter 5 grounds this reading of Grotianism in a new 
historical narrative of the origins of modern international society, concentrating 
on the practice of colonisation rather than the practices of state-formation, positive 
international law and balance of power diplomacy. This is intended to echo Bull's 
attempt to tie his interpretation of Grotian thought to the emerging practices 
associated with the modern European states-system. In particular, thetenurial and 
constitutional forms of Dutch and British colonisation in the Netherlands, North 
America and the East Indies exhibit an affinity with Grotius's ideas of 
appropriation and divisible sovereignty. The development of the values, rules and 
institutions connected to this practice are then pursued through the expansion and 
consolidation of the American states-union and the Dutch empire in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in Chapter 6. This leaves us at the end 
of the thesis with two different, historically-grounded conceptions of modern 
international society: Bull's, which selectively accentuates the values, rules and 
institutions associated with pluralism; and a new one, which selectively 
accentuates the values, rules and institutions associated with the colonising ethic 
and the solidarist Grotian conception of international society. Chapter 7 
concludes the argument with an interpretation of contemporary world political 
order in terms of the conception of modern international society developed in the 
thesis.
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Chapter 2
Concept Formation and Use in international Relations Theory
To understand how the concept of international society has developed, it is first 
necessary to examine some logical points about how concepts are constructed 
and used by social scientists, as well as by international relations theorists in 
general and theorists in the Grotian tradition in particular. As w ill be argued here, 
the best way to think about the different conceptions of international society 
discussed in the previous Chapter is to see them as ideal types. Therefore, this 
Chapter w ill attempt to elucidate Max Weber's theory of the ideal type, and 
demonstrate its relevance to contemporary international relations theory and to 
conceptions of international society. The argument of the Chapter is in two broad 
stages. First, Weber's theory of the ideal type is explained and defended in terms 
of recent methodological and epistemological debates in international relations 
theory. In particular, two criticisms of realist theory w ill be highlighted: the 
historicist charge that realists use conceptual categories like 'sovereignty' or 
'anarchy' in an over-generalised, ahistorical way; and the interpretivist or 
normative accusation that realists make an erroneous distinction between factual, 
descriptive statements and evaluative, normative ones. Therefore, a pressing issue 
for students of international relations is how to develop concepts that are both 
historical and evaluative. Weber's early methodological and historical sociological 
ideas offer one way of constructing concepts—or, rather, ideal-typical 
representations of concepts—that combine historical and evaluative interpretation.
The second, and rather shorter, stage of the argument seeks to demonstrate 
that the Weberian approach to concept formation exhibits certain important, albeit 
formally undeveloped, methodological affinities with Hedley Bull's idea of the 
'classical approach' to international relations theory. This particular argument 
performs two functions. First, it supports the claim that the pluralist and solidarist 
conceptions of international society should be treated as ideal types. This point 
has an important consequence, since it means that the historical interpretation 
given by theorists like Bull cannot be relied on as an exhaustive description of the
32
§1. Concept formation in international relations theory
A principal focus of recent methodological and epistemological criticisms of realist 
international relations theory has been the realist claim that anarchy is a natural 
condition of international relations. As Robert Gilpin puts it: "The major difference 
between political realism and much contemporary theorizing about international 
relations is that realism assumes the continuity of statecraft. Realism is based on 
practices of states, and it seeks to understand how states have always behaved 
and presumably w ill always behave."(Gilpin, 1981: 226) This continuity is 
founded upon the "enduring anarchic character of international politics", and the 
sense in which the struggle for power in international relations is "universal in 
time and space".(Waltz, 1977: 66 & Morgenthau, 1973: 34)
The proposition about the continuity of the anarchic and power-political 
character of international relations is closely related to the 'positivist bias' of 
conventional international relations theory,(see Frost, 1986:15) because by saying 
that international relations exhibit an 'enduring anarchic character', realists can 
posit a methodological unity between international relations and the natural 
sciences. In this respect, realism uses the same logic as classic empiricist 
approaches to social science, which contend that
any phenomena displaying regular patterns of behaviour were a fit 
subject for science, and all natural phenomena were presumed to 
display such regularities, human behaviour among them. There 
could not be two sorts of phenomena, one natural and one non­
natural; all must eventually be amenable to causal explanation, 
inductively established.(Ryan, 1970: 13)
There is, it should be noted, room for disagreement about the last point, regarding 
the validity of an inductive method in scientific enquiry. Karl Popper, for instance, 
holds such an approach to be highly dubious, and argues that it should be 
replaced by a method of deductive hypothesis formation, and methodological 
falsificationism.(see Lakatos, 1970) However, with this modification, the empiricist 
argument is widely used in realist and neo-realist theories of international
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relations, which suppose that, since international actors always behave in the 
same sorts of ways in response to particular situations, a nomological natural 
scientific model of explanation can be applied to the study of international 
relations. This involves the development and testing of falsifiable hypotheses 
about the covering-laws of cause and effect in international relations.(Waltz, 1977: 
Chapter 1)
There have been two main criticisms of this argument. One is essentially 
an historical objection, which claims that the above argument involves a 
reductionist over-generalisation of modern conditions of international relations. 
The second is a normative objection, which claims that the study of international 
phenomena always involves evaluative assumptions, which should first be 
subjected to a process of moral argument. These arguments derive from two 
different criticisms of the classical empiricist claim that there is a methodological 
unity between social and natural science: the first argues that social phenomena 
are non-natural in the sense of being historical; the second argues that social 
phenomena are non-natural in the sense of being meaningful.
In social theory, a very strong statement of the former view is the Marxist 
theory of commodity fetishism in capitalist societies, according to which "the 
definite social relation between men...assumes here, for them, the fantastic form 
of a relation between things."(Marx, 1976: 165) The theory of commodity 
fetishism proposes that social relations in modern capitalist societies appear as 
natural, abstract forms. However, this is a consequence of the general 
commodification of relations between people, and of the experience of alienation, 
in which, as Derek Sayer puts it, "Disembodied, the very forms of our sociality 
turn against us, and within them there is no place for humane values."(Sayer, 
1991: 154) This 'mystification' of social relations between people extends to the 
analytical categories of political economy, which suppose the commodity form 
to be "as much a self-evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour 
itself."(Marx, 1976: 175) A principal task of social theory is therefore to uncover 
the 'definite social relations between men' that underpin these phenomenal forms.
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To grasp these social relations, one must examine the historical processes by 
which individuals, acting collectively, have altered or reproduced social practices 
and institutions. "Ostensibly natural and universal 'self-understood forms of social 
life' are revealed as more or less mystified forms of historically specific 
relationships between people, and reconceptualised accordingly."(Sayer, 1987: 
133) Thus, this argument calls for social theorists to acknowledge the essential 
historicity of the concepts that are used to theorise the social world, and a crucial 
part of the process of concept formation is to uncover the historical character of 
the relationships between people that makes sense of the apparently natural 
phenomena of modern social life.
The second, normative criticism of classical empiricism argues that the 
difference between the social and the natural world cannot be understood as a 
product of the peculiar nature of social relations under capitalism. Instead, this 
criticism of empiricism depends on the contention that:
the phenomena of human behaviour differ essentially from those of 
inert matter in that they have a dimension of 'meaningfulness' 
which the latter do not.... [N]atural phenomena do not endow their 
own actions with meaning, as do human beings. In this way, the 
phenomena studied by the natural sciences are different in kind, 
not merely in degree of complexity, from those which the social 
sciences seek to understand.(Ryan, 1970: 16)
The implications of this position are pursued by interpretive social theorists, like 
Peter Winch. Winch points out that classical empiricism neglects the importance 
of rule-following behaviour as a characteristic feature of social action. Any proper 
understanding of social life "must necessarily presuppose, if it is to count as 
genuine understanding at all, the participant's unreflective understanding. And this 
in itself makes it misleading to compare it with the natural scientist's 
understanding of his scientific data."(Winch, 1990: 89) It should be noted that this 
still leaves room for considerable debate as to how such an interpretive approach 
should proceed. For example, it is arguable whether one should look at the 
subjective meanings that actors themselves give to their actions, or at the broader
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frameworks of inter-subjective meanings that determine what counts as a 
reasonable or true belief about a particular action.(see MacIntyre, 1962: 62; 
Skinner, 1972; & Hollis & Smith, 1991: Chapter 4) Whichever specific approach 
is adopted, this challenge to the Humean conception of causality upon which 
classical empiricism relies generally serves to undermine the idea that the study 
of the social world can be conceived as a 'scientific' activity, at least on the 
model of the natural sciences.
In other words, in social theory there are two quite distinct lines of attack 
against the assumptions of classical empiricism. One stresses the historicity of 
concepts in social theory, and the other highlights the normativity of those 
concepts. Both of these are different versions of the claim that empiricists (and 
realists) are mistaken to claim that social (and international) phenomena are 
regular, behave similarly to natural phenomena and therefore are subject to 
nomological scientific analysis. First, let us briefly survey these criticisms as they 
have been elaborated by two international relations theorists, and then we can ask 
what sort of relationship exists between the two approaches.
The historicity of concepts in international relations theory
The observation that realist conceptual categories are ahistorical has been made 
by a number of different theorists, including some who are broadly oriented 
towards an interpretive approach.(see, for example, George, 1993) However, for 
a 'purer' form of historicism, we can look at Justin Rosenberg's historical 
materialist and 'classical social theoretical' criticisms of realist theory,(Rosenberg, 
1994a & 1994b) similar arguments to which have been developed by, among 
others, Fred Halliday and Robert Cox. Halliday looks at the role for historical 
sociology more broadly conceived than Rosenberg's Marxist approach, and he 
pays particular attention to the historical development of the state-society complex 
in international relations.(Halliday, 1994 & see also Hintze, 1975) Like Halliday, 
Cox is also concerned about realism's naturalisation or formalisation of the 
concept of the state as an analytical concept, and argues for an approach that
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"does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls 
them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether 
they might be in the process of changing."(Cox, 1981: 129) Cox's argument thus 
"takes the form of an interconnected series of historical hypotheses".(Cox, 1981: 
139) For Cox, "the definition of a particular structure [is derived], not from some 
abstract model of a social system or mode of production, but from a study of the 
historical situation to which it relates, and secondly, by looking for the emergence 
of rival structures expressing alternative possibilities of development."(Cox, 1981: 
137)
Similarly, in arguing for the essential historicity of concepts in IR theory, 
Rosenberg defines his project as "the wholesale transposition of IR theory out of 
this formal/legal problematic [of realism] which takes the condition of anarchy as 
its starting point, and into a historical problematic whose starting point is the 
identification of what is distinctive in the social forms of modernity."(Rosenberg, 
1994a: 46) Rosenberg argues that both realism and international society theory 
survey the phenomena of modern international relations, and highlight the 
fragmented nature of the international; either as an inter-state anarchy, or as an 
anarchical, juristic society of states. In so doing, they highlight something that is 
genuinely important in modern international relations: "the distinctive social form 
of the modern state—expressed in its sovereign legal, territorial and violent 
aspects".(Rosenberg, 1994a: 31) However, "the sovereign individuality of the state 
is read back into the state of nature, hence suppressing the labour of its historical 
emergence".(Rosenberg, 1994a: 160) Realists, in other words, ignore the fact that 
"the meaning of sovereignty is historically specific."(Rosenberg, 1994a: 36)
Consistently with Sayer's account of the Marxist use of concepts, 
Rosenberg sets himself the task of identifying the social relationships of which this 
emerging sovereign state is a part: "when we conceive the modern international 
system...we need to understand how its political dimension—in this case the 
sovereign states-system itself—is of a piece with the basic social structures which 
distinguish modern societies."(Rosenberg, 1994a: 57) How are the historical
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identities of these 'basic social structures' to be understood? Here, Rosenberg 
invokes an historical materialist conception of the relationship between social 
structures and international political forms: "It is always the direct relationship of 
the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers...which reveals 
the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the 
political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short the 
corresponding specific form of the state."(Rosenberg, 1994a: 51, emphasis 
omitted) For now, there is no need to go into this last step in Rosenberg's 
historical scheme in detail.(see below, Chapter 6, §1) The key point is that, for 
him, the abstract, and therefore de-historicised, concepts of 'sovereignty' and 
'anarchy' that are central to realism are descriptions that mystify the real 
relationships between people that constitute contemporary international relations. 
By recovering the historical processes behind these phenomenal forms, Rosenberg 
seeks to reveal their true content.
The normativity o f concepts in international relations theory
With a very different critical agenda in mind, Mervyn Frost also seeks to take 
issue with a core principle of realism: "Scholars are supposed to provide analyses 
which are above all firmly grounded in the facts; they should not become 
involvied in normative arguments."(Frost, 1986: 11, emphasis original) Once 
again, what is at issue here is the scientific status of realism, and the similarities 
between international and natural phenomena. Unlike Rosenberg, however, the 
problem for Frost is not that realist categories are ahistorical; it is that they claim 
to be impartial. This claim to impartiality is based on a distinction between 
descriptive and normative propositions about international relations, w ithin which 
the former are privileged as the proper subject of IR theory. In other words, a 
quite different consequence of realism's claim about the methodological unity 
between the natural sciences, the social sciences and international relations is at 
issue.
Frost begins his argument by noting that the critique of positivist claims to
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objectivity is already well established in most disciplines that concern themselves, 
in one way or another, with questions of the meaning and significance of social 
phenomena. His intention, then, is to assess the implications of these 
developments for the study of international relations.(Frost, 1986: 17) To do this, 
he rehearses the anti-positivist arguments of philosophers of social science like 
Winch that, in order to determine the character of a human action, "it would be 
necessary to understand the action from the participant perspective as well".(Frost, 
1986: 20) This "precludes the social scientist from remaining an external observer 
in the way that positivists supposed social scientists to be."(Frost, 1986: 21) 
Furthermore, this approach is a form of normative analysis, since "all actions have 
an ineluctable normative element."(Frost, 1986: 23) However, according to Frost, 
this kind of interpretive approach does not properly set out the relationship 
between the value-commitments of the theorist and the social actor: "the 
verstehen method does not require the social scientist qua social scientist, to enter 
into normative argument about the values of the investigatees. A critical approach 
denies that it is possible for social scientists to proceed in this neutral way."(Frost, 
1986: 27) Frost bases this criticism of verstehen on the point that there may be 
many plausible rival interpretations of a particular event from among the various 
actors involved in it: "there is no one clear understanding of the act, but rather 
several competing understandings."(Frost, 1986: 29) Consequently, "describing it 
in one way rather than another involves evaluating it one way rather than 
another.... It follows that social scientists, and scholars in international relations 
as well, cannot avoid becoming engaged in normative questions and must face 
up to the challenge of normative theory."(Frost, 1986: 30)
For Frost, 'facing up to the challenge of normative theory' means 
participating in a dialogue with the participants in a particular practice, where the 
social scientist attempts to persuade the participant of the rightness of the former's 
understanding of the practice: "the point is that for critical understanding the 
subject's considered reaction to the theory is of vital concern in determining its 
validity."(Frost, 1986: 35) In this characterisation of 'normative theory', Frost is 
implictly drawing upon Charles Taylor's conception of the proper role of social
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theory, which involves the clarification and questioning of participants' self- 
understandings within a particular practice, possibly resulting in the reform or 
'purification' of the practice itself.(Taylor, 1985)1 Thus, normative theory in 
international relations is very much a species of critical interpretive social 
science,(see Brown, 1992: 3) wherein the social scientist must engage in a 
normative argument with the participants in a social practice as a necessary part 
of the process of concept formation, rather than confronting those participants 
with a non-negotiable morally right judgement or with an objective scientific 
explanation of their actions, manufactured on the basis of deductively or 
inductively formed concepts.
The tension between historicist and normative approaches
One of the reasons for looking at the ways in which Rosenberg and Frost discuss 
the issues of the historicity and normativity of concepts, rather than at other like- 
minded theorists, is that Frost and Rosenberg have been involved in a dispute 
which very neatly illustrates the tension between these two challenges to realism's 
claim to uncover natural regularities in international relations that are analysable 
through a nomological natural scientific model.(Frost, 1994 & Rosenberg, 
1994b)2 The key point here is that, in order to expose the historical content of 
the real social relationships between people that are behind the phenomenal 
forms of modern social life, it is hard for Rosenberg to adopt an interpretive 
approach that would satisfy Frost's normative attack on positivism. However, for 
Frost to engage in moral argument with participants in contemporary practices 
risks taking the phenomenal forms of modern society as the real social 
relationships that the social theorist should be investigating, and thus replicating
1. It should be noted that Frost himself frames his work as drawing on Ronald Dworkin's approach 
to political theory. The Taylorean elements of his normative theory are identified here only for 
purposes of elucidating the social theoretical roots of constitutive theory.
2. M y reason for using Rosenberg and Frost is that they illustrate the poles of this debate. Arguably, 
some IR theorists, such as Andrew Linklater or R.B.J. Walker, to a greater or lesser degree combine 
elements of these two approaches. However, the Frost-Rosenberg debate is worth looking at, because 
it establishes the roots of the tension between these two elements of the attack on realism with 
exemplary clarity.
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the fetishisation of the apparent forms of those social relationships.
Let us consider the latter point first. The problem here can be illustrated 
by looking at Frost's attempt to construct a substantive normative theory of 
contemporary international relations. Because of his insistence on the need to 
ground social theory in the self-understandings of participants, Frost argues that 
a necessary first step in the construction of a normative theory is the identification 
"of an area of agreement between people—a domain of discourse—which gives 
us a basis from which we might construct an argument towards a substantive 
normative theory."(Frost, 1986: 81) This helps Frost to specify the task of the 
normative theorist in international relations: "we are called upon to outline what 
is considered normal in the domain of discourse relating to the inter-state 
practice."(Frost, 1986: 85)
Now, this is not to say that Frost's normative theory cannot be critical of 
the ways in which particular practices are carried on in the 'modern state domain 
of discourse'. However, it does entail certain limitations on the ways in which the 
normative theorist can advocate changing particular practices. Frost makes this 
point quite clear:
By having recourse to the ordinary language of international 
relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system 
as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that 
people ought always to live in states as we know them.... [M]y 
argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large scale 
reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be 
made in the language of the modern state.(Frost, 1986: 99)
To explore the normative vocabulary of the modern state domain of discourse, 
Frost employs Hegel's philosophy of ethical life to show that, "individuals w ith 
the rights which we value are constituted within a system of mutual recognition 
which includes within it the institutions of family, civil society, the state and the 
system of sovereign states."(Frost, 1986: 183) Therefore, the key question that a 
normative theorist should try to answer concerns the proper way of understanding
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the constitution of the person through the political institutions embedded in the 
modern state domain of discourse.
However, why is the language of the modern state domain of discourse the 
appropriate language for moral enquiry in contemporary international relations, 
and how can we be sure that locating our moral discussion in this particular 
domain of discourse does not constitute a fetishisation of the phenomenal forms 
of modern international relations?3 To see why this is a problem, let us consider 
Frost's sequence of family, civil society, the state and the system of sovereign 
states, which is a particularly striking interpretation of Hegel's philosophy. It is 
worth noting that Marx offers an alternative schematisation: "in Hegel's 
philosophy of law...the family superseded equals civil society, civil society 
superseded equals the state, the state superseded equals world history."(Marx, 
1975: 340, emphasis original) In particular, Hegel's philosophy culminates in the 
idea of Weltgeist as manifest in world-historical processes.(Hegel, 1991: 373) In 
Frost's formulation, then, the system (or, perhaps, society) of sovereign states is 
'standing in' for world history, raising an interesting question: what is the 
particular historical narrative that would make this a plausible claim? Frost accepts 
that with regard to the historical emergence of the criteria of sovereignty and the 
sovereign claims made by particular states, there remains "a wealth of detail 
which needs to be filled in here."(Frost, 1986: 168, 184)
The question we need to ask is how Frost would set about 'filling this 
detail in', and whether he could do so without violating the methodological and 
epistemological presuppositions of his normative theory. It seems clear that this
3. On this point it is worth noting R.B.J. Walker's remarks about the historically specific character of 
the statist domain of discourse, and about the desirability of effecting the "reconstruction of what we 
mean by political community under novel spatiotemporal conditions."(Walker, 1993: 156) With his 
argument about the importance of social movements in establishing a resolution of political questions 
on terms other than the statist formulation of political community,(see Walker, 1988) Walker takes an 
important historicist step beyond Frost's constitutive theory, which would help us to understand how 
the statist domain of discourse was constructed in the first place. O f course, one could in principle 
make this historicist move in other ways than Walker's substantive focus on social movements, and 
it would not necessarily imply such a negative attitude towards the potential of the state as a form of 
political community.
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would involve making explicit the historical narrative and conception of 
international society which leads Frost to accord a world historical role to one 
particular condition of politically-organised human life: sovereign statehood. On 
this point, Rosenberg's implicit criticisms of normative theory begin to become 
interesting. First of all, the historical narrative that Frost needs cannot be 
constructed through an interrogation of the self-understandings of participants in 
contemporary practices, partly because contemporary social arrangements may be 
"very different in reality from how they appear to the naked eye."(Rosenberg, 
1994b: 105) If the 'domain of discourse' contains fetishised categories that 
conceal their underlying social relationships, this can only be exposed historically, 
not through the direct contemporary experience of alienated social life. As we 
saw, such a point was made very forcefully by Marx's attack on the conceptual 
failings of political economy.
One answer to this challenge might be to use Frost's normative approach 
to investigate the historical emergence of these contemporary practices, as a way 
of uncovering latent structures of social power and historical configurations of 
human agency. However, this seems unlikely to work, since it would be 
impossible to establish a moral dialogue with long-dead participants in historical 
practices. How could we be sure what 'the subject's considered reaction' would 
be if we had no subject with whom to engage in moral argument? Thus, Frost 
cannot establish the validity of his historical interpretation of the significance and 
content of the modern state domain of discourse through the normative method 
that he uses to validate his interpretation of contemporary practices. In other 
words, Frost's normative theory is ultimately grounded in an implicit historical 
claim about the essential character of modern international society, but this 
historical claim must necessarily be defended through other means than his stated 
approach of 'entering into normative argument with the values of the 
investigatees'. Frost's normative theory lacks the ability to identify, in itself, the 
roots of possible contradictions in and alternatives to the contemporary inter-state 
moral domain of discourse. Ultimately, then, he is vulnerable to the charge that,
44
if a particular social world is reproduced through certain definite 
relations of power, then one would expect that the ethical 
dimension of those relationships would be encountered by the 
members of that world recurrently in particular ways, familiar moral 
dilemmas which are characteristic of that particular historical form 
of collective human agency. What systematic moral reasoning could 
do is explain why they recur in this form and what is at stake in 
them; what is their social content. What arguably it cannot do is to 
provide an intellectual resolution of those dilemmas—for the simple 
reason that those dilemmas are not at root intellectual: rather they 
reflect real tensions and contradictions in the characteristic social 
relations of the society in question.(Rosenberg, 1994b: 105-6, 
emphasis original)
Frost cannot expose these tensions because he has not properly worked the 
historicity of the modern domain of discourse into the concepts that he develops 
through moral argument with participants in practices.
Let us move on to consider the possible normative criticism of Rosenberg's 
critique of realist classic empiricism. This attack has been made more directly by 
international relations theorists, and is essentially that, although he challenges 
realism's naturalisation of sovereignty and anarchy, Rosenberg ignores other 
aspects of the wider (interpretive) social theoretical attack on positivism, and this 
seriously compromises his claims to be developing an alternative to realism. 
"Rosenberg sees empirical analysis as providing information about the structures 
that influence the choices that individuals make; thereby, empirical analysis exists 
prior to normative analysis, and, crucially, is separate from it."(Smith, 1994: 398)4 
In Frost's view, Rosenberg emerges as an empiricist, but, "In the light of
4. Another criticism that Steve Smith directs against Rosenberg is that the latter adopts a 'pick and mix' 
attitude to epistemology, and consequently oscillates between a scientific/structuralist/explanatory 
approach and a hermeneutic/agent-centred/understanding approach.(Smith, 1994: 402) Although I 
agree with Smith that Rosenberg does not pay sufficient attention to the interpretivist attack on 
positivism, I do not accept this other criticism, because Rosenberg's account of the relationship 
between human agency and social structures seems to me to be quite consistent with the Sayerian 
version of Marxist theory discussed above. Within this form of Marxist epistemology, Rosenberg's 
treatment of the relationship between explanation and understanding, and structures and agents, is 
consistent. Smith's criticism of Rosenberg's failure to take epistemology seriously is a reflection of the 
important differences that exist between the way in which Smith and Rosenberg frame epistemological 
questions in social science, rather than of an absence of epistemology in Rosenberg's approach 
(although, admittedly, Rosenberg himself does not seek to engage in a debate with Smith's approach 
on this point).
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developments in the philosophy of the social sciences over the past few decades 
this position is no longer tenable."(Frost, 1994: 115) This attachment to the 
fact/value distinction "is a surprisingly conservative view of the 
empirical/normative relationship, one that privileges science and social science 
and seriously limits the role and scope of emancipatory knowledge."(Smith, 1994: 
399) This last charge depends on the claim that, by accepting a positivist 
formulation of the distinction between normative and descriptive statements and 
a Marxist account of the relationship between historical structures and 
contemporary social forms, Rosenberg is implicitly and uncritically advocating a 
normative agenda within the Enlightenment.(Campbell, 1994) He is thus 
vulnerable to Frost's interpretive attack on the fact/value distinction in 
international relations theory. As Frost comments, "Before tackling the structural 
questions, [Rosenberg] would have to decide which of [the possible, superficial] 
interpretations is the best.... [Rosenberg] w ill not simply be able to accept these 
interpretations (with the value judgements embedded in them), but w ill himself 
have to evaluate them in terms of his own normative commitments."(Frost, 1994: 
117)
In other words, Rosenberg uncovers the historicity of the conceptual 
categories of realist thought; but at a price. In order to get to the historical 
relationships that underpin the phenomenal appearance of the modern social 
world, Rosenberg is forced to disengage from moral argument within the 
contemporary domain of discourse. Of course, this is not to say that Rosenberg's 
historical demystification lacks normative content. However, that normative 
content is unargued. Rosenberg's moral vocation of emancipation through reason 
and freedom supposedly emerges from the historical exposure of the substantive 
problems faced by the members of a society, rather than from a process of moral 
argument about the self-understandings of participants in contemporary 
practices.(Rosenberg, 1994b: 87) Yet, as Frost makes clear, normative 
commitments provide the only possible basis on which the historical analysis of 
the real social structures underlying phenomenal forms can take place, given the 
multiplicity of different possible interpretations of the true meaning and
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significance of social phenomena. Even so, Frost's method does not provide a way 
of developing an historical awareness of the structural determinants of 
contemporary modes of international political discourse.
§2. Weber's theory of the ideal type
A slightly modified version of Weberian social theory can meet the challenge of 
combining the interpretive (or normative) and historical dimensions of concept 
formation in international relations theory.5 In this section, Weber's theory of the 
'ideal type' is presented as a way of constructing concepts through a combination 
of evaluative and historical interpretation. However, as w ill be explained in the 
next section, some modifications of Weber's basic theory need to be made which 
would make this kind of approach more useful in contemporary international 
relations theory, especially with regard to the question of how interpretive 
concepts should be used by theorists. This attitude towards Weber is formally 
similar to Susan Hekman's assessment that Weber's social theory is relevant to 
contemporary social theory, but that it is nevertheless helpful to effect a 
"reinterpretation of Weber's work from the perspective of contemporary 
problems."(Hekman, 1983: 193)6
At the outset, it should be noted that the decision to use Weberian social 
theory in this way immediately opens up a controversy in international relations
5. This is not to say that verstehen is the only way of reconciling this tension. There are many other 
fruitful approaches that could be used to synthesise interpretive and historicist concerns: the social 
theories of Jurgen Habermas or Michel Foucault present obvious examples, which have attracted great 
interest in international relations theory. There are two reasons why I will focus exclusively on the 
potential contribution of verstehen sociology to this problem. First, and most importantly, this is the 
way of reconciling interpretive and historicist concerns that is most closely related to traditional 
theories of international society. It is therefore the most appropriate methodology for the specific 
argument of my thesis. Secondly, I feel that Weber's potential contribution has been unfairly neglected 
by international relations theorists, for reasons I will discuss later (see n6 below). Therefore, by talking 
about verstehen here, I hope to redress the balance somewhat.
6. Hekman is principally interested in the relationship between verstehen and anti-foundationalist and 
critical theoretical approaches to social theory. However, the argument for the current relevance of 
Weberian methodology can be more widely conceived; as, for example, in Stephen Kalberg's 
observation that Weber's work could make an important contribution to debates in contemporary 
historical sociology.(Kalberg, 1994)
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theory. The theorists who have engaged in the attacks on realism that were 
described earlier might object to this intended use of Weber in two ways. First of 
all, it might be claimed that Weber's sociology is not interpretive enough, and 
remains too close to certain aspects of classical empiricist epistemology. This 
suggestion was made by Winch, who claimed that Weber gave away too much 
ground by conceding the methodological incompleteness of verstehen and by 
supplementing it "by a different method altogether, namely the collection of 
statistics."(Winch, 1990: 113) In international relations theory, a somewhat 
different version of this argument has been put by Jim George, who highlights the 
connection between Weber and the realist theorist Hans Morgenthau: "Weber 
gave to Morgenthau (and to a whole generation of Traditional Realists) a 
Verstehen-based synthesis that appeared to overcome the moralism of the liberals, 
the progressivism of the idealists and the crude inductivism associated with 
conventional scientific approaches."(George, 1994: 91) In the end, though, a 
similar conclusion to Winch's results: Weber is tarred with the positivist brush, 
and would-be interpretivists should look elsewhere for the tools with which to 
develop an alternative, non-positivist research programme in international 
relations theory.
The second objection has already been flagged, when we saw how Frost 
attacked the descriptive and uncritical dimension of verstehen sociology 
(understood by Frost to include both Winch and Weber). As has already been 
outlined, Frost accepts that there is a crucial difference between positivism and 
verstehen, but nevertheless maintains that Weber does not go far enough to 
provide a properly critical response to positivism and realism. In Frost's view, this 
is partly because verstehen refuses to 'finesse' the self-understandings of 
participants in practices, and partly because verstehen presumes a coherence in 
those self-understandings, and therefore risks ignoring contradictions within 
practices. This allegation of a tendency to uncritical descriptivism in Weber's 
social theory is made independently by Marxist theorists. Usually, these 
objections to Weberian sociology work in one or more of three ways: Weber's 
postulation of 'value-free' social science is a mask for an apologist account of
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bourgeois ideology; the abdication of an idea of historical progress is a pessimistic 
surrender to the imperfectly recognised contradictions and unfreedoms of 
capitalist society; and Weber's conceptual categories are idealistic abstractions 
that lack a real historical content.(see Weiss, 1981: Chapter 3) This is closely 
related to the suspicion that Weber's social theory is incapable of offering causal 
explanations of social change, as a basis for a critical theory of radical human 
agency in contemporary society.
These objections should be borne in mind throughout the subsequent 
discussion, as we see how Weber sought to combine historical and evaluative 
approaches in social scientific concept-formation. The criticisms of Weber can 
largely be answered from within Weber's theory of the ideal type, and especially 
so when Weber's earlier methodological essays are brought to the fore of the 
discussion.7 Nevertheless, the main reason for modifying verstehen (a task 
attempted in section 3 below) is to try to take these complaints as seriously as 
possible. In general, Weber's solution to the problem of reconciling the 
normativity and historicity of concepts should be seen as a 'second-best' solution: 
it is imperfect from either a pure historicist or a pure interpretivist perspective. 
However, some relaxation of both pure approaches is necessary if a reconciliation 
is to be achieved, and useful non-empiricist, historically-grounded and interpretive 
theoretical concepts are to be developed in international relations theory. 
Hopefully, Weber's approach w ill reflect the best features of both Rosenberg's 
and Frost's criticisms of realism: some cannot be accommodated; in some cases, 
revision is necessary to reflect their methodological insights. However, in general,
7. This is a very distinctive gap in much of the work on Weber in IR theory. Normally, most attention 
is paid to Weber's sociology of the modern state, and to his two lectures on Politics and Science as 
Vocations. In my view, this is not a proper treatment of Weber's methodological and epistemological 
ideas, a better understanding of which can be gained from reading his early essays on the logical 
problems of 'historical economics', 'objectivity' and historical knowledge. The aspect of Weber's more 
substantive historical sociology that is the most fully-developed working-through of these ideas is the 
sociology of religion, and especially the argument in the 'Protestant ethic' thesis.(Weber, 1930, 1949, 
1975, & 1977) My discussion will be based on these works, and I hope it will become clear that these 
present a very different picture of verstehen sociology from the conventional reading. I make no 
apologies for this apparent selectivity, since these are a much more accurate reflection of Weber's core 
methodological presuppositions than are obtained anywhere else in his later works.(see Huff, 1984: 
16-18)
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Weber's social theory provides a good approximation of historical and interpretive 
concept formation.
Evaluative interpretation in concept formation: the idea of value-relevance
Weber is a central figure in the debate about the relationship between social and 
natural science. He argues that the object of social scientific research is 
significantly different from that of natural science, because of the former's concern 
with questions of the meaning of phenomena: "'Culture' is a finite segment of the 
meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings 
confer meaning and significance."(Weber, 1949: 81, emphasis original) The 
sociality of an action is conferred by its meaningful quality. In other words,
nature is the domain of the 'meaningless'. Or, more precisely, an 
item becomes part of 'nature' if we cannot raise the question; what 
is its 'meaning'?... [The] polar antithesis of 'nature' as the 
'meaningless' is not 'social life', but rather the 'meaningful': that is, 
the 'meaning' ascribed to a process or object, the 'meaning' which 
can be found in it.(Weber, 1977: 110-11, emphasis original)
However, this does not imply that social science should not aspire to being 
'objective'. Weber disputes the idea that scientific objectivity means only 
impartiality:
The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively 
upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which 
are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the 
presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the 
presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical 
knowledge is able to give us.(Weber, 1949: 110, emphasis original)
Thus, 'objectivity' in social science implies only that "the empirical data are 
always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing 
and the significance of the empirical data is derived from those evaluative 
ideas."(Weber, 1949: 111)
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This understanding of 'objectivity' in natural and social science betrays the 
neo-Kantian, Rickertian origins of Weber's epistemology. In this approach, the 
main problem in concept formation is to establish an 'objective' method of 
abstraction by which evaluatively significant elements of social {i.e., meaningful) 
phenomena can be identified.(Burger, 1976: 107) As Thomas Burger points out, 
in this method "the problem of 'objectivity' is not that of correctly establishing 
what the facts are.... Rather, the problem is that of the selection of the same facts 
by all scientists in their endeavour to present an account of empirical 
reality."(Burger, 1976: 17-18, emphasis original) 'Objective' knowledge is 
"knowledge which everybody wants to have, in which everybody is 
interested."(Burger, 1976: 12) 'Objectivity' in the formation of concepts therefore 
depends upon the possibility of consensus within the social-scientific community 
on which facts are significant: "A description is objective when it describes those 
phenomenon in which for human observers values are embodied which relate to 
a cultural concern of the collectivity of which they are members."(Burger, 1976:
80)
This forms the basis for Weber's defence of an 'objective' social science. 
It is not based on a positivist claim to vaIue-freedom, as is often supposed, but on 
an application of the Rickertian principle of value-relevance: Wertbeziehung.isee 
Rossi, 1991) Concept formation is evaluative, in the sense that it is about 
identifying values which are shared in the community of social scientists, and are 
regarded as relevant by members of that community. An excellent example of this 
can be found in the famous opening lines of the 'Author's Introduction' to the 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism:
A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem 
of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination 
of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western 
civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena 
have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of 
development having universal significance and value.(Weber, 1930:
13, emphasis original)
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The key here is the parenthesised comment: 'as we like to think'. The universal ;
~>
significance of Weber's enquiry is determined by an agreement upon its value- 
relevance by the academic audience to whom the work is addressed. This, rather; 
than professional detachment or correspondence with reality, is the real basis for 
its 'objectivity'. Thus, what Weber is doing here is establishing the conditions for 
the 'objectivity' of his subsequent enquiry. He does not do this through an appeal 
to statistical regularities or historical laws, since these only throw up "the 
inexhaustible diversity to be found in all historical material."(Weber, 1930: 45) 
Instead, he appeals to the shared cultural values of his audience of social 
scientists, seeking to "elaborate in an explicit form the focal points for the possible 
'evaluative' attitudes which the segment of reality in question discloses and in 
consequence of which it claims a more or less universal 'meaning'".(Weber, 
1949: 151, emphasis original)
Two points about this process of 'evaluative interpretation' and appeal to 
universal value-relevance can be made. First of all, it is consistent with a rejection 
of the use of nomological scientific covering-law analysis associated with classical 
empiricism and realist theories of international relations. It is not, therefore, 
surprising when Weber launches himself into a polemical attack on precisely this 
kind of approach to social scientific research. He argues, in an interesting contrast 
to Winch's claim that Weber adopts a statistical methodology, "there is a priori 
not the slightest reason to believe that the meaningful and essential aspects of 
concrete patterns would be identified by the abstract concepts of the 
correlations."(Weber, 1975: 65, emphasis original) Weber is strong in his 
insistence that social scientists always approach their subject with an evaluative 
point of view, through which they "select out those relationships which are 
significant for [them]."(Weber, 1949: 82) Weber's methodology is therefore 
conceived as a direct attack on nomological scientific approaches that seek to 
isolate general concepts as the basis for identifying patterns of causal correlations.
It would be hard to think of a more direct way of establishing the anti-empiricist 
credentials of an approach to social science. Often, this attack veers towards 
polemics that match the intensity of the contemporary debate.
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If the notion that those standpoints can be derived from the 'facts 
themselves' continually recurs, it is due to the naYve self-deception 
of the specialist who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative 
ideas with which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, 
that he has selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the 
study of which he concerns himself.(Weber, 1949: 82, emphasis 
original)
For Weber, then, knowledge of social, historical and cultural phenomena, because 
of its meaningful character, is conditioned by 'evaluative ideas',(see Weber, 1949:
81) because evaluation is essential to the selection of the culturally significant 
elements of complex historical phenomena. This process is 'objective' and 
therefore valid not because it corresponds to reality, but because it reflects 
'general cultural values',(see Burger, 1976: 39) and is of universally-recognised 
cultural significance within a scientific community. "This way of being 
conditioned by 'subjective values' is...entirely alien...to those natural sciences 
which take mechanics as a model, and it constitutes, indeed, the distinctive 
contrast between the historical and natural sciences."(Weber, 1949: 160, 
emphasis original) This is why Toby Huff claims that "Virtually all the criticism 
levelled by post-empiricist philosophers of science against logical positivism can 
be found in Weber's early methodological writings".(Huff, 1984: 8)
Secondly, because a particular evaluative interpretation is essential, 
analysis is always undertaken from a specific point of view. This has important 
implications for the logical status and use of concepts. Certain features of a 
concept like 'capitalism' can be highlighted and abstracted to construct an 'ideal 
type'.
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or 
more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, 
discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete 
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one- 
sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct.(Weber, 1949: 90, emphasis original)
In consequence, ideal types are not invalidated through the discovery of events
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and circumstances that prove their 'predictions' (if such were made) to be 
mistaken: ideal types "cannot be 'refuted' by a case that contradicts the concept.... 
The only test of the accuracy of an ideal type is whether it explains the 
phenomena under investigation."(Hekman, 1983: 36, emphasis original)8
In keeping with this understanding of the construction and function of an 
ideal type, Weber points out that an ideal type is not intended to be an exclusive 
or exhaustive picture of social reality. For example, there could be a great many 
different ideal types of capitalistic culture: "Each of these can claim to be a 
representation of the 'idea' of capitalistic culture to the extent that it has really 
taken certain traits, meaningful in their essential features, from the empirical 
reality of our culture and brought them together into a unified ideal- 
construct."(Weber, 1949: 91) As this argument suggests, Weber is quite happy to 
accept, for example, the heuristic value of Marxist ideal-typical accentuations of 
certain features of contemporary society. What Weber objects to in Marxist 
approaches is the frequent claim that these Marxian ideal types in fact reveal 
some deeper, trans-cultural metaphysical truth about human relations in society 
and in nature.(Weber, 1949: 103 & see also Zaret, 1991: 202) There is not 
necessarily a single ideal-typical representation of, say, capitalism: different ideal 
types could illuminate different significant aspects of the meaning of capitalist 
cultural phenomena; different points of view attach significance to different 
phenomena.(Weber, 1930: 47-48)
This is an important point because it suggests a possible way out of a 
problem that arises with Weber's theory of evaluative interpretation. As we saw, 
Weber's argument makes the assumption that general cultural values exist, 
through which the subjective evaluations of the social scientist can be 
'objectified'. This obviously begs an important question: what if these general
8. Note the use of 'explanation' as the goal of an ideal type: this is consistent with the idea that 
explaining something means being able to tell why it is happening: in other words, it means exposing 
someone's reasons for acting in a particular way. Later, under the rubric of 'adequate causation' and 
axiological analysis, I will discuss this version of 'explanation', which is different from a Humean 
model of causal explanation.
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cultural values do not exist? What if there are irreconcilable differences of opinion 
within the community of social scientists? The above discussion of the possibility 
of forming many different ideal types as ways of illustrating different significant 
aspects of social life suggests that Weber might be prepared to accept that, under 
certain circumstances, there might be genuine disagreements on the significance 
of particular cultural phenomena, and that therefore genuine contests might arise 
over the concepts used by social scientists. This would go a long way towards 
answering Frost's objection that verstehen theorists refuse to 'finesse' the self- 
understandings of participants in practices and that they fail to introduce a critical 
element into the process of concept formation. Weber's idea of 'evaluative 
interpretation' would need to be augmented through the identification of the 
characteristic features of those concepts that were likely to be contested in this 
way. The strong link to 'objectivity' through 'universal significance' and 'general 
cultural values' would be unsustainable, but Weber's identification of an 
interpretive element in the process of concept formation would otherwise be 
unaffected. This point w ill be pursued further in section 3.
Historical analysis and concept formation: the Protestant ethic thesis
As we have seen, verstehen social theorists can respond to the interpretivist 
charge that they are positivistic by pointing to the fundamental importance they 
attribute to 'evaluative interpretation' in concept formation. However, a somewhat 
different problem then arises: since ideal types are created by a process of 
'idealizing abstraction', do they therefore lack historical concreteness? The above 
discussion might suggest that Weber's concepts are, indeed, reifications. They 
spring from evaluative agreement within a culture, and are then generally applied 
throughout history as abstract concepts.9 However, such a representation would 
be mistaken, since Weber does appreciate the essential historicity of the ideal 
types that are created through 'idealizing abstraction'. Indeed, "An historically 
grounded procedure for generating concepts was central to Weber's work."(Zaret,
9. I would like to thank various members of the LSE Modernity and International Theory Research 
Workshop, and especially Hannes Lacher, for presenting this objection very forcefully to me.
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1991: 195) Ideal types, at least in early Weberian theory, are always seen as 
'historical individuals', and the cultural values which inform the initial method of 
abstraction are themselves historically located, a fact that is revealed through the 
historical enquiry that is an essential part of sociological work. After this is 
explained, the general charge that Weber's work is necessarily uncritical and 
descriptive can be addressed.
As we saw above, Weber introduced the ideal type as a process of concept 
formation that was 'objective' without being nomological. The objection that 
Weber's concepts are unhistorical is based on the view that, by establishing the 
'scientific' status of sociological enquiry in this way, Weber is over-generalising 
his concepts, and preventing them from being expressions of the unique, peculiar 
characteristics of an historical event. This issue is an old chestnut in debates about 
the coherence of 'historical sociological' research: the historian is concerned with 
the individual and specific features of a particular phenomenon, while the 
sociologist studies the general features that recur across different societies and 
cultures.(see Smith, 1991) Historical concepts are, therefore, individual; 
sociological concepts are general (although they are 'general' in a different way 
from nomological natural scientific concepts). An illustration might help to explain 
this point: the historical concept of 'the modern state' is a different, more 
individual, kind of concept from the sociological idea of 'domination', while both 
operate differently from the even more general natural scientific concept of 
'energy'.
A similar debate can be found within Weber's social theory itself. As 
Burger points out, from the early essay on 'Objectivity' to the later work in 
Economy and Society, Weber changed from an historical to a relatively more 
sociological outlook, "by postulating a shift in the conception of 'ideal type' from 
the historicist's interest in historical wholes—'historical individuals'—to the 
sociologist's interest in the analytical elements of a general theory."(Burger, 1976: 
119) However, even in his early work, Weber acknowledged a tension between 
'philosophical' generalised abstractions, and 'historical' reproductions of
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reality.(Weber, 1975: 55) The problem is that these must be balanced, rather than 
one being privileged over the other. As we saw, Weber pays a great deal of 
attention to the philosophical method of conceptual abstraction; how does he 
combine this with attention to the need for historical concreteness and specificity?
This dimension of concept formation can most clearly be seen in the 
structure of the argument of The Protestant Ethic, where the ideal type of the 
'spirit of capitalism' is developed both through evaluative interpretation and 
historical analysis. This is worth quoting at length, since it is an exceptionally 
clear statement of the historicist elements of Weber's early methodological 
approach.
What is to be understood by [the 'spirit of capitalism']?.... If any 
object can be found to which this term can be applied with any 
understandable meaning, it can only be an historical individual, 
i.e., a complex of elements associated in historical reality which we 
unite into a conceptual whole from the standpoint of their cultural 
significance.
Such an historical concept, however, since it refers in its 
content to a phenomenon significant for its unique individuality, 
cannot be defined according to the formula genus proximum, 
differentia specifica, but it must be gradually put together out of the 
individual parts which are taken from historical reality to make it 
up. Thus the final and definitive concept cannot stand at the 
beginning of the investigation, but must come at the end. We must, 
in other words, work out in the course of the discussion, as its most 
important result, the best conceptual formulation of what we here 
understand by the spirit of capitalism, that is the best from the point 
of view which interests us here.(Weber, 1930: 47)
This is not just an excuse for an incomplete definition of an important concept in 
Weber's historical enquiry. It is a clear statement that the meaning of the cultural 
phenomena is revealed historically as much as interpretively.
On its own, then, evaluative interpretation only serves to identify a 
cultural ly-significant 'historical individual'. The meaning of the social relationships 
and actions embodied in this individual is not immediately disclosed by the 
evaluative interpretation. A further process of historical interpretation is needed
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fu lly to understand the meaning of the relevant phenomena. Evaluative 
interpretation does not replace historical analysis; evaluative interpretation is only 
ever an incomplete preliminary step that must be supplemented through historical 
analysis.
Insofar as it analyzes 'interpretively' what is characteristic of 
particular features of certain 'cultural epochs' or certain 
personalities...[evaluative interpretation] aids in the formation of 
historical concepts.... [I]t functions either as an auxiliary insofar as 
it aids in the recognition of the causally relevant components of a 
concrete historical complex as such; it functions, conversely, as a 
source of guidance and direction, insofar as it 'interprets' the 
content of an object...with respect to its possible relations to values.
In doing the latter, it presents 'tasks' for the causal work of history 
and thus is its presupposition.(Weber, 1949:160, emphasis original)
In part, then, the full meaning of a particular phenomenon is disclosed through 
empirical analysis of the causal regress disclosed by the initial interpretation. 
W hile this may admit a role for nomological, empirical analysis, in two ways 
Weber's account of the causal regress does not altogether collapse into a simple 
empiricism.
First, the analysis does not reveal determinate causes, but only 'adequate 
causes'. In other words, the 'causes' are relevant only to a categorically-formed 
mental construct; not to 'reality' as such. Here, it is important to remember that 
an ideal type is not intended to be a description of reality, far less a nomological 
hypothesis about how reality operates. The notion of 'adequate causality' is rather 
confusing, and an example might help. Fortunately, Weber's own historical 
sociology provides an excellent illustration: the Reformation did not 'cause' 
modern capitalism in the sense that it was decisive in producing all of the features 
of modern capitalist production and exchange. Hence, Protestantism cannot be 
regarded as a determinate cause of modern capitalism (in the form of an 'if P then 
Q ' formulation). However, certain aspects of the religious beliefs that developed 
during the Reformation were responsible for the peculiarly methodical and 
vocational character of modern economic behaviour, which is an especially
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significant part of modern capitalist culture as a whole. Therefore, modern 
capitalism does owe one of its most characteristic, unique and significant features 
to the Reformation, which can consequently be regarded as an 'adequate cause' 
of modern capitalism. As we can see from this illustration, assessments of causal 
significance are made only by constructing deliberately unreal causal 
relationships, in order to identify the linkages between essential and characteristic 
components of a wider, causally plural, set of phenomena.(Weber, 1949:164-88) 
As is clear from the illustrative example chosen here, a great deal of mistaken 
debate about The Protestant Ethic could have been foregone if only the limited 
character of 'adequate causality' were properly appreciated.
Secondly, for Weber, causal analysis must proceed axiologically as well as 
empirically. That is to say, one should study the relationships between systems of 
values and ethics, here regarded as motives for action: ’’historical interpretation 
is not concerned with our ability to subordinate 'facts' under abstract concepts 
and formulae.... On the contrary, it is concerned with...'understanding' concrete 
human action in terms of its motives."(Weber, 1949: 196) As Huff sums up, 
"'Motives', which can here be assimilated to 'reasons', serve as the 'causes' of 
social action."(Huff, 1984: 47) This is as close as Weber gets to a proper theory 
of interpretation. Interpretation should always be based on values and 
relationships between values, ratherthan upon subjective, emotional identification 
with the acting subject.(Weber, 1949: 181) The goal of historical analysis is to 
explore the ways in which significant value systems develop historically. Thus, the 
'laws' with which the social scientist (or historian) operates, are not nomological, 
but axiological, it is "neither an empirical regularity nor a 'rule-governed' process. 
On the contrary, it is a norm which can be conceived as having 'axiological 
validity'".(Weber, 1977:131, emphasis original) Axiological validity is established 
through examining the logical relationship between different systems of values, 
and the implications for behaviour that follow from these particular maxims, 
rather than through an empirical analysis of the qualitative differences between 
cause and effect. In this respect, verstehen rests on a non-Humean theory of 
causation.
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This shows that Weber recognises, indeed highlights, the historical 
specificity of the cultural system of values within which an evaluative 
interpretation is made. Evaluative interpretation discloses those aspects of cultural 
life that are significant for members of a culture, and thus creates an area of 
historical interest. For example, we might identify as significant the cultural 
phenomenon that modern capitalism involves methodical, instrumentally rational 
economic conduct. However, this would be an incomplete formulation of the 
meaning of the 'spirit of the capitalism'. To gain a fuller understanding of the 
meaning of capitalism, the systems of values within which this ethic is historically 
located must also be brought into the concept. Thus, at the end, we can recognise 
that the 'spirit of capitalism' is not simply instrumentally rational economic 
conduct; it is "rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling", the 
meaning of which can only be understood through an examination of ascetic 
Protestantism, and the understanding of which illuminates the historical content 
of the contemporary cultural values on the basis of which the initial evaluative 
interpretation was conducted.(Weber, 1930: 180)
This is sufficient to illustrate the historicity of concepts in Weberian social 
theory, and to show that they do challenge reification, through the 
demystification—i.e., revelation of meaning— of aspects of modern culture that 
are typically emptied of their underlying meaningful human relationships, such 
as modern economic conduct. Verstehen is, then, historical; but does this go 
beyond description, or even demystification, to provide a grounding for critique? 
Let us begin by noting that Frost is mistaken to claim that verstehen involves an 
empathetic identification with the acting subject, within which the subject's 
individual values cannot be finessed. The goal of verstehen is historically and 
evaluatively to interpret the meaning of the ethical systems w ithin which 
individuals' behaviour is subjectively given meaning. This is quite consistent with 
the clarification and possible reform of a social practice (which, it w ill be recalled, 
was Frost's idea of the goal of normative theory). The difference is that verstehen 
provides a clear insight into the need to ground this interpretation in an historical 
analysis of the background of ethical ideas within which contemporary cultural
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values are located, and provides a procedure for so doing.
Frost's second criticism can also be questioned, in three ways. First, 
verstehen sociology is not necessarily committed to seeing contemporary 
motivations as cohesive. Admittedly, Weber's substantive historical sociology of 
modern rational conduct does not expose an internal contradiction in that 
practice; but neither does it presuppose a consensus (except in the social scientific 
community). Weber's point is that the contemporary practice is marked by an 
evacuation of meaning from the idea of the calling.(Weber, 1930: 181) This may 
not identify an immanent alternative or dynamic, but it is hardly uncritical. 
Secondly, as we saw, Weber explicitly identifies Marx's analysis of capitalism as 
an example of an ideal typical analysis. This clearly indicates that contradictions 
can be identified within the broad methodological framework of verstehen and 
also renders Marxist criticisms of Weber's methodology less compelling. Thirdly, 
Weber's comments about the possibility of multiple ideal types suggest that 
verstehen does not exclude the possibility of different interpretations being 
developed, and contests between those rival interpretations could then arise. This 
would suggest that verstehen, understood as a method rather than as Weber's 
particular sociology of modernity, can accommodate ideas of contradictions in 
contemporary practices, which would come through as contests between rival 
evaluative interpretations of the significance of those practices. It would then be 
necessary to drop Weber's insistence on the Rickertian principle that subjective 
values can be 'objectified' through an appeal to 'general cultural values'. This 
latter point, insofar as it affects the way in which concepts should be used, is the 
subject of the next section.
§3. An agonistic theory of concept use
As we saw, Weber's claim to be both interpretive and 'objective' rested on the 
idea that 'general cultural values' exist, on the basis of which the researcher's 
subjective value-orientation can be objectified through the identification of 
cultural phenomena that are universally regarded as significant. Flowever, the
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different reasonable interpretations.(see Gallie, 1964: Chapter 8) Furthermore, it 
is argued that these conceptual disputes are not always signs of error or 
confusion, but might be an unavoidable, and even desirable, feature of academic 
enquiry. The continuing existence of disagreement about the 'real meaning' of 
such concepts, "far from being a cause of philosophical scandal, is rather a proof 
of the continuing need of philosophy and of vital, agonistic philosophy."(Gallie, 
1964: 156)
W.B. Gallie gives a good explanation of how concepts come to be open 
to different reasonable interpretations. First, he observes that such a concept must 
be appraisive, in the sense that "it signifies or accredits some kind of valued 
achievement."(Gallie, 1964: 161) The idea of appraisive concepts has been most 
thoroughly developed by W illiam Connolly, who maintains that some concepts 
"characterize arrangements and actions from a normative angle of 
vision."(Connolly, 1993: 29) In such cases, the point of using the concept is 
bound up with its connection to moral points of view. Nor can we reconstruct the 
concept in a non-normative way, since "a concept so cleansed would lay idle.... 
With no point or purpose to serve, the concept itself would fall into 
disuse."(Connolly, 1993: 29) By itself, however, the fact that a concept is 
appraisive does not explain why contests over its meaning should inevitably arise. 
In addition to being appraisive an essentially contested concept must also depict 
a particular kind of valued achievement: one that is internally complex, variously 
describable and open. In other words, "Any explanation of its worth 
must...include reference to the respective contribution of its various parts or 
features; yet...there is nothing absurd or contradictory in any of a number of 
possible rival descriptions of its total worth".(Gallie, 1964: 161) Andrew Mason 
summarises this point rather well: political theorists "disagree over how to 
describe values such as freedom, social justice, and democracy properly (and 
therefore over what counts as freedom, social justice, and democracy) because 
they can reasonably disagree over how much weight to attach to the elements that 
go to make up the achievement accredited by concepts such as these".(Mason, 
1990: 83, emphasis original)
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Beyond these four conditions of appraisiveness, internal complexity, 
variable describability and openness, Gallie also maintains that for a concept to 
be essentially contested, it must be used strategically and there must be a shared 
'original exemplar', to which rival uses of the concept approximate.(Gallie, 1964: 
161, 168) These further conditions are especially important if a disagreement is 
to be evidence of a contest, rather than simply being a case of confusion since, 
as Steven Lukes points out, "essentially contested concepts must have a common 
core; otherwise how could we justifiably claim that the contests were about the 
same concept?"(Lukes, 1974: 187) Furthermore, the various users of the concept 
must recognise the relevance of other interpretations than their own; otherwise 
they could not be said to be engaged in a contest at all, but would simply be 
talking past one another. Thus, while the combination of appraisiveness and 
complexity shows why questions about the proper use of concepts come to be 
involved with deep-seated philosophical and political disputes, the idea of a 
'common core' or 'original exemplar' explains when such a dispute is a 
conceptual contest and not the result of a confused or vague misuse of a concept. 
Together, these two aspects of the overall argument provide us with grounds for 
identifying concepts which are properly contested, in such a way that the contest 
w ill not be resolvable through decisive rational arguments for one particular 
interpretation, nor through a more precise use of the concept in question.
It is important to be able to make distinctions between contested and 
confused concepts with reasonable authority, because they carry considerable 
implications for the way in which we should regard attempts to clarify or define 
the meaning of obscure concepts. In a nutshell, if a concept is simply confused 
or vague, we should welcome clarification through 'reconstruction' or better 
definition according to abstract, general principles.(Oppenheim, 1981) On the 
other hand, if a concept is contested, we should regard an attempted definition 
as no more nor less than an argument for a particular interpretation and explore 
its relationship to other reasonable interpretations of the concept within the 
context of the historical development of a tradition of academic enquiry. In this 
case, as the legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart puts it, "though theory is to be
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welcomed, the growth of theory on the back of definition is not."(Hart, 1983: 25) 
Instead, any particular use of a contested concept should be advocated in an- 
open-minded and reciprocating way. One's defence of an interpretation should 
be "of the same contested character as the arguments it opposes, not claimed in 
advance by some pretense at hard-hitting empirical metaphysics."(Dworkin, 1986: 
86)
Overall, then, the thesis that some concepts are essentially contested points 
towards an agonistic approach to political argument. Under agonism, moral and 
political disputes are carried on through arguments about the proper way of using 
particular concepts, rather than through arguments about which concept to use 
to describe the world. Such arguments are unlikely to lead to a decisive 
conclusion, but they w ill not be a free-for-all, since they should operate w ithin 
the broadly defined, widely agreed and flexible parameters established by the 
concept's 'original exemplar' or 'common core'. If conducted properly, they w ill 
tend to be reciprocal and tolerant, gradually approximating towards a better 
shared understanding of the meaning of the core concept itself. This agonistic 
approach to political argument is rather similar to Alasdair MacIntyre's account 
of a 'living tradition', as one which "is an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute 
that tradition."(MacIntyre, 1985: 222) To engage in an agonistic political argument 
about the meaning of an essentially contested concept is precisely to acknowledge 
one's embeddedness in the "continuities of conflict"(Maclntyre, 1985: 222) that 
constitute such a living tradition of thought and practice, and to seek to sustain 
the tradition by preserving and enriching, rather than definitively resolving, that 
internal conflict.
Of course, agonistic arguments have some important negative features. 
Most obviously, the way in which a tradition of argument is constituted is in itself 
political, and not everyone is or can be part of a tradition. There is, if you like, 
a degree to which the openness of an essentially contested concept is limited or 
superficial. As David M iller points out, theorists make political judgements when
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they identify the permissible uses of a shared concept, but then deny the efficacy 
of political judgements in deciding between different uses of the concept. This 
seems to suggest either the operation of a double standard or an abdication of 
responsibility: "Having set foot in the political arena to arrive at the list of 
permissible uses of a term, why is the philosopher reluctant to take the second 
step and argue for the correct use?"(Miller, 1983: 51 )10 Alternatively, if the virtue 
of an essentially contested concept is its openness to different points of view, and 
its capacity to accommodate value pluralism in political argument, the political 
decision about what goes into the common core surely rules certain perspectives 
out of the argument altogether. Thus, although the death of a tradition may be 
damaging to political argument by making it less reciprocal or cooperative, it may 
be liberating in other respects, in the sense that the tradition may have stifled 
argument among some people or silenced some perspectives. However, whether 
or not a particular tradition is positive or harmful, it is obviously important that, 
at the very least, philosophers (and theorists of international relations) understand 
the traditions in which they operate and understand how changes have taken 
place in the idiom of political discussion within which disputes between 
international relations theorists are carried on.
Concept formation and concept use
Weber's ideas of evaluative and historical interpretation principally refer to the 
way in which concepts are constructed; on the other hand, the idea of essential 
contestedness is concerned with the way in which concepts are used w ithin an 
academic community. This is why the latter can be grafted onto the basic 
propositions about concept formation outlined by Weber. It deals with an 
interpretivist suspicion of Weber's claim to be able to pick out universally-relevant 
cultural phenomena, but it does not substantially alter the process of evaluative 
interpretation as antecedent to an historical interpretation. We could still construct 
ideal types, but we would have to acknowledge that the various ideal types that
10. For a more extended discussion of this issue, see Swanton, 1985, and for a reply to this kind of 
objection about the incoherence of the essential contestedness thesis, see Connolly, 1993: 226-27.
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we use to understand contemporary practices are part of a process of contesting 
the meaning of those practices.
The thesis of essential contestedness thus provides a new set of criteria for 
assessing particular instances of ideal type construction. Weber introduced Value 
relevance' in order to provide a way of determining the quality of particular ideal 
types, in terms of their ability to disclose the possible significances of a set of 
cultural phenomena, and speak to the widest possible range of value-orientations 
of the members of an academic community. However, we should recognise that 
ideal-typical representations of concepts are not always formed in pursuit of this 
Rickertian 'objectivity', but rather they are sometimes constructed and used 
strategically as part of an effort to defend positions in political debates. Because 
of this, "there is a tendency to take sides, to applaud some of the practices of 
some of the participants, to identify dark areas in prevailing practice that might, 
if illuminated, allow a transcendant view to gain ascendancy."(Connolly, 1993: 
181) This aspect of concept use should be recognised as part of the process by 
which we assess an evaluative interpretation. If it is, then we can see that a 
particular concept should not be assessed on the basis that it presumes to disclose 
features of 'universal significance' as Weber proposes. Rather, we should ask what 
sort of interpretation of contemporary practices is embodied in a particular 
formulation of a concept: what is the role that an evaluative interpretation—and 
a process of ideal type formation more generally—plays in debates w ithin 
traditions of thought? Of course, this is not to suggest that a conceptual contest 
can eventually be closed. Instead, it implies that manifold evaluative 
interpretations of contemporary cultural phenomena should be carried out, and 
compared. Only then can the true character of any one interpretation be assessed.
Not only would this respond to any lingering suspicions that Weber is too 
positivist, it would also show how Weber's method of concept formation could 
potentially be part of a more critical approach to international relations. We saw 
that the claim that Weber is always looking for areas of consensus in society as 
a whole was wrong, but it holds at a smaller level, for an academic community.
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However, by relaxing this assumption of general cultural values within an 
academic community, we can see how an essentially Weberian method of 
abstraction and historical enquiry can indeed be tied to a form of concept use that 
is more agonistic, through acknowledging and participating in conceptual 
contests. Thus, we can respond to Frost's worry about the inability of verstehen 
theorists to engage in political debate about participants' self-understandings in 
practices.
So far, this discussion has been conducted at a very general level. It sought 
to show that Weberian ideal types are both historically and evaluatively 
constructed. In other words, Weber's social theory gives us a clear and properly 
developed method for constructing concepts that w ill be useful for contemporary 
non-realist theories of international relations. An initial process of evaluative 
interpretation abstracts an 'historical individual', the meaning of which is then 
apprehended through an 'adequate causal' and axiological form of historical 
analysis. Once the meaning of this formulation of the concept has been properly 
grasped, we need to ask what relationship exists between this conception and our 
experience of contemporary practices: does it illuminate them, does it expose 
hitherto unrecognised meanings contained in those practices, and what judgement 
of the practice is made implicit in the conception?
§4. The classical approach and verstehen sociology
Now, we need to ask what are the implications of such an approach for the way 
that we think about the concept of 'international society', and to what extent this 
Weberian approach to the historicity and normativity of concepts really does 
afford an opportunity to get to grips with the traditional theory of international 
society. Here, it is interesting to note that a number of international relations 
theorists have commented on the similarities between Bull's conception of 
international society and Weberian ideal types. For example, Stanley Hoffmann 
takes the view that Bull's "blend of intelligent social science and humanism...takes 
a Weberian form."(Hoffmann, 1990: 18) Similarly, Terry Nardin comments that
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international society should be regarded as an 'ideal type',(Nardin, 1983: 33-34) 
while Hidemi Suganami observes that Bull's concepts of "'international system', 
'international society', 'a state of war', 'transnational solidarity and conflict', and 
'world political system'...are, in my view, all ideal types."(Suganami, 1983: 
2365n) More recently, Tim Dunne has observed that theorists of international 
society "drew from the well of an interpretative background social 
theory."(Dunne, 1995b: 373) Consequently, "the English school has always stood 
four-square in the constructivist camp."(Dunne, 1995a: 146 & see also Waever, 
1992)
Admittedly, against these suggestions, we must set James Richardson's 
point of view. Richardson agrees that Bull's concepts look like Weberian ideal 
types, but argues that "while there are obvious affinities, in so far as [verstehen 
sociology] emphasises the unique case—the individual person, society, or 
culture—this is at odds with Bull's primary concern, the procedures by which 
general propositions about international relations may be established."(Richardson, 
1990: 162) However, as was indicated in the above discussion of Weber's theory 
of the ideal type, whether or not he is right about Bull, Richardson's 
understanding of Weber seems mistaken here. The point of an ideal type is that 
it approximates towards the combination of the individual and general aspects of 
concepts together in a single whole, since it involves, as was noted earlier, 'the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally 
absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those 
one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct'.
Bull characterises his own 'classical' approach as one that "derives from 
philosophy, history and law, and that is characterised above all by explicit 
reliance upon the exercise of judgement."(Bull, 1966a: 361) Because of the 
centrality of judgement, "general propositions about [international relations] 
must...derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception and 
intuition."(Bull, 1966a: 361) Three main points arise from this, which suggest 
certain affinities between this approach and verstehen social theory. First, Bull
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denies the usefulness of nomological scientific methods in the processes of 
concept formation in IR theory: "strictly testable empirical generalisations can be 
established...but the steps from this to saying something significant about 
international relations...can be taken only if there is a self-indulgent lapse into the 
'classical' style."(Bull, 1972: 259) In other words, scientific method can only be 
used after, and within a context previously defined by, an initially judgemental 
and unscientific process of normative reflection. As Bull revealingly characterised 
the work of the British Committee for the Theory of International Politics, of 
which he was a leading member: "our discussions reflect the outlook of a former 
great power and colonial power, and (despite everything) a presently still 
relatively rich one. We are not accustomed to looking at international relations 
from the perspective from which most of the world sees it, the perspective of the 
underdog."(Bull, n.d.: 1) Here Bull is using a typically Weberian formulation: 
concepts are constructed for a particular group that shares a particular area of 
historical interest and point of view. As another classicist puts it: "what could this 
higher ground be, this standpoint for theory, but some rickety platform of our own 
personal devising for our own personal morality?"(Donelan, 1978: 22) In other > 
words, concept formation in the classical approach depends upon something very 
alike to Weber's process of evaluative interpretation and appeals to the principle 
of value-relevance.
Secondly, such normative reflection is not enough for Bull; it must be 
supplemented with historical analysis. Bull offers four reasons for this claim: it 
gives a feeling for the singular peculiarity of actors in world politics, it provides 
a feeling for the temporal sequence of events, it serves a pedagogical function, 
and it allows general theories to be tested.(Bull, 1972: 255-57) As the previous 
discussion of the unscientific nature of ideal types shows, the last of these reasons 
seems rather odd, in view of Bull's acceptance of the role of judgement in 
concept formation. This indicates, perhaps, that Bull had not completely thought 
through the logical implications of his argument. Nevertheless, the first 
point—where Bull identifies actors as 'historical individuals'—is quite consistent 
with a Weberian approach, and in general these comments show that Bull
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recognised the need to combine evaluative and historical interpretation in concept 
formation.
Thirdly, this raises the question as to how Bull thought that the historical 
individual should then be analysed. Here, it is important to be clear about the 
scope of this rejection of scientific methods and advocacy of historical analysis. 
Bull's argument was directed as much against extreme classicists as against 
extreme scientists, and he maintains that the classical approach should seek to 
accommodate scientific methods.(Bull, 1966a: 375)11 Indeed, it was
characteristic of the arguments between classicists and scientists that progress lay 
"not in rejecting one approach and favouring the other, but in rendering each the 
servant of the other."(Knorr & Rosenau, 1969: 3; see also, Kaplan, 1969 & Singer, 
1969) In other words, while arguing for an essentially evaluative, judgemental 
process of concept formation, Bull still maintains that scientific, empirical analysis 
can be carried on within given conceptual structures. In this regard, two points 
need to be made. First, Bull is silent on the question of the possibility and 
problems of causal explanation within an interpretive framework, he does not 
really develop any idea of adequate casuality. Secondly, Bull, along with other 
like-minded thinkers like Martin Wight, recognised the importance of axiological 
analysis in going beyond initial evaluative interpretations. For W ight (on Bull's 
description), international relations theory should be "pursued by way of an 
examination of the main traditions of thought about International Relations in the 
past."(Bull, 1991: x-xi) Once again, this is not exactly a perfect methodological 
correspondence, but it does seem to illustrate a certain affinity w ith verstehen 
sociology: what are studied historically are the axiological relationships between 
different systems of values and ethical principles.
As a final illustration of the affinities between Bull's idea of the classical 
approach and verstehen sociology, let us note that Suganami finds in Bull an
11. For an even clearer statement of this line of argument, see Bull's first draft of the article on the 
classical approach, presented as a British Committee Paper, which was less polemically entitled: 
'Recent American Contributions to the Theory of International Politics'.(Bull, 1965)
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aspiration to value-freedom.(Suganami, 1983: 2364) Now, as was argued above, 
in his earlier writings at least, Weber was really arguing for the principle of value- 
relevance, rather than value-freedom. When this is recognised, an even stronger 
connection between Bull and Weber can be identified than Suganami's point that 
Bull abstains from 'categorical prescriptions'. Bull uses the concept of order to 
refer to goals of social life that are elementary, primary and i/n/Versa/,(Bull, 1977: 
5-6) while the concept of world order refers to "those patterns or dispositions of 
human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among 
mankind as a w/7o/e."(Bull, 1977: 20, emphasis added) He then tries to justify his 
analytical focus on international order not simply on the grounds that it is an 
empirically demonstrable fact of life, but also on the grounds that international 
order stands in a relatively close relationship to world order. Thus, international 
order is significant, for Bull, because it moves us closer towards the universally- 
relevant goals of world order. In other words, the way in which Bull actually 
identifies the focus of his study—international order—is through a process of 
evaluative interpretation that is remarkably similar to Weber's procedure of 
identifying 'cultural phenomena...which (as we like to think) lie in a line of 
development having universal significance and value'.
For these reasons, it can be concluded that Hoffmann, Nardin and 
Suganami are correct that Bull's conception of modern international society is an 
ideal type. One can go further, however, to argue that, even though he makes no 
formal acknowledgement of the fact, Bull's procedure for constructing this 
conception is quite close to Weber's own procedure for constructing an ideal type 
of modern capitalism. In other words, it employs a procedure of evaluative 
interpretation based on the principle of value-relevance, followed by historical 
interpretation to reveal the meaning of contemporary phenomena by locating 
them in the context of the historical development of an ethical system. This 
assertion w ill be supported in the next Chapter, when Bull's substantive account 
of modern international society is examined in more detail.
The identification of the ideal-typical status of Bull's conception of modern
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international society leads to two points. First, Bull's historical description of 
modern international society must logically be a selective abstraction, built on a 
deliberately unreal connection of phenomena that are adequately or axiologically 
related, but not related through patterns of determinate causation. Bull's historical 
account of the nature of modern international society should be treated as part of 
his overall interpretation of international order. If international order is no longer 
regarded as relevant (perhaps because it no longer approximates to the universally 
significant world order), then the associated historical interpretation should be 
discarded or radically reconsidered, not simply seen as having been superseded 
by a new 'stage in the development of the world community'.
The second point is that our more systematic appreciation of the Weberian 
principles according to which, broadly speaking, Bull constructed his 
interpretation of international order puts us in a position to appraise the way in 
which Bull used his conception of modern international society to settle contests 
about the meaning of the concept of international society in the Grotian tradition 
of thought. Here, the modification of Weber's own theory of concept use 
introduced in section 3 above w ill show its importance. What we need to do is 
look at the way in which contests about the concept of international society were 
carried on in the 'English school', and see through what means these conceptual 
disagreements were settled in Bull's favour: whether he settled them through an 
unarguable appeal to Weberian 'objectivity' and 'general cultural values'; or 
whether they were settled through assertions that leave room for other reasonable 
conceptualisations of modern international society to be formulated. This task—the 
theoretical appraisal of Bull's anarchical society thesis—is taken up in the next 
Chapter.
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Chapter 3
The English School and the Concept of International Society
Hedley Bull's proposition that modern international society has, since around the 
seventeenth century, been a pluralistic 'anarchical society' of sovereign states was 
not formulated in a vacuum. Rather, his conception of modern international 
society was constructed to defend one particular position within a series of 
disputes about a research programme designed to make sense of contemporary 
world politics through political philosophical and historical reflection. This 
research programme was the core around which coalesced what is today 
generally known as the 'English school' of international relations theory. The 
purpose of this Chapter is to explore how Bull's 'anarchical society thesis' 
developed within the English school, and how Bull's arguments changed the way 
in which the disputes around this research programme, and thus about the 
concept of international society, were conducted within the school. This argument 
w ill be introduced through an account of the contested nature of the concept of 
international society and a discussion of the moments of evaluative and historical 
interpretation in the English school.
Although Bull's work was and is enormously influential, for two reasons 
it is important not to accord too much independent weight to Bull's anarchical 
society thesis. First, Bull's arguments were often not especially original in and of 
themselves. His contribution primarily lay in synthesising theoretical ideas or 
historical propositions that were already part of the English school's research 
programme. What was different and special about Bull's work was the way he 
pulled these elements together into a unified and remarkably compelling the s is / 
about the character of modern international society and its relationship to world 
political order. Secondly, the potency of Bull's work was in large part the 
consequence of a prior formulation of the concept of international society by 
scholars like Martin Wight, who had constructed the English school's research 
programme in the first place. Thus, the anarchical society thesis did not really 
introduce any new ideas about world politics into the English school debates, nor
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did it offer up a new conception of modern international society. What it did was 
to synthesise established theoretical and historical propositions in such a way as 
to make the idea of an anarchical society of states appear as the only reasonable 
conception of modern international society on the terms of the research 
programme adopted by the members of the English school.1
To develop and defend this characterisation of Bull's work, this Chapter 
w ill make two main points. First, early disputes about the meaning of the concept 
of 'international society' suggest that it is an essentially contested or contestable 
concept, on the terms outlined in the previous Chapter. The contest over the 
meaning of 'international society' was carried on in a rather limited way within 
the English school, and Bull's ideal-typical representation of the concept proved 
to be an overwhelmingly compelling intervention in this contest not because it 
appealed to an 'objectively' significant evaluative interpretation of contemporary 
phenomena, but because of the structural limitations of the English school's • 
research programme. Secondly, an alternative evaluative interpretation of the 
element of sociability and order in world politics was proposed within the English 
school itself by Bull's critics, but it was never successfully developed into a ^  
proper ideal type of modern international society, again because of the restricted 
structure of the school's research programme. The argument w ill proceed as 
follows. To provide a basic context for the subsequent analysis of the 
development of the concept of international society in the English school, section 
1 w ill explain how the concept was used in early international political and legal 
thought, and w ill make some general points about the concept's essentially 
contested character. Section 2 w ill identify the members of the English school, set 
out the broad terms of its research programme, and show how this research 
programme involved rough procedures of evaluative and historical interpretation. 
The analysis emphasises the restrictions imposed on one particular evaluative 
interpretation of the concept of international society by the historiographical
1. As will become clear later, in this respect Bull did make an original contribution through his 
redefinition of the idea of a Grotian tradition of thought, which he cast in terms of a conception of 
international society as a society of states. To a degree, this was a novel interpretation of Grotian /  
international theory, but otherwise Bull's achievement was more synthetic than innovative.
75
limitations of the school's research programme. Section 3 w ill outline the main 
points of Bull's anarchical society thesis and explain why they were so decisive 
in the disputes within the English school. Finally, section 4 w ill conclude by 
identifying a starting-point for a new research programme, designed to construct 
an ideal type of modern international society on the basis of the hitherto 
neglected alternative evaluative position in the English school. Because this w ill 
challenge the dominance of Bull's interpretation it w ill allow for the 
reconstruction of the Grotian tradition of international theory on the broaderterms 
that it used to have, before it came to be exclusively associated with a rather 
narrow conception of international society.
§1. International society as an essentially contested concept
We are now so used to the idea that modern international society is an anarchical 
society of sovereign states that it is hard to appreciate that once this was only one 
of several different conceptions of modern international society, albeit an 
especially dominant one. However, in order to understand the role and scope of 
Bull's anarchical society thesis it is vital to realise that the concept of international 
society was originally construed in a number of different ways. Recalling the 
methodological discussion in the previous Chapter, the main contention here is 
that international society is an essentially contested or contestable concept, and 
that this was recognised by international relations theorists before the concept 
came to be definitively formulated by Bull through his anarchical society thesis. 
In other words, there was a long-standing disagreement about the real meaning 
of international society, which was a genuine and essential conceptual contest 
rather than a sign that some users of the concept were either mistaken or 
confused. In accordance with the account of essentially contested concepts given 
in Chapter 2, this requires that disagreements about the concept of international 
society were possible because that concept is appraisive and complex, and hence 
that the disagreements were based on different reasonable interpretations of the 
concept. Furthermore, there must also have been a 'common core' or an 'original 
exemplar' of international society, to which all of these different interpretations
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referred, and which provided a shared foundation upon which their mutual 
recognition and strategic interaction was established. First, the evidence for the 
disputed nature of the concept of international society in early international 
political and legal thought w ill be presented, then the concept's common core 
w ill be identified, and finally its appraisive and complex character w ill be 
illustrated.
Disputes about the concept o f international society in early international theory
At first glance, there seem to be good grounds for supposing that the concept of 
international society is likely to be a contested one. As Wight observes, "Men 
have been arguing for centuries about what the state really is, what its purpose 
is, how it holds together and why it should hold together; there is far more scope 
for argument about the nature of the much more shadowy and insubstantial entity 
called international society."(Wight, 1991: 30) Wight himself analyses this 
disagreement in terms of three different traditions in 'international theory': 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism. Each tradition has a distinctive broad 
answer to the question of the meaning of international society, and this difference 
of opinion is perfectly illustrated by their various ideas about the membership of 
international society. For Realists, "it is states that are the subjects of international 
law, and states alone are the units of the international juridical 
community."(Wight, 1991: 36, emphasis omitted) For Rationalists, "both states and 
individuals are capable of being members," while for Revolutionists, "the only 
true international society is one of individuals."(Wight, 1991: 36-37 & 45 & see 
Wight, 1966b: 101-102) As Wight sums up, "Are kings or peoples or individuals 
the members of this ambiguous society? exclaims the positivist in irritation. All 
were. Nor was this tradition entirely eclipsed by the orthodox doctrine of state 
personality."(Wight, 1966b: 102)2
2. It should be acknowledged that Wight also frequently makes comments equating international 
society more exclusively with the idea of a society of states, and this was probably the major 
interpretation even before Bull.(see, for example, Wight, 1966a: 20-21) Nevertheless, the point stands 
that Wight acknowledges a range and flexibility in the different uses of the concept that is considerably S  
reduced by Bull's narrower and more state-centric distinction between pluralist and solidarist
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When one goes on to examine the three traditions' ideas about the basis 
of international legitimacy, it becomes even clearer that the meanings they attach 
to the concept of international society differ from one to the other, reflecting their 
different conceptions of the state of nature.(Wight, 1991: 30) For Realists, with 
their Hobbesian view of the state of nature, the only possible source for binding 
obligations in international society is the w ill of the member states 
themselves.(Wight, 1991: 36) This leads Realists to see the norms and rules that 
govern behaviour in international society largely as more or less hypocritical 
expressions of states' self-interest. While Rationalists recognise the importance of 
state volition, they prefer to regard international society as modelled on the 
Lockean state of nature, and hence as governed by the law of nature, manifested 
in God's w ill or human reason. Thus, the Rationalist argument "offers a different 
answer to the question about international society. Given this view, international 
society is a true society, but institutionally deficient; lacking a common superior 
or judiciary."(Wight, 1991: 39) Revolutionists see the essence of international 
society neither in the w ill of states, nor in the Rationalist version of a 
constitutionalist Lockean social contract. Instead, the basic Revolutionist claim is 
that "international society is none other than the community of mankind."(Wight, 
1991: 39) To be sure, this description is highly aspirational; "'is' here means 'is 
essentially', 'ought to be' or 'is destined to be'".(Wight, 1991: 39) On this view, 
the mistake of the Rationalists is to suppose that there is no more to international 
society than the phenomenal appearance of an 'institutionally-deficient quasi­
society', and to ignore the deeper bonds between human beings that really 
constitute the essence of international society.
Wight's taxonomy of the three traditions might seem to be rather a flimsy 
foundation upon which to build an authoritative account of an essential contest 
about the meaning of the concept of 'international society'. For example, it might 
be argued that Wight's scheme lacks weight since it was only ever a device for 
presenting the relevant material in the form of lectures; W ight himself did not
conceptions of international society.(Bull, 1966c)
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prepare it for publication and it cannot be relied on as a fully worked-out 
treatment of the literature about the concept.3 Against this objection, however, 
one could reply that, although Wight presents his scheme as a classification of 
international political thought, when he talks about these three different 
conceptions of international society he is really just using new labels to describe 
three old and well-established branches of international legal thinking. The S  
Realist, Revolutionist and Rationalist conceptions of international society 
correspond to the classic tripartite distinction between positivist, naturalist and 
'eclectic' theories of international law.(see, for example, Hershey, 1912: 59)
The interdependence of theories of international law and society is hardly 
surprising, when we remember that most accounts of international law begin from 
the maxim 'ubi societas ibi jus est': "W ithout society no law, without law no 
society."(Westlake, 1894: 3) This maxim indicates that any theory of the sources, 
content and enforcement of international law necessarily requires a prior 
conception of international society.(see, for example, Lauterpacht, 1970b: 28) 
Clearly, however, this leaves a great deal of scope for different accounts of what 
it is about society in world politics that makes it possible to speak of the existence 
of law. Furthermore, the existence of at least three different accounts of where 
international law comes from, what its guiding principles are, and how it actually 
affects international conduct can be taken as compelling evidence that there is a 
protracted disagreement about the concept of international society. These disputes 
about the nature of international law must, at root, be disputes about the nature 
of international society. Wight's contribution was to show how these different 
conceptions of international society sprang from, and contributed to, more general 
perspectives on international politics.4
3. This objection was put to me by Nicholas Wheeler, as a discussant to my paper at the Millennium  
25th Anniversary Conference panel on 'International Society'.
4. Showing how- Wight's account of the Realist, Rationalist and Revolutionist conceptions of 
international society is related to these different branches of international law anticipates a further 
possible objection to my claim that international society is an essentially contested concept. As we saw 
in Chapter 2, W.B. Gallie's account of conceptual contests located such disputes within a tradition; 
Wight's account of a conceptual dispute between traditions might therefore seem not to be evidence 
of a proper conceptual contest (I would like to thank Joao Marques d'Almeida for making this point
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The common core of the concept of international society
Even if it is agreed that different conceptions of international society do exist in 
international political and legal thinking, there are still two possible explanations 
for this phenomenon: either it could be a genuine conceptual contest about the 
proper use of the concept, or it could be that some people are using the concept 
of 'international society' incorrectly. Perhaps legal positivists, eclectics and 
naturalists are talking about different concepts, for which they are sloppily using 
the same word, thus creating conceptual confusion. If this latter possibility is to 
be ruled out, there must be some common core concept of international society 
to which all of these different uses refer.
One can construct a common core concept by negatively comparing the 
concept of international society with an alternative concept. Gallie himself uses 
this kind of procedure when trying to ascertain the original exemplar for the 
concept of art.(Gallie, 1964: 170) One option here is suggested by Chris Brown's 
summary of the distinction between the concepts of international society and 
international system: "An international society differs from an international system 
because it is a form of order which is normatively based, and not simply the 
outcome of an interplay of forces."(Brown, 1995: 186, emphasis omitted) What 
the concept of international society does, in other words, is to depict conduct in 
world politics as rule-governed and meaningful. At this point, it is helpful to recall 
that the different conceptions of international society we identified were each 
articulated within branches of international legal thought. What the concept of 
international society does is isolate those particular phenomena in world politics 
that are evidence of norm or rule-following behaviour. Obviously, this leaves 
open the question of the precise content of the rules in question. This makes the 
link between a verstehen approach, the concept of international society and the 
concept of order in world politics especially clear. To the extent that world
especially clear to me). However, if it is true that Wight's three conceptions of international society 
are contained within a broad tradition of speculation and debate about the nature of international law, 
I submit that this objection loses a great deal of its force.
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definition. However, this raises the question of the arguments that can be used 
in support of the claim that this conception is the proper use of the concept of 
international society; it cannot simply be assumed.
The valued achievement expressed by international society
Let us turn to the other features of an essentially contested concept: appraisiveness 
and complexity. Here, we can begin by recalling that a concept is appraisive if 
it 'describes from the moral point of view', and as Connolly noted, if the 
normative element is taken out of such concepts, there w ill be little point in using 
them. The use of the concept of international society does indeed seem to be 
contingent upon the need to describe international relations in normative terms. 
For example, James Mayall observes that the concept seems to have "fallen into 
disuse" at a time "When so much theorising has been concerned to avoid explicit 
argument of a normative or moral kind".(Mayall, 1978: 122) Further evidence for 
the broadly appraisive character of 'international society' can be found in Alan 
James' argument that, while it lacks some of the strength of the idea of 
community, the idea of society nevertheless has a certain warmth and intimacy, 
which he contrasts favourably with the "rather chilly, distant, and mechanical 
resonance" of the concept of 'international system'.(James, 1993: 280-81) 
Admittedly, talk of the appraisiveness of a concept at such a general level w ill 
always seem a little vague. The appraisiveness of international society is, 
however, more clearly confirmed when we ask what reasons people give for 
using the concept of international society. Then, it can be seen that people 
typically do use the concept of international society in order to describe a valued 
achievement.
As we have already seen, one reason for valuing international society is 
that it is seen to provide order in an otherwise disorderly world. This is perhaps 
the most widely celebrated aspect of international society, which is clearly 
appraisive since it makes order in world politics "the achievement of international 
society".(Vincent, 1990: 58, emphasis omitted) It is also quite consistent with the
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idea that the core concept refers to the norm-governed character of international 
relations. We w ill recall that, when we unpack this idea of order in world politics 
even as it is used only within Bull's conception of international order, it is easy 
to see that the order supposedly achieved by international society consists of 
many different components: the 'preservation of the society of states itself', the 
protection of state autonomy, peace, the limitation of violence, keeping promises 
and stability of possession.(Bull, 1977: 16-19) Even while Bull's list is not 
exhaustive, it clearly indicates that, even if international society is valued only 
because it represents the achievement of order between states, we can still 
identify a number of different reasons why it is so valued. In other words, the 
concept of international society, even on this limited formulation, is both 
appraisive and complex.
If we broaden our discussion to embrace other aspects of Wight's account 
of disputes about the concept, we can see how other components of international 
society could be said to constitute part of its valued achievement. One such idea 
would be the propagation of 'Western values' of liberal tolerance, political rights 
or justice. For example, such a position comes through quite strongly in Herbert 
Butterfield's emphasis on the importance of the institutions of cuius regio eius 
religio and the balance of power in securing toleration in early modern European 
society.(Butterfield, 1959, 1962, 1965 & n.d.) Alternatively, one could plausibly 
claim that 'Western values' do not only concern toleration; rather, they are 
primarily concerned with "the development and organization of liberty, especially 
in the form of...constitutional government".(Wight, 1966b: 89) Notably, in this 
view, instances of intervention are quite consistent with international society, 
either because "the independence and separateness of states is less important than 
the homogeneity of international society"; or because "of the duty of fellow- 
feeling and cooperation."(Wight, 1966b: 113 & 116) This last claim begins to lead 
towards a slightly different reason for valuing international society, which would 
be emphasised within a cosmopolitan Revolutionist conception: the achievement 
of 'international society' in furthering the realisation of justice and human dignity. 
This is an achievement which, in Antonio Cassese's view, international society
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has come closer and closer to realising through the United Nations Charter system 
of international law.(Cassese, 1986: 399)
Although this has not been a comprehensive discussion of possible reasons 
for valuing the achievement represented by international society, it is sufficient 
to demonstrate that the concept of international society is both appraisive and 
internally complex, in the sense that it describes an achievement that is valued 
for a number of different reasons. Thus, to sum up the argument of this section, 
there existed, at least in early international political and legal thought, a number 
of different interpretations of the concept of international society. The 
disagreement between these interpretations can be regarded as evidence that the 
concept is essentially contested, because it concerned a common core (norm- 
governed behaviour) that was both appraisive and internally complex. Thus, 
recalling Andrew Mason's words (cited in the previous Chapter), one can 
reasonably disagree over how much weight to attach to the various elements that 
go to make up the achievement accredited to international society.
§2. The English school and its research programme
These early debates in international political and legal thought notwithstanding, 
the concept of international society is now generally associated with the English 
school, and it is nearly always understood to refer exclusively to the idea of a 
society of states. This tendency has become so pronounced that international 
relations theorists currently feel compelled to use concepts like 'global civil 
society' or 'world society' to describe arrangements in world politics that look 
remarkably like the original Rationalist and Revolutionist conceptions of 
international society described by Wight.(see; for example, Shaw, 1994; & 
Lipschutz, 1992) To explain how this change in the usage of the concept of 
international society has come about we need to appreciate the way in which the 
members of the English school constructed their research programme, and then 
we can see how and why Bull's anarchical society thesis was effectively able to 
win the argument in the English school about the meaning of the concept of
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international society.
Identifying the English school
To begin with, it w ill be helpful to define precisely what the 'English school' was, 
who its members were, and what characteristics made them describable as a 
'school' of thought. The idea of an English school was popularised by Roy Jones 
as a way of identifying a particular current in mainstream international relations 
theory, based on the London School of Economics and mainly interested in the 
idea of an international society.Cones, 1981) Jones named the principal members 
of the school as Charles Manning, Wight, Bull, Fred Northedge and Michael 
Donelan, and he grouped these theorists together as a school in order to criticise 
their holism, illiberalism, lack of attention to economic issues and unreasonable 
hostility to non-traditional methodologies. Despite Jones's polemical attack, the 
idea of an English school has become widely accepted, even by students of 
international relations who are more favourably disposed towards the approach 
criticised by Jones. The first point that needs to be established concerns the 
precise grounds upon which this school of thought coalesced: what attributes 
mark out the English school? Perhaps because his intentions were largely 
destructive, Jones did not pay a great deal of attention to the question of the exact 
criteria by which a school of thought can be identified, nor to the logical basis of 
his claim that the relevant thinkers actually did constitute a school. Consequently, 
Jones gave little indication of the general attributes that might be associated with 
an English school, as opposed to the specific features that he wanted to criticise, 
like a lack of attention to economics. More recently, however, the issue of the 
foundation of an English school has been the focus of a brief exchange between 
Sheila Grader and Peter Wilson.
Grader argues that "a 'school' could be expected to acknowledge certain 
common philosophical assumptions which relate to the study of international 
relations".(Grader, 1988: 31) Her main intention is to deny that the relevant 
theorists share sufficient philosophical assumptions that qualify them as members
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of a school: "Their views of politics, and its relation to history and 
philosophy...showtheir individuality.... [E]ach scholar would fit differently into the 
three categories of philosophical, empirical and normative, which...[are] relevant 
to the understanding of a variety of approaches."(Grader, 1988: 35) Against 
Grader's position, Wilson contends that Grader's exploration of the broad 
methodological approaches of the theorists, while relevantto their various general 
attitudes towards international relations, should be distinguished from the idea of 
a school, because "a 'school' refers more specifically to substantive 
arguments."(Wilson, 1989: 52) Following this different idea of the criteria by 
which a school of thought is identified, Wilson points to four substantive positions 
within theoretical debates on which Manning, Wight, Bull, Northedge and 
Donelan agreed: the ordered nature of the state system, the existence of a 
normative framework through which international relations are ordered, anti­
utopianism and hostility towards behavioural and scientific approaches.(Wilson, 
1989; & see also Suganami, 1983) Thus, according to Wilson, these scholars can 
fairly be described as constituting a school of thought.
It is unfortunate that both Grader's and Wilson's discussions of the logical 
conditions for a 'school' are so abbreviated, and that relatively little attention is 
paid to the general features that constitute academic schools of thought. For 
instance, Grader accepts, with important qualifications, that the theorists in 
question share a general focus on 'international society', but she asserts that this 
"lacks the philosophical legitimacy to found a school."(Grader, 1988: 38) 
Unfortunately, this raises a key question: what constitutes 'philosophical 
legitimacy'; and, if attention to the concept of 'international society' is insufficient 
to found a school, how much attention to which concepts would be sufficient? 
Grader never properly answers this crucial question. Wilson's criterion, though, 
is equally vague: he gives no indication of a general process by which we can 
select the 'substantive arguments' upon which a school is based, and thus, like 
Grader, begs a crucial question: how strong an agreement on which substantive 
issues would be sufficient to found a school? It is clear that, if we are to clarify 
the intellectual context that structured Bull's conception of modern international
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society, then we need a more detailed account of the basis of the tradition of 
speculation in which Bull was a participant than can be provided by either 
Grader's or Wilson's criteria. Unfortunately for the purposes of our enquiry, 
neither of the ideas of shared 'philosophical assumptions' nor common positions 
in 'substantive arguments' is detailed enough to enable us to make a clear 
assessment of the dynamic tradition shaping Bull's intentions in developing his 
particular conception of international society, and neither helps us to explore the 
way in which Bull developed his account of modern international society by 
simultaneously drawing on and challenging aspects of the work of scholars who 
were self-consciously involved in similar projects.
Instead of these broad, unspecified categories of 'philosophical 
assumptions' or 'shared substantive arguments', a more rigorous account of the 
logical conditions for the existence of a school of thought could be based on four 
requirements and would give us a great deal more analytical purchase on the 
relationship between the English school and Bull's anarchical society thesis. First 
of all, the idea of a school implies a degree of institutional continuity. The most 
obvious example of this is the Frankfurt school, where the identity of the school 
was quite literally constituted by a group of writers' shared membership of a 
particular institution. That a group of theorists formally belong to an institution 
seems to be a fairly straightforward requirement. It is especially important when 
we are considering the initial establishment of a school, before a clear, shared 
intellectual position has been fully established, but is more dispensable once such 
a coherent 'manifesto' has been worked out, and when school membership can 
arguably be gained by signing up to a particular intellectual programme, as 
discussed below. Of course, this requirement could easily be accommodated by 
Jones's original conception of the English school, with its institutional focus on 
the LSE.
Secondly, there is a lot of sense in Wilson's point that the adoption of 
common positions in substantive arguments is an important element in the 
establishment of a school of thought. However, it is important to qualify this
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general formulation in two ways. First, such interventions in substantive debates 
should be made in an inter-connected manner. It would not do to identify a 
school because a group of academics happen to defend similar positions on a 
range of issues, even if they defend those positions for very different reasons, or 
with very different goals in mind. To talk about a school, agreements on 
substantive arguments should be made with the deliberate intention of sustaining 
a jo in t position against rival arguments. As a second qualification, the range of 
issues on which members of a school make interventions should be carefully 
circumscribed. It would be odd to group theorists in a school if they worked in 
a wide variety of different areas, some of which overlapped and where there was 
common ground, but in some of which they expressed quite different interests or 
points of view. To speak of a school implies that the members of the school have 
roughly similar hierarchies o f interest, and regard certain kinds of substantive 
arguments as being more important than others. This helps to identify which 
agreements are important, and which are irrelevant, when particular theorists 
agree on some issues and disagree on others, thereby lending more specificity to 
Wilson's category of agreement on 'substantive arguments'.
This leads into the third requirement, that a school should contain certain 
characteristic themes o f internal dissension. The point here is that a school is not 
only constituted to defend a particular position against various opponents; a 
school is also established when a group of theorists regard a set of questions as 
being of primary importance, and when they share sufficient common ground that 
they regard an on-going debate between themselves on this issue as one of the 
most useful and productive academic activities available to them. This point 
addresses Grader's challenge that the members of the putative English school each 
have different conceptions of international society.(Grader, 1988: 38) Grader 
might be correct on this point, but this difference would not prevent them from 
constituting a school. On the contrary, it is highly significant that the various 
theorists in question are engaged in developing variations on a common theme: 
in a sense, this is one of the most distinctive characteristics of a school of thought.
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Finally, the members of a school should self-consciously regard themselves 
as sharing an intellectual project: for theorists to constitute a school, they must 
demonstrate a common unity of purpose. This raises a problem for Jones's and 
Wilson's conception of the English school, because it is hard to see Manning, 
Wight, Bull, Northedge and Donelan as obviously engaged in any common 
projects or shared research activities. They do not self-consciously divide 
academic tasks between themselves, and they do not explicitly set themselves any 
generally applicable goals or research agenda. To be sure, they are all interested 
in theorising modern international society, but they do not regard theorising 
international society as a shared endeavour, they are not working towards any 
commonly agreed focus, and this decisively weakens their credentials for 
inclusion together in a school.5
This rather long digression into the conditions of identifying a school of 
thought has been worthwhile, because it allows us to make a much more precise 
assessment of the intellectual context within which the earlier contests about the 
meaning of international society were carried on after 1945, and within which 
Bull shaped his conception of international society. The key point here is that the 
claim of Jones's selection—Manning, Wight, Bull, Northedge and Donelan—to be 
a school of international relations theory is seriously undermined. These theorists 
possess some of the relevant attributes, like institutional continuity or agreement 
on key substantive issues, but they lack others. Crucially, they are not self­
consciously engaged in a shared intellectual project and their discussions do not 
appear to exhibit characteristic themes of internal dissension. However, just 
because Jones' formulation is unsatisfactory does not deny the usefulness of 
placing Bull within a school of thought about international relations. It is possible 
to identify a group of theorists that possess all of these attributes, of which Bull 
is a member, and which is of crucial significance for gaining a proper 
understanding of Bull's conception of international society.
5. This point would apply, a fortiori, to those representations of the school which include theorists 
from further afield, such as E.H. Carr.(Buzan, 1993) Certainly, Carr was influential in the thinking of 
the English school, but he was not a member of the school.
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The group that most obviously meets the relevant criteria for being a 
school of thought is the British Committee for the Theory of International 
Politics.(Butterfield & Wight, 1966; Butterfield, 1975: 5-6; Watson, 1992: 2-7)6 
The British Committee, which first met in 1958, was a parallel project to the 
(similarly endowed) American Rockefeller Committee, which most notably 
included Kenneth Waltz among its members. The chairmen of the Committee 
were, respectively, Butterfield, Wight, Bull and Adam Watson. These four would, 
therefore, form the core of the English school so defined. Other important 
Committee members were Michael Howard, Geoffrey Hudson, Maurice Keens- 
Soper, Donald Mackinnon and Desmond Williams. The Committee met on a 
regular basis over an extended period of time, giving it an institutional solidity 
and consistency that is not shared by, for example, one-off events like the 1969 
Aberystwyth conference. As well as the well-known edited collection Diplomatic 
Investigations, important monographs by W ight and Watson were also based 
upon contributory papers to the British Committee.(Wight, 1977 & Watson, 1992) 
The members of the Committee were also united to defend particular approaches 
against rival positions, especially the classical approach described in Chapter 2. 
As we w ill see in a moment, they had similar hierarchies of interests in their work 
on international relations, especially concerning themselves with moral 
philosophical and historical questions. In addition, certain key questions were the 
subject of recurring disagreement within the Committee; and finally the 
Committee members did, at least initially, set themselves shared intellectual tasks, 
especially in the comparative historical study of international relations. Thus, the 
Committee satisfies the four conditions for being a school of thought outlined 
above.
The research programme of the English school
This might seem to be labouring a rather trivial point, since to identify the English
6. The cited works offer good introductions to the work of the Committee. It should be noted that the 
idea that the English school can be represented as the British Committee is also suggested by Nick 
Rengger and Chris Brown.(Rengger, 1992; Brown, 1992)
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school with the British Committee involves only marginal changes in personnel 
and very few new insights into the importance of certain texts in the English 
school literature. The main change in these terms is probably the exclusion of 
Manning and Northedge from the English school, and a much increased emphasis 
on the importance of Butterfield and Mackinnon in the development of the 
school. However, although it only leads to a minor change in the personnel of the 
English school, defining the school as the British Committee offers a significant 
advantage in terms of clarifying the research programme of the school.
The strength of the Committee's shared agenda should not be 
overestimated, but there was a clear effort to establish a sense of unity out of the 
Committee members' diverse interests. Williams made clear at the outset of the 
Committee's work that the lack of identical viewpoints should not obscure the 
sense of a shared undertaking. He points out the areas which the Committee was, 
and was not engaged in.
In my view the committee did not come together either for the 
purpose of arranging an agreed outlook on international relations 
in general or for the purpose of merely discussing current affairs. Its 
real function was to bring together a group of people with a 
common, though not a similar, interest in international relations 
from an historical and theoretical viewpoint. It is quite likely that, 
in the course of time, a certain harmony of attitude w ill develop 
and that, in fact, we shall reach a certain unity of purpose amid the 
diversity of viewpoints. In practice this is what normally happens, 
however wide the diversity.(Williams, 1959: 39)
In practice this is what did indeed happen: soon the Committee members felt 
themselves to be engaged in a coherent project. As W ight construed it in 'De 
Systematibus Civitatum', a paper originally presented to the Committee in 1967.
My aim in the present paper is to offer some notes towards 
clarifying the idea of a states-system, and to formulate some of the 
questions or propositions which a comparative study of states- 
systems would examine. Some of them may be beyond the limits 
of our enquiry; many may be wrongly formulated. But they 
illustrate the kind of issue which I believe we should discuss
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systematically.(Wight, 1977: 22)
Therefore, the Committee "decided to make a prolonged study of States-Systems 
in various parts of the globe throughout the ages,"(Butterfield, 1975: 6, & see also
1965) with the initial intention of producing a common work on the subject, 
much in the manner of Diplomatic Investigations. Accordingly, "the committee 
set out to compare the historical evidence, and see what the systems in various 
parts of the globe have in common and how they differ."(Watson, 1992: 3) By the 
early 1970s it was quite clear that the task was too ambitious for a single volume 
(as noted in a letter of the British Committee in 1971) and so the responsibility 
for producing the work was left to the individual members to write separate 
treatises, with the encouragement and frequent assistance of the other members 
of the Committee.(Butterfield, 1975: 6; Watson, 1992: 2-5) The separate 
production of Wight's Systems o f States and Watson's The Evolution o f 
International Society reflect this realisation of the scale of the undertaking, and 
the individual parcelling out of an essentially communal task.
The school's research programme was not, however, exhausted by this 
monumental comparative-historical task. Wight also posed a key question that 
reveals their sensitivity to the normative issues raised by this choice of historical 
programme: "For what reasons are we inclined (as I think we probably are) to 
judge a states-system as per se a more desirable way of arranging the affairs of a 
great number of men than the alternatives, whatever these may be?"(Wight, 1977: 
44) On this crucial normative question, although the school was principally 
interested in the modern states-system as an historical individual, it also was more 
generally interested in the meaning and role of 'Western values' in international 
relations.(see Wight, 1966b) This opened out the school's evaluative interpretation 
of modern international relations in ways that extended beyond their more 
restrictive historical focus on states-systems, and provides some grounds for 
believing that the school contained important evaluative disagreements about the 
concept of international society, albeit in a slightly restricted form compared with 
the earlier debates in international political and legal thought. Therefore, the
92
research programme that the school adopted embraced both evaluative and 
historical dimensions, which centred on the meaning of 'western values' and on 
an historiographical focus on the European states-system as a mechanism ensuring 
order and the toleration of difference in international politics.(see Dunne, 1995a: 
131-32)
Evaluative interpretation in the English school: Crotian dualism
The idea that the members of the British Committee should concern themselves 
with the study of 'Western values' was very forcefully suggested by Butterfield in 
an early Committee paper. He argued that the major issue of the time, the Cold 
War, "has of necessity to be conducted henceforward as a war of ideas and 
ideals."(Butterfield, 1959: 15) As he saw it, "the stage is now set for a conflict of 
ideals in the world at large", and one in which the basic issue was the 
international spread of Western liberal-democratic values.(Butterfield, 1959: 12 
& 17) Obviously, this made it important for the Committee to understand the 
meaning of 'Western values' and their place in international relations.
Wight provided a catalogue of those 'Western values' which he believed 
to be relevant to modern international relations: individual positive liberty, 
toleration or open-mindedness, constitutionalism, moderation, resistance and 
responsibility or prudence. (Wight, 1966b: 88, 89, 91,122 & 128) In a sense, this 
illustrates the breadth of different evaluative interpretations possible in the English 
school. He seems to place most emphasis on the fact that "it is a characteristic of 
medieval and modern Europe that...it has cultivated [the] middle ground, and 
developed the conception of a political morality distinct equally from personal 
morality and from Realpolitik."(Wight, 1966b: 127) This middle ground rejects 
appeals to individual moral sentiment or articles of faith, and yet it nevertheless 
"upholds the validity of the ethical in the realm of politics", making, in effect, an 
"accommodation between moral necessity and practical demands."(Wight, 1966b: 
128) This understanding of 'Western values', which is both tellingly different from 
Realpolitk and echoes E.H. Carr's earlier influential account of the need for a
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balance between realism and utopianism,(Carr, 1946) is very closely associated 
with Wight's conception of the Rationalist tradition, which he also saw to be 
concerned to occupy the ' via media' in international relations theory, between the 
Revolutionist and Realist traditions, balancing the Revolutionists' moral sentiment 
with a characteristically Realist awareness of the role of power politics.
Therefore, in elaborating this initial normative interest in 'western values' 
in international relations, Wight was, to a degree, associating the English school 
with the Rationalist perspective on world politics, and locating their enquiry 
within the 'Grotian tradition' of speculation about world politics, including 
Grotius and "his offspring and descendants among Grotian writers on international 
law, together with Hooker, Althusius and John Locke, and the Founding Fathers 
of the American Republic, at least Washington, Madison and Hamilton, to say 
nothing of Jefferson."(Wight, 1991: 15) Through this rough affinity between 
'Western values', 'Rationalism' and the 'Grotian tradition', one can identify the 
terrain on which the normative debates within the English school were 
prosecuted. Although it was not so broad as the original canvass of discussions 
on the concept of international society, this terrain nevertheless left plenty of 
room for disagreements because, as Wight himself remarked, "In Grotius's 
description of international society there is a fruitful imprecision."(Wight, 1966b: 
102) This imprecision occurs as the result of the bifurcated purpose to which 
Grotius' political theory is dedicated. In the apt phrase of Richard Tuck: "Grotius 
was both the first conservative rights theorist in Protestant Europe and also, in a 
sense, the first radical rights theorist."(Tuck, 1979: 71) This dualism in Grotius's 
thought w ill be more fully explored in Chapter 4; for now, we are merely 
concerned with the way in which this dualism was played out in the English 
school, largely through a disagreement between Bull, Butterfield and Mackinnon.
Bull's contribution to this debate w ill be reviewed in more detail in the 
next section, since his account of the Grotian tradition forms a crucial element in 
his anarchical society thesis. Here, it w ill suffice merely to observe that Bull's 
conception of Grotian 'solidarism' offers a rather statist perspective on Grotian
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thought, arguing, for example, that "The central Grotian assumption is that of the 
solidarity...of the states comprising international society, with respect to the 
enforcement of the law."(Bull, 1966c: 52, emphasis added) As w ill be argued 
later, this is not a misreading of Grotian theory, but it is a partial account. While 
acknowledging some of the more 'Janus-faced' characteristics of Grotius' 
approach, for example in his discussion of the importance Grotius attributed to 
natural law or the status of individuals as subjects of international law,(Bull, 
1966c: 67-68) Bull's account places a clear emphasis on the absolutist tendencies 
in Grotius' theory. This leads Bull, despite an acknowledgement of the 
significance of the Dutch Revolt as a political context for Grotian theory, to 
suggest that, "Grotius, in his view of the relationship between man and the state, 
was an 'absolutist' or 'Hobbesian'. The subjects of the state, he says, have no 
right of rebellion by natural law."(Bull, 1992: 85)
Among the members of the English school, Butterfield and Mackinnon 
were more sensitive to the liberal and republican elements in Grotian thinking. 
The cornerstone of this reading of Grotius in the English school was Hirsch 
Lauterpacht's celebrated earlier interpretation of Grotian international political 
thought. Lauterpacht identified no less than eleven components of the Grotian 
tradition of thought, of which the main elements from a liberal or republican 
perspective were the independent role of natural law and the law of nations, the 
analogy between states and individuals, the rejection of reason of state as the 
basis for political morality, and the assertion of the rights and freedoms of 
individuals.(Lauterpacht, 1946: especially 19-51) On the first point, Lauterpacht 
notes that Grotius combines together natural and positive themes, in the sense 
that "though a great deal of international law proper rests on consent, much, but 
not all, of it follows from the precepts of the law of nature."(Lauterpacht, 1946: 
21) On the second point, Lauterpacht argues that the state-individual analogy 
means that "The individual is the ultimate unit of all law, international and 
municipal, in the double sense that the obligations of international law are 
ultimately addressed to him and that the development, the well-being, and the 
dignity of the individual human being are a matter of direct concern to
95
international law."(Lauterpacht, 1946: 27) With regard to the rejection of reason 
of state, Grotius's attitude was, according to Lauterpacht, one of "a challenging 
absence of recognition", in the sense that Grotius quite simply ignored the "flood 
of books and pamphlets on the 'Reason of State'" then current.(Lauterpacht, 1946: 
30) Finally, with regard to the fundamental rights of individuals, Lauterpacht notes 
that "behind [Grotius's] facade of the general disapproval of the right of resistance 
there lay qualifications so comprehensive as to render the major proposition 
theoretical."(Lauterpacht, 1946: 45)
Picking up on some of these themes, Butterfield argued that the concepts 
of Christendom and ultimate individual responsibility were central to Grotian 
theory, rather than the assumption of solidarism between states. Butterfield argued 
that "those who hold that the development of etatisme has been responsible for 
some of our evils may feel that these two aspects of Grotian ism need revival 
rather than suppression."(Butterfield, 1962: 12) He offered a plaintive, but 
nonetheless pointed, comment on Bull's rendition and criticism of the Grotian 
conception of international society. "When thought gets lost in abstract nouns and 
pretentious collectivities, I sometimes feel that we might find our way back to 
sanity if we could reduce all questions to their simplest terms, doing our thinking 
on the basis that nothing save human souls really counts or really exists in this 
world."(Butterfield, 1962: 14)7 Mackinnon's contribution to this debate was more 
sustained than Butterfield's, and engaged more systematically with the distinction 
between natural law and natural rights, which (as Tuck shows) is central to 
Grotius's contribution to the radical branch of early modern European rights 
theory. Although Mackinnon did not acknowledge this as connecting directly to 
the dispute over the Grotian conception of international society, we can read 
Mackinnon's work as an attempt, by proxy, to intervene in the debate from the 
perspective of a liberal defence of the importance of natural rights.(Mackinnon,
1966) Immediately, we have moved towards the radical elements of Grotian 
political theory: "A natural right is a right that men claim to be theirs as men; they
7. It may be interesting to compare this comment with Bull's more solidarist remarks in the Hagey 
lectures, cited in Chapter 1.
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demand recognition of their right to subsistence or freedom to associate, not as 
citizens...but as men."(Mackinnon, 1966: 80, emphasis original) This is, as 
Mackinnon argues, both individualist and naturalist, and implies a liberal (i.e., 
voluntarist) conception of political obligation in international society. In particular, 
Mackinnon calls for a liberal theory of political obligation in international 
relations which, "must engage with the very difficult question of the individual's 
justification in challenging and indeed resisting decisions in the field of 
international relations, made by the executive."(Mackinnon, 1964: 7) In other 
words, Mackinnon in effect argues for a radical version of Grotian natural rights 
theory as the basis for a conception of international society constructed from a 
liberal, or at least individualist evaluative perspective, which would justify 
individual resistance against sovereign authority. Mackinnon's view of political 
obligation, resistance and natural law in international society might be called the 
apogee of solidarist Grotian thinking within the English school.
This debate could be seen as the result of a lack of clarity over how to 
understand a difficult and often contradictory thinker. This dualism derives from 
Grotius's articulation of two different political projects at different times in his life, 
for quite understandable political and personal reasons, and it creates the 
possibility of constructing the concept of international society from two very 
different evaluative perspectives. One of these would be consistent with 
individual rights, a republican conception of political community and a theory of 
obligation which includes a strong right of resistance, a la Mackinnon. The other 
is consistent with the idea of a society of externally absolutely sovereign states, 
aware of the need to account for state interest and deeply skeptical of the 
standing of individuals, a la Bull. W ithin the English school debates about the 
meaning of 'western values', Rationalism and the concept of international society 
were initially constructed along these lines. The former evaluative perspective was 
already, however, handicapped by the need to appeal to Grotius as a key thinker, 
since his is an early, weak and imperfect account of voluntarism or resistance 
theory compared with, for example, Locke's or Jefferson's. For it to be fully 
developed, it would have been necessary to give an account of the nature of
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modern international society of equal sophistication and clarity to Bull's 
'anarchical society'. This was made almost impossible by the second aspect of the 
English school's research programme: its attachment to Rankean historiography, 
and hence to the significance of the states-system as the institutional basis for 
order in modern world politics.
Historical interpretation in the English school: the modern states-system
As we saw earlier, the major historical task that the English school set itself was 
the comparative study of states-systems. This choice was informed by the work of 
the 'Gottingen school' or German 'Historical school', and was mainly carried on 
by W ight and Watson. Their focus here accorded a unique significance to the 
development of the continental European states-system. The idea of a 'states- 
system' was the basic analytical category that they employed, and the further 
explication of this system was the main goal of their historical research. It must 
be admitted that some of Wight's early work on juridico-constitutional 
developments in the British Empire and Commonwealth did not share this focus, 
but this seems to have played relatively little part in his work for the 
Committee.(Wight, 1946, 1947, & 1952) Watson gives an unequivocal statement 
of the goal of this project: "to bring [Heeren's Handbuch der Geschichte des 
Europaeischen Staatensystems] down to the present."(Watson, 1987: 150) Their 
project was, therefore, guided by the ways in which the Gottingen historians like 
Alexander van Heeren reworked Enlightenment universalist histories in favour of 
an historicist emphasis upon the pluralistic and power-political features of the 
modern European system.
In trying to identify the origins of the modern European system, Heeren 
attached a considerable importance to the Peace of Westphalia because he saw 
the Peace as "settling the leading political maxims" according to which the 
"subsequent policy of Europe" was conducted.(Heeren, 1873: 103) In particular, 
these maxims were embodied by the German constitution clarified in the 
Westphalian Treaties, which established the independence of the German states
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with respect to the Holy Roman Emperor and thus helped to make the balance 
of power a principal object of state conduct.(Heeren, 1873: 101-103) The result 
of his emphasis on the independence of the German states under the Westphalian 
Treaties was that the "most important"(Heeren, 1873: vii) feature of modern 
European history came to be seen as the interaction of states in a system 
characterised by "internal freedom; that is, the stability and mutual independence 
of its members."(Heeren, 1873: 5, emphasis original)
In light of his fascination with the independence of seventeenth-century 
German principalities, it is perhaps understandable that Heeren's account of 
modern European history was profoundly hostile to, and dismissive of, republican 
ideas and institutions. This attitude towards republicanism was integral to his 
understanding of the European states-system, because he used the supposed 
predominance of monarchical institutions to argue that "the management of public 
affairs became more and more concentrated in the hands of princes and their 
ministers, and thus led to that cabinet policy which particularly characterizes the 
European states-system."(Heeren, 1873: 7) One can see Heeren's anti­
republicanism most clearly in his treatment of the international role of the United 
Provinces of the Netherlands, especially in his assertion that Dutch republicanism 
"could tend to the propagation of no new ideas, and most certainly of no 
republican enthusiasm in the rest of Europe."(Heeren, 1873: 64) On this point, it 
is striking that Heeren does not pay proper attention to the role of republican 
ideas in the Dutch Revolt, the English civil war or the Glorious Revolution. 
Furthermore, Heeren blandly observes that the political arrangements of the North 
American colonies "were united with a considerable leaven of republicanism, 
which the state of society in these colonies naturally produced."(Heeren 1873: 
116) He makes no connection between the republican character of colonial 
government and the existence of powerful European colonising regimes of a 
similar political disposition.
The lasting significance of this historiographical assumption lay in its 
implied valuation of the development of the European society of sovereign states
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and balance of power diplomacy as the key mechanism of international order in 
the eighteenth century. This was predicated on three classically Rankean 
propositions: that Europe held predominance in the universal history of mankind 
since 1492; that European history between 1492 and 1798 could essentially be 
viewed in terms of the development of the modern state; and finally, that these 
European states formed a society, based on common culture, religion and moral 
outlook.(Butterfield, 1955: 110-111) The second and third of these were 
especially crucial to the further development of the English school's historical 
conceptualisation of modern international society. The historiography that the 
English school adopted therefore compelled a focus on the juridico-constitutional 
history of the absolutist, territorial state as the basis for the construction of the 
European, and subsequently international, society, leading to the basic proposition 
that "Among the regional systems into which the world was divided that which 
evolved in Europe was distinctive in that it came to repudiate any hegemonial 
principle and regard itself as a society of states that were sovereign or 
independent."(Bull & Watison, 1984: 6)
This explains the constitutive importance attached to the Peace of 
Westphalia w ithin the English school's historical narrative of international society. 
Wight, despite his reservations, argued that the Peace represented, "the legal basis 
of the states system."(Wight, 1977: 113) That this is so is almost a signature of the 
English school. As we w ill see in a moment, Bull took 1648 to mark "the 
emergence of an international society as distinct from a mere international 
system."(Bull, 1992: 75) For Watson, "The concept of independence for a similar 
multitude of small states in our present international society...has evolved from 
the Westphalian settlement and bears an inherited resemblance to it."(Watson, 
1992: 196) For his part, Butterfield concentrated on the importance of the Peace 
in defusing European religious conflict. He felt that this involved the creation of 
a new kind of international order:
The concept of an international order that shall have room for both
Catholic and Protestant, and shall lim it the form of the warfare or
rivalry between them, is once again a more specialised thing, and
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it is a necessary accompaniment of the development that is taking 
place. At this more refined level one ... claims to be fighting for the 
balance of power; and, in this new context, the principle begins to 
come into its own.(Butterfield, n.d.: 14)
Thus, the balance of power was the key mechanism of the 'new concept of an 
international order', which was grounded on the principle of cuius regio eius 
religio as the basis of tolerance. It is worth noting that Butterfield's argument for 
this principle and this mechanism is not predicated on the 'logic of anarchy', the 
universal struggle for power, or other conventional realist ideas, but upon his 
gloomy prognosis about the prospects for reconciliation otherwise of religious 
strife. Butterfield's understanding of how cuius regio eius religio came to 
underwrite the European society is based almost entirely on his assessment of the 
urgency of the need for a solution to the problem of the toleration of difference.
The emergence of religious dissent that proved irrepressible must 
have been of momentous importance, since the principle of cuius 
regio eius religio meant that the Respublica Christana was itself 
splintered and multiplied, and the secular power was recognised by 
treaty as having what was tantamount to unprecedented authority 
over religion.(Butterfield, 1965: 6)
Here, Butterfield's more general research focus on history and religion seems to 
have drawn him away from the conclusion that his reading of Grotius should have 
indicated: this historiographical tradition, upon which the English school draws, 
overlooks the importance of natural rights or republican theories in contesting the 
more or less absolutist principle of cuius regio eius religio as the basis for 
seventeenth-century international organisation. The focus on the Peace of 
Westphalia as a fundamental constitutive moment in the development of the 
modern international society prevents any alternative focus upon the ways in 
which these natural rights or republican resistance theories developed into 
practical theories of government and institutions which were also constitutive of 
modern international society. With a deep but telling irony, then, the English 
school's exclusive focus on 'German school' historiography may ultimately have 
depended on Butterfield's efforts to try to understand the relationships between
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The historical narrative which the English school developed, on the basis 
of the historiographical assumptions derived from Heeren, thus led them towards 
a particular account of the origins and expansion of the modern international 
society. Most tellingly, this was based on a rejection of naturalist arguments about 
the universal and progressive character of human reason, and instead 
concentrated on an historicist sensitivity to the differences and peculiarities of 
particular cultural formations. This led the English school to prioritise the principle 
of cuius regio eius religio as the desirable basis for international society, because 
it made possible the toleration of those cultural differences which were 
highlighted by the historicist approach. Those who, like Butterfield, had preferred 
a more liberal interpretation of the Grotian conception of international society 
nevertheless accepted this historiographical solution as the only possible basis for 
religious toleration. The idea that the expansion of European society illustrated the 
success of the principle of cuius regio eius religio and the related institutional 
mechanisms of absolutist states and balance of power politics supported this 
predisposition. The result was, as Watson puts it, "The European system since 
Westphalia—that is, during most of its existence—has theoretically been a society 
of independent states who all recognise each other as such. The committee 
accepted the theory."(Watson, 1990: 103)
The above analysis can be summarised as follows: the earlier contest about 
the meaning of the concept of international society did play a part in conceptual 
debates in the English school. It intruded into the process of conceptualising 
international society through the slender opening offered by Grotian dualism, and 
thus the contest was carried on in a limited, narrow and fragile form. This was an 
especially weak basis for the construction of a more liberal, republican or 
resistance-oriented evaluative perspective on international relations because 
Grotius' theories also contain a strong absolutist theme, and the ensuing version 
of the long-standing contest over the meaning of international society was further 
prejudiced by the school's commitment to the Gottingen historians' theory of 
modern European history.
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§3. The anarchical society thesis
Bull's anarchical society thesis emerged within this already relatively narrow and 
biased conceptual contest. His argument was, in effect, a formidable synthesis of 
the two major elements of the English school's research programme. What Bull 
did was to take a relatively authoritarian reading of the absolutist or statist 
elements in Grotian theory, harness it to the Rankean historiography favoured by 
the English school, and thus develop a conception of modern international society 
as an anarchical society of sovereign states, grounded in a norm of absolute 
external sovereignty, a positivist legal doctrine of non-intervention and the 
institutional mechanism of balance of power diplomacy between states. Although 
this is not Bull's terminology, one might call this constellation of norms, rules and 
institutionalised practices the 'diplomatic ethic', since it describes a code of 
conduct within which diplomatic relations were (and are) carried on between 
representatives of sovereign states.
This furnished Bull with an argument that had three salient features. First, 
it combined evaluative and historical interpretation, to produce a 
methodologically-satisfactory account of a distinctive, significant and meaningful 
element of modern international relations. Secondly, it did so in a way that 
definitively settled the conceptual contests within the English school in favour of 
one particular formulation of 'Western values' and the Grotian tradition, excising 
the liberal, republican and resistance-oriented elements of the tradition. Thirdly, 
it offered a powerful interpretation of contemporary world political order, in terms 
of the ebb and flow of the institutions and consensual basis of the society of 
states. This was a formidable thesis, and it proved dominant w ithin the English 
school at the time. There are three important steps to the construction of Bull's 
conception of modern international society. The first is an interpretation of 
Grotian international political theory, which has already been briefly outlined and 
w ill now be discussed in more detail; the second establishes a connection 
between this version of Grotianism and the diplomatic practice of the Peace of 
Westphalia; the third extends the Grotian-diplomatic affinity further by relating it
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to the standard of 'civilisation' that governed the expansion of international 
society. Bull's most original, or at least distinctive, contribution was made through 
his interpretation of the Grotian tradition; from there, the other two parts of the 
argument fell into place rather easily, thanks to the previous establishment of this 
historical narrative in the English school's research programme. Therefore, the 
analysis here w ill devote most attention to this crucial first step in the anarchical 
society thesis.
Bull's interpretation of the Crotian tradition
In his interpretation of the Grotian tradition, Bull in effect practiced two sleights 
of hand. First, he developed what purported to be an account of Wight's three 
traditions, but in which, unlike in Wight's account, the concept of 'international 
society' was tied exclusively to the Grotian-Rationalist tradition. Then, Bull subtly 
changed the content of the Grotian-Rationalist conception of international society 
to emphasise its legal positivist and authoritarian statist dimensions, undermining 
the legal naturalist, liberal and republican themes that were also present in 
Grotius's thought, and that had been more fully acknowledged by Wight, 
Lauterpacht, and others.
On the first point, Bull faithfully recorded the principal doctrines of 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism; but crucially, he stopped short of 
describing the different traditions' views as different conceptions of international 
society. Thus, Bull's description of 'Machiavellians' {i.e., Realists) highlighted their 
view that "there is no international society; what purports to be international 
society...is fictitious."(Bull, 1991: xi-xii) He did not go on to discuss the Realist 
conception of international society that Wight had identified. Similarly, the 
'Kantian' {i.e., Revolutionist) assertion of an essential community of mankind was 
related by Bull to a concern with 'international morality'. He did not mention 
Wight's point that this was also a vision of the real essence of international 
society, although it is odd to suppose that one can meaningfully appeal to a 
particular version of international morality without having a distinct conception
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of international society.(Bull, 1991: xii) In the end, Bull acknowledged Wight's 
survey of the traditions' differences in terms of "the distinctive doctrines that each 
of them put forward concerning war, diplomacy, power, national interest, the 
obligation of treaties, the obligation of an individual to bear arms, the conduct of 
foreign policy and the relations between civilized states and so-called 
barbarians."(Bull, 1991: xii-xiii) It is telling that their various conceptualisations 
of the state of nature and international society are not on this list, even though 
they form a major part of Wight's treatment.
Bull's decision not to attribute conceptions of international society to the 
Machiavellian and Kantian traditions led him to the conclusion that only Grotians 
conceive of international relations in terms of an international society. Moreover, 
both Hobbesians and Kantians came to be seen as radically antagonistic towards 
the idea of international society.
In place of the Hobbesian view that states are not limited by legal 
or moral rules in their relations with one another, and the Kantian 
view that the rules to which appeal may derive from the higher 
morality of a cosmopolitan society and enjoin the overthrow of 
international society, [Grotians assert] the duties and rights attaching 
to states as members of international society.(Bull, 1996b: 38-39)
It therefore seems only to be the Grotian tradition that "describes international 
politics in terms of...international society."(Bull, 1977: 26)
Furthermore, as the above quote suggests, Bull depicted the Grotian 
tradition as attached to a surprisingly statist account of the membership of 
'international society'.
The sovereign state, in Grotius's scheme, clearly has a privileged 
position in relation to other bearers of rights and duties in the great 
society of all mankind.... If there is a right of individuals and non­
state groups to resort to private war, it exists only in abnormal 
circumstances; under normal conditions, the right to resort to force 
is the privilege of the sovereign state.(Bull, 1992: 84-85)
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However, for Wight, as we saw earlier, the Rationalist conception explicitly 
included states, individuals and non-state actors as members of 'international 
society'. In his early essays in Diplomatic Investigations^Bull, 1966b & 1966c) 
Bull to a degree accepted this point (although always in a qualified way), but by 
the time of writing The Anarchical Society, he came to insist more outspokenly 
that "the Grotians accept the Hobbesian premise that sovereigns or states are the 
principal reality in international politics; the immediate members of international 
society are states rather than individual human beings."(Bull, 1977: 26) This is 
one aspect of the significance of Bull's dual use of the term 'Grotian' to refer both 
to the concept and to one particular conception of international society, which 
was noted in Chapter 1 above.(see Bull, 1977: 322n) By relating the Grotian 
tradition as a whole to the idea of a society composed more or less exclusively 
of states, the individualist, or at least non-statist, strands of Grotian thought, which 
re-emerge to an extent in the idea of a solidarist as opposed to a pluralist 
conception, are muted and are brought in only as qualifications to an essentially 
statist perspective.
It w ill be recalled that Wight developed his account of the Rationalist view 
of international society by showing how Grotius and Locke are connected; both 
blur "the antithesis between natural and social conditions...the transition to civil 
society is not a breach with the moral law of nature but a development of 
it."(Wight, 1991: 38) This argument, as Wight pointed out, was used by Locke 
against Hobbes (and Filmer) as a crucial part of the challenge to absolutist 
political obligations. "Just as the Realist doctrine that the state of nature is a state 
of war leads to an unlimited contract; so the Rationalist doctrine that the state of 
nature is a quasi-social condition, institutionally deficient, leads to a limited 
contract; a contract of the Lockian type."(Wight, 1991: 39) Thus, Wight notes that 
both Grotius and Locke share an understanding of the overlapping intersection 
between political society and the state of nature, and this is both a crucial part of 
the Rationalist understanding of international society and central to the defence 
of individual rights against absolutist theories of political obligation. This 
formulation of the state of nature underpins a lim ited contract, within which fairly
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extensive rights to resist sovereign power can potentially be defended. The 
connection from here to Mackinnon's demand for a voluntaristic theory of 
international political obligation is not hard to see.
By contrast, Bull represented Grotius's 'institutionally deficient' view of 
international society simply as a medievalist hangover: it is a consequence of the 
fact that "In Grotius' time these institutions existed only in embryo; the 
international society he describes is an ideal or normative one, for which there 
was as yet little concrete historical evidence."(Bull, 1992: 90) There was little 
awareness on Bull's part of the political theoretical significance of this 
'institutional deficiency', nor of the way in which Wight used this connection 
between Grotius and Locke to open the Rationalist tradition out to a more 
voluntaristic theory of political obligation. This connection made Wight's 
extension of the Grotian tradition to American revolutionaries like Jefferson 
plausible. Bull, on the other hand, insisted that "Grotius appears very remote from 
the doctrine of Locke and his disciples among the American and French 
revolutionaries".(Bull, 1992: 85) Through his identification of the Rationalist 
tradition with Grotius, coupled to his absolutist interpretation of Grotius, Bull 
changed the personnel of the Rationalist tradition.
Perhaps more significantly, Bull's argument also changed the political 
theory of the Rationalist conception of international society. Although Bull 
acknowledged the possibility of alternative readings and contextualisations of 
Grotian political thought, he denied that they were applicable to the Grotian 
conception of international society. This is because he denied that either the 
Dutch Revolt or Grotius' early works were effective in shaping the origins of 
modern international society. Bull described the Dutch Revolt as a movement of 
national self-determination, and thus made it fairly easy to characterise within a 
conventional conceptual framework.(Bull, 1992: 70 & 86) However, he nowhere 
acknowledged the importance of the Revolt as a site for the development of 
innovations in the political theory of resistance.(see below, Chapter 4, §2) 
Crucially, Bull also denied the international relevance of Grotius' early works,
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which were unequivocally embedded in the political theory of the Dutch Revolt. 
Bull's first essay on Grotius was merely, as he himself admitted, "a treatment of 
De Jure Belli ac Pads" rather than an overview of Grotius' work taken as a 
whole.(Bull, 1966c: 51) Later, Bull offered a defence of the decision to focus on 
the later work. He claimed that the historical and constitutional significance of the 
early works was limited to the Netherlands, and considered only two of Grotius' 
works to have any international significance whatsoever: De Jure Praedae and De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis.iBull, 1992: 70-71) Even then, De Jure Praedae was reduced 
to its limited local significance as a treatment of a specific incident in the Dutch 
revolt: it was not regarded in the context of wider themes of political resistance, 
and its main importance was that "the material that went into this youthful work 
of advocacy was absorbed into the writing of the mature and systematic treatise: 
De Jure Belli ac Pads."(Bull, 1992: 71) As we w ill see in the next Chapter, there 
is a strong connection between Bull's absolutist interpretation of Grotius and this 
limited focus only on the later work De Jure Belli ac Pads. Because of this 
limitation, Bull underplayed the varieties of political theory created by Grotian 
ambiguity, and underestimated the significance for international political theory 
of certain themes that are most clearly articulated in Grotius's earlier works. The 
problems with this interpretation of Grotius are discussed in more detail in the 
next Chapter.
Thus, Bull developed an interpretation of Grotius that simultaneously 
narrowed the conceptual dispute about the nature of international society and 
acknowledged Grotian dualism in a rather grudging way. Crucially, Bull 
emphasised the statist and absolutist strands of Grotius's thinking, and thus made 
it seem as if the significance of Grotius's ideas for modern international society 
was that they served as a precursor of the subsequent scientific theories of 
international law in the society of states developed by positive international 
lawyers like Emerich de Vattel. As Bull put it,
although Grotius's view of international relations concedes so much
more to the domestic analogy than does that of [the legal positivist]
Oppenheim, it may be argued that his own orignality, his
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'contribution', was to have assisted the movement of thought in a 
direction quite opposite to this. The place of a domestic model in 
De Jure Belli ac Pads may be seen as a medieval residue; its 
novelty as lying in the stirrings it contains towards the conception 
of international society as a unique society, that is fully defined 
only by the writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.(Bull,
1966c: 66)
Through these two sleights of hand, the concept of international society came to 
be associated exclusively with the Grotian-Rationalist tradition, and the Grotian 
tradition came to be associated with a more exclusively statist conception of 
modern international society than had previously been the case.
The origins and expansion o f international society
This interpretation of Grotian political theory presented Bull with an excellent 
opportunity to develop an ideal type of modern international society through a 
methodologically unified evaluative and historical analysis of international 
relations that attributed ontological priority to the pluralist conception of 
international society. This achievement was unmatched in the rest of the English 
school, since alternative evaluative readings of the political theory of the Grotian- 
Rationalist tradition were not followed up in proper historical interpretations. 
Bull's argument here was based on the two further elements of the anarchical 
society thesis: an account of the origins and of the expansion of modern 
international society. The former is a straightforward version of the classic 
Westphalian focus and can be dealt with very quickly.
Here, the essential point that Bull picked out was the relationship between 
his reading of Grotian theory and the diplomatic practice of the Peace of 
Westphalia, which had already been highlighted by the Committee's attachment 
to Rankean historiography. While recognising that there were important 
differences between the two, Bull could still claim that Grotian political theory 
was "given concrete expression in the Peace of Westphalia" and that, "in their 
broad impact on the course of international history the theory of Grotius and the
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practice of the Peace of Westphalia marched together."(Bull, 1992: 75 & 77) The 
combination between Grotian political theory and the diplomacy and substance 
of the Peace of Westphalia therefore provided a conjuncture of great 
methodological significance for Bull's theory of international society. In one 
convenient package, Bull could identify a tradition of political theoretical 
speculation about the constitutional principles at the heart of modern international 
society, which was broadly consistent with a set of diplomatic practices that were 
open to historical investigation. He could therefore construct a methodologically 
satisfactory account of the origins of modern international society, that combined 
evaluative interpretation with historical and axiological analysis. The juxtaposition 
of absolutist Grotianism as the forerunner of positive international law and the 
Westphalian system of sovereign, territorial states thus provided the core of Bull's 
ideal type of modern international society.
Having established this affinity between Grotian international legal thought 
and the diplomatic practice of the Peace of Westphalia, Bull subsequently 
rounded off his account of the nature of modern international society with an 
account of the process by which this seventeenth century international society 
developed into the contemporary international society. This story was told in 
terms of a process of expansion because the essential features of modern 
international society—the principle of state sovereignty, positive international law 
and balance of power diplomacy—were held to have originated in Europe, and 
to have been originally conceived to apply only to European states. The current 
global coverage of international social rules and institutions thus raised a crucial 
question: how was modern international society transformed "from a society 
fashioned in Europe and dominated by Europeans into the global international 
society of today, with its nearly two hundred states, the great majority of which 
are not European"?(Bull & Watson, 1984: 1)
This question is conventionally answered by drawing attention to the 
extension of membership in international society to embrace states that Europeans 
considered to be 'civilised'. As Bull put it, "The standard European view of this
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emergence of a universal international society was that non-European states 
entered an originally European club of states as and when they measured up to 
criteria of admission laid down by the founder members."(Bull, 1984a: 123)8 In 
outline, Bull's story of international social expansion, which was extended and 
deepened by Gerrit Gong, concentrated on three main steps: the definition of a 
standard of'civilisation' by European diplomats and positive international lawyers 
(and some naturalist lawyers too); the initial imposition and subsequent fulfilment 
of this standard in non-European countries; and, finally, the recognition by 
Europeans of the 'civilised' character of certain non-European countries, and their 
formal admission into international society as more or less equal and independent 
sovereign states. By examining the working through of this process in different 
parts of the world, Bull was able to chart the development of the modern 
international society up to the early twentieth century.
According to Bull and Gong, international society began to be opened out 
to the possibility of admitting non-European members when "the international 
society which had earlier identified itself with Christendom and then with Europe 
came gradually to characterise itself as 'civilised'."(Gong, 1984: 4 & see also Bull, 
1977: 34) The point of this change was that it extended the scope of positive 
international law, if only potentially, "according to secular, non-geographically 
bound, universal principles".(Gong, 1984: 54) Thus, it introduced a new and 
more flexible way of categorising political communities. Hitherto, a state had 
either been European or non-European. Now, a new, relatively fluid distinction 
became possible, between 'civilised', 'semi-civilised', 'barbarous' and 'savage' 
societies, each of which enjoyed a particular status with respect to the society of 
states.(Gong, 1984: 55) Such was the power of this distinction, especially in
8. It should be noted that Bull recognised that this 'standard European' account has met two main 
challenges.(Bull, 1984a: 123) First, from the thesis that a universal and egalitarian 'family of nations' 
already existed on the basis of sixteenth and seventeenth-century natural law, and was unilaterally 
changed from within by the rise of European legal positivism.(Alexandrowicz, 1967) Secondly, the 
'standard European' account has been challenged by the thesis that non-European practices had an 
impact on the ways in which European states conducted themselves in international society, and that 
it is Eurocentric to see non-European states as having had no influence on the values, rules and 
institutions of modern international society.
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conjunction with other intellectual developments in European thinking, that even 
those international lawyers with naturalist inclinations, such as James Lorimer, 
succumbed to this way of thinking about the distinction between societies.(Bull, 
1977: 38 & Gong, 1984: 49)
Of course, such a profound change in the identity of modern international 
society raised a crucial question: what did it mean to be 'civilised'? According to 
Gong, the standard of 'civilisation' emerged through a two-step process: first, 
through codification in treaties between European and non-European societies, 
which established certain rough benchmarks and patterns of expectation as to 
what constituted 'civilised' behaviour; and secondly, through articulation by legal 
publicists as a more precise set of legal requirements.(Gong, 1984: 25-33) Paying 
most attention to the latter part of the process, Bull located the core of the 
standard in "certain formal criteria of statehood, e.g. that there must be a 
government, a territory, a population, and a capacity to enter into international 
relations or fulfil international obligations."(Bull, 1984a: 121) Like Bull, Gong 
recognises that the 'civilised' state was supposed to possess an organised 
bureaucracy, obey international law, maintain proper diplomatic relations, and 
"by and large [conform] to the accepted norms and practices of the 'civilised' 
international society".(Gong, 1984:14-15)9 However, largely thanks to his greater 
emphasis on the role of the principle of extra-territoriality in early treaties, Gong 
identifies a further feature of the standard of 'civilisation' in modern international 
society: the 'civilised' state was also supposed to guarantee certain basic rights, 
such as life, dignity or property. This point comes out only rather imperfectly and 
vaguely in Bull's version of the cultural principles behind the standard,(see, for 
instance, Bull, 1977: 39) but is an important feature of the way in which the
9. This is rather similar to Robert Jackson's idea of an 'old sovereignty game', in which states consist 
of "a bordered territory occupied by a settled population under effective and at least to some extent 
civil -  that is 'civilized' -  government." Jackson's account is interesting, because it places more 
emphasis on a slightly different aspect of sovereign statehood: "they are organized, equipped and 
prepared for war even if they only wish to avoid it."(Jackson, 1990: 38) Thus, within this view, there 
are two paradigmatic accounts of the international personality of states: as a war machine, and as a 
subject of international law. The latter of these seems to me to be the main focus of the account of the 
standard of 'civilisation', although the former should not be ignored.
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standard of 'civilisation' transformed the internal organisation of non-European 
societies.
Thus, there are two main components to the standard of 'civilisation', 
relating to the internal social, political and legal organisation of a society, and to 
the external conduct of a society in its relations with others. In terms of the 
internal organisation of a society, the standard does not simply concern the 
capacity of a state to control its territory and defend itself against possible 
challengers, although this is an important element. It also regulates the way that 
a state can treat individuals, whether its own citizens or foreign nationals with 
regard to certain areas, especially judicial, penal and commercial. In terms of its 
external conduct, the standard entailed proper participation in diplomatic 
protocols and observance of international law. It also, as Gong notes, contained 
a more subjective element, in the sense that an aspirant to membership had to 
adhere to 'accepted norms and practices'.(Gong, 1984: 15) The latter feature of 
the standard gave a powerful role to established members of international society 
(that is to say, Europeans, at least initially), in determining whether or not the 
standard had been satisfied in the sense that accepted practices were being 
properly observed.(Gong, 1984: 55-56) O f course, it could be turned against 
European powers just as easily after World War Two and was a factor in the 
process of decolonisation.
The initial imposition of the standard of 'civilisation' was typically 
attendant on European displays of military superiority, and is often illustrated with 
reference to the 'capitulations' imposed on the Ottoman Empire, or the 'unequal 
treaties' imposed on China or Japan. The capitulations began to be imposed on 
the Ottoman Empire following its military decline, especially after the treaty of 
Carlowitz in 1699, "the first treaty signed by the Ottoman Empire as a defeated 
power."(Gong, 1984: 108) The subsequent defeat of the Empire by the Habsburgs 
led to the treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, in which "the Austrians dictated terms 
entirely to their own advantage and extracted profitable capitulations which 
served as a model for such treaties later in the century."(Naff, 1984: 150) In
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China, the Opium War of 1839 and the subsequent treaty of Nanking in 1842 are 
key moments, marking " the start of...a hundred years of unequal relations due to 
the imposition of 'unequal treaties' and of European standards of 
'civilisation'."(Gong, 1984: 137) They were followed in 1858 by the Tientsin 
treaties, which extended the process that "forced China to open its ports, to trade 
on Western terms, and to conduct its relations according to the patterns of 
international law and diplomatic representation familiar to the West."(Gong, 1984: 
140) The case of Japan is slightly different, in the sense that the treaties with the 
Americans of 1854 and 1858 were not the outcome of defeat in war. However, 
as Hidemi Suganami argues, the Tokugawa central administration was 
"intimidated by [Commodore Perry's] show of superior force [and] concluded that 
there was little it could do to avoid accepting some of his demands, at least 
temporarily."(Suganami, 1984: 190)
These were all early aspects of the process of international social 
expansion, and they did not involve the imposition of an already fully worked-out 
standard of 'civilisation'; indeed, they were themselves part of the process 
whereby the idea of what 'civilisation' actually meant in international law was 
properly established. Perhaps the most important features of this part of the story 
concern the way in which the various treaties established commercial access to 
non-European countries, diplomatic contact and protocol, and the principle of 
extra-territoriality. The establishment of commercial links led to profound changes 
w ithin the non-European countries, especially in the areas of the 'treaty ports'. 
Under the rubric of ensuring free trade, the provisions gradually transformed the 
judicial, administrative and fiscal systems of the non-European countries in regard 
to commercial affairs.(see, for example, Gong, 1984: 142 and 168-69). W ith 
regard to diplomatic relations, the 'unequal treaties' systematically dismantled the 
non-Europeans' conceptions of proper diplomatic conduct, and instituted a more 
European set of diplomatic formalities. For instance, in the case of China, the 
Europeans insisted on "diplomatic equality in official correspondence, the 
abolition of the word 'barbarian' from Chinese treaty texts, the assertion that 
Western-language texts of the treaties be authoritative, and the demand for
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permanent residence in Peking".(Gong, 1984: 43) Perhaps the most important 
aspect of the imposition of the standard was the development of the principle of 
extra-territoriality, under which European states extended their legal control over 
their own citizens into foreign countries. To retain their formal territorial integrity, 
non-European countries were thus forced either to treat Europeans as exceptions 
to the law or to reform their legal systems as a whole, so as better to conform to 
European expectations of 'civilised' treatment. While the first inroads of the 
standard of 'civilisation' into non-European countries were made through the 
European imposition of 'capitulations' and 'unequal treaties', the complete 
fulfilment of the standard of 'civilisation' was achieved only after reformist 
movements emerged within certain non-European countries, and sought to 
introduce the principles embodied in the standard.
To sum up the argument of this section: the anarchical society thesis 
represents the connection of the English school's work on the history of the 
modern states-system to one side of the evaluative debates that were 
simultaneously prosecuted in the school. Mackinnon's quite justified appeal for 
an international theory of political obligation which would incorporate a theory 
of individual resistance against sovereign authority was never acted upon. This 
would have involved exploring how the radical Grotian conception of 
international society was picked up, extended and more firmly grounded by 
subsequent thinkers like Locke or Jefferson. It would also involve the 
identification of an 'historical individual' associated with these views, the 
empirical-causal and axiological relationships of which could then be traced. 
Bull's thesis, by synthesising and codifying the conventional absolutist 
perspective, in effect prevented such alternative avenues from being explored, by 
resolving the conceptual contest about the meaning of international society on his 
own terms. What had once been one conception of international society (albeit 
an extremely important one) now became a generally-accepted definition.
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§4. Reconceptualising modern international society
The above analysis of the English school and the anarchical society thesis 
provides both the justification and the starting-point for the reconceptualisation 
of modern international society. It provides a justification because it is clear that 
Bull's conception of modern international society was compelling on the terms 
o f the English school's research programme, and specifically on the terms of the 
school's restrictive historiographical assumptions. In other words, Bull's 
conceptualisation of modern international society resolved the contest about the 
concept only with regard to a very narrow field of enquiry, defined by the 
intersection between absolutist Grotian political thought and 'German school' 
historiography. There is, however, nothing sacrosanct about this particular 
research programme, and there are therefore no grounds to suppose that Bull's 
idea of the 'anarchical society' of sovereign states is the only conception of 
international society that can reasonably be upheld as relevant to modern 
international relations. On its own, Bull's conception does not demonstrate the 
unreasonableness of the alternative Revolutionist or non-absolutist Grotian 
conceptions of modern international society. Just as Max Weber observes, for 
example, that there may be many different ideal types of capitalism, each 
selectively accentuating a particular significant feature of capitalist culture, so 
there may be many different ideal types of modern international society, each 
selectively accentuating a significant aspect of the way in which modern 
international relations are norm-governed.
Secondly, this Chapter has paid special attention to the debate in the 
English school about Grotian political thought, because this debate offers a'ready­
made' starting-point for the reconceptualisation of modern international society, 
from a different evaluative perspective than that adopted by Bull. This is not to 
say that the English school offers the only prospect for such a reconceptualisation; 
that would be to conceive the tradition of international society theory very 
narrowly indeed. However, by accentuating the legal naturalist, liberal and 
republican themes in Grotian international political thought, we can identify a set
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of normative principles in international society quite different from those 
accentuated by Bull. These principles would then need to be historically 
grounded in modern international practices, in order to provide a counter-point 
to Bull's conjunction between state sovereignty, legal positivism and balance of 
power diplomacy, which can be described as a kind of 'diplomatic ethic' in 
international society. This project w ill be pursued in Part 2 of the thesis: Chapter 
4 w ill discuss the Grotian tradition, Chapter 5 w ill identify a conjunction between 
Grotian principles and the early modern practice of colonisation, and Chapter 6 
w ill extend this conjunction through a new story of the process of the 'expansion 
of international society'.
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Part 2
An Ideal Type of Modern International Society:
The Colonising Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Solidarism
Introductory remarks: a solidarist evaluative interpretation o f world politics
The following Chapters are devoted to the task of constructing a new ideal type 
of modern international society, through a reappraisal of the three main 
components of Hedley Bull's conception of the anarchical society of sovereign 
states: the political theoretical content of the Grotian tradition, the origins of 
modern international society, and the expansion of international society. Each of 
these areas is examined in turn, and an alternative position to Bull's is developed, 
offering a new synthesis of theory and practice in modern international society in 
terms of the 'colonising ethic': the system of ethical principles that governed the 
practice of the colonisation of supposedly vacant lands or of colonial 
administration. The central purpose of this historical analysis is to develop a new 
interpretation of the solidarist elements of society and order in contemporary 
world politics.
. Mutatis mutandis, the overall structure of the argument resembles Max 
Weber's Protestant ethic thesis, in which a significant aspect of contemporary 
capitalist culture is historically interpreted in terms of its relationship to the ethical 
system of ascetic Protestantism, thus enabling Weber to present modern economic 
conduct as "rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling".(Weber, 
1930: 180) As Chapter 2 explained, constructing such an ideal type involves two 
related procedures: evaluative and historical interpretation. Essentially, this means 
that one must first identify a significant aspect of contemporary social or 
international relations, and then explore its historical emergence, principally 
through an analysis of the axiological relationships between contemporary norms 
and older systems of ethical principles.
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The historical interpretation developed in the next three Chapters w ill aim 
to build upon an evaluative interpretation of international relations contained in 
the Grotian tradition, but which has been neglected following the coming to 
dominance of Bull's conception (or ideal type) of modern international society. 
In Chapter 1, we saw that one formulation of this evaluative interpretation is the 
idea of 'solidarism', in the sense of collective action for common purposes and 
the recognition of individual rights and moral personality in international society. 
In Chapter 3, we saw that this idea could be related to Martin Wight's account 
of the classical Rationalist or eclectic conception of international society, which 
sees international society as comprising both states and individuals; or to certain 
components of the 'Western values' discussed by Wight, Herbert Butterfield and 
Donald Mackinnon, such as individual liberty, constitutional government and 
natural rights of resistance. The central task of the next three Chapters is to 
develop an historical interpretation of Grotian international theory and modern 
international relations that w ill illuminate the practical meaning of this solidarist, 
Rationalist or Western conception of international society.
This rather blunt way of fixing on the solidarist conception might seem to 
be an abdication of the need to justify this evaluative starting point through 
normative argument. Such a criticism might, for example, be suggested by Mervyn 
Frost's attack on verstehen sociology discussed in Chapter 2 above. However, this 
criticism would be mistaken. In the first place, since Weber's version of verstehen 
was modified through the thesis of essentially contested concepts, the 
identification of a solidarist evaluative starting point for historical enquiry is 
designed merely to re-open a debate that was previously closed down for the 
reasons explained in Chapter 3 above. In this context, it is necessary to articulate 
the solidarist position in a properly meaningful way before the kind of normative 
debate that Frost envisages can be undertaken. Furthermore, the focus here on 
solidarism does not imply a commitment to this position as a normatively 
desirable basis for world political organisation. Rather, solidarism is being 
explored because the primary intention is to loosen the grip of Bull's anarchical 
society thesis on the way in which we currently conceptualise international
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society. Since this solidarist conception is the one most firmly embedded in the 
'o ld ' Grotian tradition, it seems most sensible to try to 'revive' this conception 
rather than to try and articulate a completely new idea of the values, rules and 
institutions of modern international society. This recalls Alasdair Maclnytre's view 
of the proper way of arguing within a tradition which opened out the thesis as a 
whole. Indeed, as w ill become clear when the historical interpretation unfolds, 
while the solidarist conception of international society is significant, it is 
normatively problematic or ambiguous in many respects, especially through its 
association with the practice of colonisation. This is similar to the way in which 
Weber has a rather ambiguous normative attitude to the instrumentally rational 
form of conduct he regards as significant to modern capitalist culture.
Not least because it goes under a number of different names, and has many 
different possible referents, this complex conception of international society may 
appear a little confusing or under-specified to some readers. However, as Weber 
explained at the beginning of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, 
this is an unavoidable aspect of the process of constructing an ideal type: our 
ideal type of modern international society "must be gradually put together out of 
the individual parts which are taken from historical reality to make it up. Thus the 
final and definitive [conception] cannot stand at the beginning of the investigation, 
but must come at the end."(Weber, 1930: 47) At the end of the historical- 
axiological analysis of Grotian ideas and the practice of colonisation, we w ill then 
be in a position to give a proper account of the meaning of the solidarist 
conception of modern international society, and illustrate its relevance to 
contemporary problems in international relations.
Nevertheless, it may be helpful to offer a more detailed, but still 
preliminary, account of what solidarism, Rationalism or 'Western values' might 
mean in the context of contemporary international relations. To put this enquiry 
into a Weberian form, one might ask what features of contemporary world politics 
would lead one to have an interest in the solidarist conception of international 
society in the first place? Here, it is instructive to look at recent work on human
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rights and the democratic conception of 'self-determination' in international 
society, and at the emergence of relatively centralised international organisations 
like the United Nations. Together, these developments have given rise to what 
Richard Falk calls a 'UN Charter system of legal order',(Falk, 1985b) and it is this 
that seems to be the most interesting contemporary expression of solidarist 
principles; of'Western values' of individual liberty, constitutional government and 
natural rights; and of the Rationalist idea that states, individuals and non-state 
organisations all share moral and legal personality in international society.
To begin with, it is helpful to review the changes that have taken place 
since 1945 in the meaning of 'self-determination' as a principle of international 
law. The problem here is that the concept of self-determination is inherently 
subjective, since it requires a prior definition of the 'self' to which it refers. In 
particular, the concept was originally formulated by western liberals as part of the 
broader democratic proposition that government should be based on consent, thus 
giving the idea of self-determination an 'internal' focus. However, developments 
like the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States helped to construct 
a 'new UN law of self-determination'.(see Pomerance, 1982: 12) Here, the 
internal aspects of the principle of self-determination were largely ignored by non- 
European states, who concentrated on asserting an 'external' concept of self- 
determination, connected to the positive-legal idea of sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention. In other words, "while refusing...to recognise any 
right of self-determination directed against themselves, States of the Third World 
have eagerly joined in collective legitimation of the 'right' of self-determination 
directed against others."(Pomerance, 1982: 61 & see also Mayall, 1991: 421-22)
This may simply be grist to the pluralist mill.(see, for example, Bull, 1983) 
However, the excision of the liberal or democratic elements of the doctrine of 
self-determination may now be in process of being reversed, especially since the 
1975 Helsinki Declaration, which
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essentially embodies the idea that self-determination means a 
continuing possibility for a people to choose a new social and 
political regime. Self-determination, therefore, necessarily 
presupposes full respect for all the basic rights and freedoms of 
individuals. Thus, the Helsinki doctrine of self-determination to a 
great extent upholds some basic tenets of the Western conception, 
while the United Nations texts...tend to embody the gist of the 
socialist and Afro-Asian philosophy of self-determination.(Hannum,
1990: 158-59)
The Western conception has been further elaborated and affirmed by subsequent 
actions of states, such as the 1976 Algiers Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, 
until ultimately one can say that not only has more attention been focused on the 
'internal' concept of self-determination, but "there has been a shift from an all- 
embracing and generic concept of 'internal' self-determination [centred on the 
nation] to a notion that closely links the collective right to the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of individuals".(Hannum, 1990: 160, emphasis omitted) 
The present legal situation is such that Thomas Franck has gone so far as to speak 
of an emerging 'democratic entitlement' in international law, through which 
internationally generated and regulated rules and processes are increasingly 
determining the legitimacy of regimes within states according to democratic 
principles.(Franck, 1992) In the view of another international lawyer, W. Michael 
Reisman, the fundamental change that has driven this development in legal 
thinking about self-determination and sovereignty has been the rise of the idea 
that individual human beings have certain legally protected rights in international 
society: "By shifting the fulcrum of the system from the protection of sovereigns 
to the protection of people, it works qualitative changes in virtually every 
component.... Precisely because the human rights norms are constitutive, other 
norms must be reinterpreted in their light".(Reisman, 1990: 872-73)
These changes have given rise to the very interesting distinction between 
two broad patterns of international legal order: the 'Westphalian' and 'UN 
Charter' systems.(Falk, 1985b; & Cassese, 1986) The Westphalian system 
"constitutes the classic framework of legal constraint postulated to regulate a 
highly decentralised world of sovereign states".(Falk, 1985b: 116) In the
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Westphalian system,
Jurisdictional ideas about the reciprocal allocation of authority to 
govern territorially distinct units of space achieved great 
prominence.... Mutual respect for territorial supremacy within well- 
defined boundaries provided a formal basis for international peace 
and a mutually beneficial endorsement of authority to govern the 
internal life of national societies.(Falk, 1985b: 121)
Thus, in this system, as in Bull's pluralist conception of international society, 
"national governments are the basic sources of order in international 
society."(Falk, 1985b: 135)
The system of international law symbolised and partly codified by the 
United Nations Charter is quite different from Michla Pomerance's view of the 
'new UN law of self-determination'.1 Instead, Richard Falk's idea of the UN 
Charter system of legal order is that it "complements [the Westphalian system] by 
centralising some cooperative activities and contradicts [the Westphalian system] 
to the extent that community-oriented procedures come to displace sovereignty- 
oriented procedures."(Falk, 1985b: 123) The similarity between this system of 
legal rules and solidarism is hard to ignore. In practice, the UN Charter system 
involves a number of distinct phenomena in contemporary world politics:
(1) the mushrooming of international organisations...(2) the granting 
of a limited role to single human beings or to groups of people in 
the international arena...(3) the assignment of a fairly extensive role 
to organised peoples subject to such oppressive Powers as colonial 
States, racist regimes or foreign occupants...(4) restrictions on resort 
to military and even economic force by States; (5) the gradual
1. This reflects, of course, the famous tension in the UN Charter between Article 2, which states 
among other things that "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
its Members.... Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State", and Article 
55 which states the intention of promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."(see Brownlie, 
ed., 1995: 3-4 & 19) In this regard, the UN Charter has been a useful vehicle for the assertion of both 
the 'external' and 'internal' doctrines of self-determination. It is my contention that this is a reflection 
of a more profound ambiguity in the Grotian conception of international personality, and I will return 
to this dichotomy within the UN Charter in the concluding Chapter of the thesis.
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emergence of values designed to lim it at least the broad import of 
force as the exclusive legitimizing criterion in international 
relations...(6) the establishment of a set of devices calculated to 
facilitate the fulfilment of the three 'legal functions' of the 
international community...(7) [universal principles] which represent 
the backbone of the whole corpus of international rules...(8) a 
concern for the rights of individuals....and (9) certain values have 
emerged which States have decided to invest with pre-eminent legal 
force: peace, and the protection of human dignity from outrageous 
manifestations of human cruelty....(Cassese, 1986: 398-99)
Amongst other things, then, the UN Charter system of international legal order 
represents a rough consensus on a series of issues and values, especially 
restrictions on the use of force and the protection of human dignity; the partial 
centralisation of rule-making authority through the formation of new international 
organisations; the justification of some rights of resistance, especially against 
colonial authorities; and the attribution of a limited form of international 
personality to non-state organisations and individuals. In these respects, we can 
take it as a more concrete, codified form of the vague solidarist cum Rationalist 
conception of international society previously outlined.
Redefining solidarism in terms of the UN Charter system is not, however, 
a sufficient answer to the broader question of international society posed in 
Chapter 1. Unfortunately, Falk does not offer a proper historical interpretation of 
the UN Charter system. His account looks rather like Bull's in the sense that he 
attributes ontological priority to the Westphalian system of legal order, as reflected 
in his comment that, "In the contemporary international system the Charter 
conception is far from fully realized, the Westphalia conception is far from fully 
displaced."(Falk, 1985b: 116) This point of view is also a feature of Antonio 
Cassese's claim that there are two stages in the development of the 'world 
community' (which, in this instance, can be taken to be synonymous with the 
international society). The first of these extends from 1648 to 1918 and the 
second from 1918 to the present. The political and legal developments associated 
with the UN Charter system are located by Cassese exclusively within the 'second 
stage' of the international community. He argues that "a main turning-point in the
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world community occurred in 1917", and then argues that the scope and pace of 
this change in the international legal order widened and accelerated after 1945, 
with the increased salience of arms control and human rights after the use of the 
atom bomb and the discovery of the Nazi concentration and extermination 
camps.(Cassese, 1986: 4n & 64; see also Donnelly, 1993: 6) Thus, Cassese tends 
to see order in world politics in terms of an historical progression through 
different eras of world political organisation: from Christendom, to the 'modern 
international society' of sovereign states, to the contemporary era "which 
gradually evolved after the First World War (and especially the Second World 
War) [and] has the hallmark of novelty".(Cassese, 1986: 397) In this respect, he 
effectively re-affirms the ontological priority of the pluralist conception of 
international society.
Even though it does not supply us with a proper historical interpretation 
of the ethical system out of which the norms, rules and institutions of modern 
solidarism developed, Falk's idea of the UN Charter system still helps to specify 
and concretise the area of enquiry with which our historical investigation is 
concerned. The challenge, then, is to uncover the meaning of the 'rudimentary 
form of social life' embodied in the UN Charter system of international legal 
order. In particular, how can we make sense of the key features of this system, 
such as the partial centralisation of rule-making authority in international 
organisations, the justification of resistance, and the attribution of a limited form 
of international personality to individuals? The following Chapters w ill try to 
demonstrate that these contemporary international phenomena are intelligible in 
terms of the 'colonising ethic' embedded in Hugo Grotius's conception of the law 
of nations and the practice of colonisation.
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Chapter 4
A Reappraisal of the Grotian Tradition
The Grotian tradition finds its seminal expression in Hugo Grotius's account of 
the content, scope and efficacy of the law of nations, or jus gentium. It is worth 
making this simple observation because current students of international relations 
pay far too little attention to the actual substance and circumstances of Grotius's 
work. The present situation is well summed up by C.G. Roelofsen's complaint:
The majority of those authors who mention things like the 'Grotian 
system of international relations', 'Grotian eurocentrism', 'the 
Grotian state' or that well-known combination 'the Grotian law of 
nations and the Westphalian international sytem' are using these 
expressions as a convenient short-hand, transferred by one textbook 
to another.(Roelofsen, 1990: 8)
There is a problem with taking a 'convenient short-hand' or 'textbook' reading of 
Grotius. As Martin Wight famously commented: "Trying to pick a path once again 
through the baroque thickets of Grotius's work, where profound and potent 
principles lurk in the shade of forgotten arguments like violets beneath overgrown 
gigantic rhododendrons, I find that he does not say what I thought he 
said."(Wight, 1977: 127) If only to the extent that Grotius is an obscure, difficult 
and ambiguous author, whose work is open to many different interpretations, 
Roelofsen is quite justified in drawing our attention to the possible inadequacies 
of the conventional textbook reading. His challenge raises a series of thought- 
provoking questions: which elements of Grotius's thinking are included in and 
excluded from the conventional reading; what other interpretations of Grotius 
might alternatively make sense of his international political and legal ideas; and 
how might a different account of the Grotian conception of the law of nations 
change our understanding of the nature of modern international society?
As we saw in Chapter 3, one especially influential interpretation of Grotius 
and Grotianism emerged from the English school, through the work of Hedley 
Bull. Bull interpreted Grotius's view of the law of nations by analysing De Jure
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Belli ac Pads (JBP) in the context of diplomatic activity towards the end of the 
Thirty Years War. His conclusion was that the book helps to demarcate the 
boundary between medieval and modern international society, because it 
combines a nostalgic affection for the unified structures of medieval Christendom 
with some suggestions of a more modern awareness of the practicalities and 
possibilities of state policy and the need for a scientific approach to the 
identification of international legal rules. Thus, for Bull, Grotius's work serves as 
an important way-station in the gradual transition from medieval naturalist to 
modern positivist international legal thinking. Unfortunately, although Bull's 
reading captures certain elements of Grotius's work, it ignores or misrepresents 
two of Grotius's most important and influential contributions to modern political 
theory: his account of the historical development and meaning of the legal 
concept o f ownership, and his modification of the classical republican concept 
of sovereignty. The burden of the argument of this Chapter is to show how and 
why these elements of Grotius's thinking should be regarded as central to his 
contribution to international theory. The Chapter develops this argument by 
analysing Grotius's account of the law of nations in terms of the political theory 
of the Dutch resistance movement against Philip II.
In section 1, the general problem of Grotian ambiguity is introduced, with 
a more detailed discussion than that already given in Chapter 3. JBP is open to 
the interpretation given in this Chapter because the book incorporates several 
different themes, which have the potential for development in contradictory 
directions. To begin with, then, the plausibility of Bull's reading must be admitted, 
but attention is drawn to the elements of Grotian thinking that were either ignored 
or pejoratively treated by Bull. Section 2 then examines an intellectual milieu 
within which these neglected aspects of Grotius's ideas can be more fully 
appreciated: early modern European theories of resistance, and especially those 
arguments used to justify the Dutch Revolt against Philip II. The political theory 
of the Dutch Revolt was founded by adapting existing 'monarchomachic' 
Huguenot resistance theories to suit the unique circumstances of the Netherlands; 
a project in which Grotius played an important role, especially thanks to his post
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as official historiographer for the United Provinces. Section 3 is an exposition of 
Grotius's account of the law of nations. It posits that Grotius's accounts of 
ownership through occupation and of the divisibility of sovereignty both make 
sense within the terms of the resistance theory that was central to the Dutch 
Revolt. Section 4 extends this analysis by looking at the further development of 
these Grotian concepts in American Revolutionary political and legal thinking, 
especially in the context of the 'Jeffersonian approach' to international 
relations.(see Lang, 1985)
§1. Coping with Grotian dualism: the case for an holistic approach
As was asserted in the previous Chapter, Grotian political thought is characterised 
by ambiguity and dualism. For this reason, Grotius's writings have offered a sort 
of tabula rasa for later political theorists. "Every age, every school of thought has 
its own Grotius interpretation, so it seems."(Willems, 1985: 106) Most pertinently, 
as Richard Tuck has pointed out, Grotius's works provided the foundation for two 
quite different theories of political rights and obligations. On the one hand, 
Grotius explicitly supported an absolutist theory of political obligation, in which 
individual and collective rights to resist authority were severely curtailed. On the 
other, he helped to establish a framework for theories of property and resistance 
in a republican idiom, within which a voluntaristic theory of obligation could 
subsequently be defended. This explains Tuck's comment, cited earlier, that 
"Grotius was both the first conservative rights theorist in Protestant Europe and 
also, in a sense, the first radical rights theorist."(Tuck, 1979: 71)
As Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts have argued, it is impossible to 
separate these different political ideas from Grotius's international 
theory.(Kingsbury & Roberts, 1992: 61-62) This makes it seem very likely that the 
dualism of Grotian political theory might also apply to Grotian international 
theory, or, more precisely, to Grotius's account of the law of nations, as was 
recognised by Hirsch Lauterpacht.(Lauterpacht, 1946 & 1970a: 12-15) Similarly, 
John Vincent has made the political ambivalence of Grotius's ideas about
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international law explicit, noting that Grotius can be "called up in support of both 
the positivist doctrine of state sovereignty and the naturalist notion of the rights 
of individuals."(Vincent, 1992: 246) One of the most suggestive features of 
Vincent's comment is his recognition that it is not simply due to a confusion of 
medieval and modern elements of international law that Grotius offers an uneasy 
combination of legal naturalism and positivism; it is just as important that the 
tensions in Grotius's thought imply two different sorts of theory of rights and 
obligations in international society, concerning the alternative claims of states and 
individuals to be bearers of international personality.
For a first cut at understanding why Grotius's work contains this dualism, 
it is helpful to recall the colourful and varied nature of Grotius's career. Christian 
Gellinek has identified three stages in Grotius's intellectual career, which are 
demarcated by the different political activities in which he was engaged.(Gellinek, 
1984) Thus, the first period of Grotius's work extends from 1599-1618, described 
by Gellinek as the "poet/scholar in office". The second, 1621-34, was a period of 
"unimpeded scholarship" for the "humanist-in-exile"; and during the third, 1635- 
45, Grotius combined work on JBP with tenure of the post of Swedish ambassador 
to France (the hiatus between 1618-21 is explained by Grotius' imprisonment in 
Louevestein castle, during which time he principally worked on two books, O f 
the Truth o f the Christian Religion and the Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence). 
Across these three stages there is a considerable change in the tone of Grotius's 
writings, as his early enthusiasm for the republican institutions of the Netherlands 
gradually came to be more qualified.
Initially, Grotius was engaged in helping to provide arguments justifying 
the Dutch revolt, especially in his capacity as official historiographer of the revolt 
(a crucial post in the circumstances of the methodological revolution inaugurated 
by Jean Bodin, which is discussed below); as advocate fiscal of Holland, Zeeland 
and Friesland; and in offering legal arguments in defence of the actions of the 
Dutch trading companies, especially Piet Heyn's infamous seizure of the Spanish 
silver fleet, which was the principal inspiration for De Jure Praedae.isee Knight,
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1925: 36-149) Often, this work was so partisan as to verge on propaganda. After 
all, as Hamilton Vreeland has pointed out, Grotius had deliberately been chosen 
to write "a history of the exploits of marvellous courage displayed by the people 
of these tiny Provinces of the north, in the war to maintain their liberty against the 
tremendous attack of Spain".(Vreeland, 1917: 39) Putting aside Grotius's 
theological and poetical writings, the principal works of this early period are De 
Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae, Annales et Historiae, De Republica 
Emendanda, Parallelon Rerumpublicarum, Commentarius in Theses XI and De 
Jure Praedae (or De /nc//s).1 As is made most explicit in the Commentarius, the 
general orientation of these works was the justification of Dutch resistance against 
the Spanish. W ithin the terms of this project, Grotius was prominently involved 
both in the development of a republican political ideology through a Bodinesque 
comparative legal-historical method (especially in Parallelon Rerumpublicarum 
and De Republica Emendanda), and in the defence of Dutch liberties through 
both historical (De Antiquitate and Annales et Historiae; on this point, see 
Eyffinger, 1984) and more exclusively natural-legal (De Jure Praedae) arguments. 
As we w ill see, the early political, historical and jurisprudential works of Grotius 
fit extremely well into the general framework of the purpose, ideology and 
argumentation of the political theory of the Dutch revolt as a whole. Through 
these works, as one commentator puts it, Grotius "tended to manifest himself as 
a partisan and a patriot....an intellectual for Dutch republican law, order, and 
authority."(Wiersma, 1991 \2 : 70)
W hile Grotius therefore seems quite favourably disposed to Dutch 
republicanism and resistance in this early period, there was a substantial change 
of tone in his later writings.(Tuck, 1979: 63ff & see also Vermeulen, 1985a: 9, &
1. It is noteworthy that no good collection of Grotius' early works exists in publication. In part, this 
is because many of the works (such as De Republica Emendanda or the Commentarius) have only 
recently been rediscovered, and because in some cases the correctness of the attribution to Grotius 
is still questionable. Excerpts from De Antiquitate, Annales et Historiae and De Republica Emendanda, 
with a complete English translation of the third, are all in Crotiana.(Grotius, 1984) The Commentarius 
has recently been published with an excellent introduction by Peter Borschberg.(Grotius, 1994) The 
contemporaneously published excerpt from De Jure Praedae ("Mare Liberum"), can be found in 
Grotius, 1916. For excellent summaries of most of Grotius' early works, see Tuck, 1993: 154-79.
131
1985b) His enthusiasm for resistance and challenges to political order had always 
been lukewarm or, more likely, circumstantial, but in his later work, especially 
in his masterpiece JBP, Grotius expressed a number of views that were hostile to 
resistance theories. Thus, as E.H. Kossmann observes, "in his JBP [Grotius] held 
monarchy in higher regard than he had in 1610; indeed in the 1640s he admitted 
that the views which he had expounded in the De Antiquitate were 
exaggerated."(Kossmann, 1991: 289) This change has led to a view of Grotius that 
sees him as an unreserved supporter of absolutist theories of sovereignty; by 
extension, they lead to the supposition among students of world politics that 
Grotius dismissed the idea that individuals could possess personality in 
international society and instead regarded "the national sovereign state as the 
effective unit of international relations."(Wilson, 1984: 8) Certainly, on this crucial 
point of the individual's obligations to obey the ruler, Bull, as we saw in Chapter 
3, views Grotius in terms of an absolutist, rather than a Lockean, tradition of 
thought, contending that "Grotius appears very remote from the doctrine of Locke 
and his disciples among the American and French revolutionaries", and, by 
contrast, "was an 'absolutist' or 'Hobbesian'."(Bull, 1992: 85) In political 
theoretical terms, Bull is in good company here: Jean-Jacques Rousseau similarly 
finds a justification of slavery in JBP, which he interprets as a straightforward 
defence of absolutism and which forms one of the main targets of his essay on the 
social. contract.(Rousseau, 1947)
More generally, in light of the earlier remarks about the change in tone of 
Grotius's writings during his career, there is a fairly obvious connection between 
Bull's exclusive focus on JBP and his absolutist interpretation of Grotius. When 
Grotius's works are read together, it becomes much clearer that even in JBP 
Grotius does not support absolutism without significant reservations, and other 
aspects of his theory (especially his theory of the divisibility of sovereignty), which 
are developed throughout his various works (including JBP), often work against 
absolutist theories of political obligation. It is important to point out that this is 
not to say that there is a complete discontinuity between an early set of 
resistance-oriented works and later absolutist ones. Rather, the above argument
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suggests that JBP should be read in conjunction with the earlier works; not to do 
so risks misinterpreting the later, certainly more comprehensive, book, which, 
when put into the context of the complete Grotian oeuvre, reveals a thorough 
working-out of many of the radical themes of Grotius's earlier writings. This is 
precisely the error made by Bull: by discounting the earlier works as lacking 
relevance to international relations, he underestimates the significance for Grotian 
international political theory of certain themes that are most stridently articulated 
in Grotius's earlier works, but which are more comprehensively developed in JBP. 
To be sure, Bull's account is not, in any absolute sense, 'wrong'; but his 
interpretation is inaccurate and misleading. It is inaccurate because Grotius's 
apparent support for absolutism in JBP was carefully qualified, in such a way as 
to allow justification for the principal resistance movement of the period: the 
Dutch Revolt. Further, Bull's interpretation is misleading because to focus on the 
defence of the public authority of states in Grotius's work neglects the fact that 
a great deal of the argument of JBP is concerned with the conditions under which 
private individuals may justly engage in war, and with the defence of a republican 
conception of political community.
The problem, then, is not that Grotius has been ignored, neglected or 
marginalised by theorists of international relations. The problem is rather that 
Grotius, perhaps like Machiavelli,(see Walker, 1993: 41 ff) has been read in a 
narrow and unsophisticated way, so as better to conform to a pre-conceived 
notion of the nature of modern international society. In response to this problem, 
Roelofsen makes the excellent suggestion that we can reappraise the Grotian 
conception of the jus gentium and international society by looking at the 
evolution of Grotius's ideas in the context of the pre-Westphalian European 
system.(Roelofsen, 1990: 19 & see also Roelofsen, 1989 & 1992) In other words, 
by temporarily forgetting all that we presume to know about the origins of the 
modern international society, and by instead asking ourselves what was the 
immediate context of Grotius's work, we can come to a better understanding of 
the diverse themes in his thought.
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§2. Theories of political obligation and resistance in early modern Europe
How, then, are we to grasp the immediate, pre-Westphalian context of Grotian 
political theory? On precisely this issue, Quentin Skinner's views have been 
enormously influential in helping to shape contemporary understandings of 
Grotius, so let us first turn to Skinner's work on modern European political theory. 
As a methodological principle, Skinner argues that historians of ideas should not 
look exclusively either at the social context or the textual content of political 
theoretical works. Instead, he maintains that texts should first of all be placed in 
a "wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the 
given writer."(Skinner, 1969: 49, emphasis original) In other words, this approach 
emphasises the importance of authorial intentions within an antecedent language 
of political theory.(see Pagden, 1987)2 In working out the parameters of early 
modern political thought, and following Skinner's lead, many recent historians of 
ideas have concentrated on the ways in which absolutism was attacked by 
theorists eager to justify resistance. These innovations formed the basis for the 
subsequent development of voluntaristic theories of obligation and modern liberal 
contractarian political theories.(Tuck, 1979 & 1993; Tully, 1993) This forms an 
interesting counter-point to Bull's reading and contextualisation of Grotius' work. 
Obviously, it demands that we amend Roelofsen's suggestion somewhat, from a 
focus on the institutional circumstances of the pre-Westphalian system, to 
emphasising the prevailing language of political theory within which Grotius 
worked. To do this, we first of all need to understand the terms of the debate 
between theorists of princely absolutism, like Bodin, and the Huguenot 
'monarchomachic' theorists of resistance.
2. For slightly different approaches, but which are still suggestive of many similar themes, see Dunn, 
1980 and Pocock, 1972. I choose to concentrate on Skinner's account of modern political thought 
because historians explicitly working within a Skinnerian framework have paid most attention to the 
work of Hugo Grotius and other Dutch political theorists.(Tuck, 1979 & 1993; van Gelderen, 1992) 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that both Dunn and Pocock have produced work that echoes and 
complements much of the analysis presented below.
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The language of monarchomachic political theory
Skinner describes the emergence of a distinctively modern form of resistance 
theory in Europe in terms of a change from ideas about a religious duty to resist 
ungodly commands, to the justification of a political right to resist tyrannical 
rulers. In the Reformation, Lutherans, and subsequently Calvinists, needed to 
respond to St. Paul's doctrine that temporal authorities were sanctioned by God 
and should therefore be obeyed: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher 
powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of 
God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: 
and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation."(Romans: 13.1-2) In 
response to this doctrine, early Protestants either argued from magistrates' specific 
constitutional responsibilities to defend God's laws, or from individual rights in 
private law. The latter, more radical, approach was linked by some Calvinists to 
the idea that all individuals had participated in a covenant with God, to produce 
a relatively populist justification of individuals' religious duties to 
disobey.(Skinner, 1978: 192-238)
French Huguenots needed to secularise these religious justifications of 
resistance for two reasons. First, they were a religious minority in France, 
although they enjoyed the support of a number of nobles and influential political 
figures. Therefore, to attract broader support, or to neutralise active hostility, they 
needed a less overtly Protestant justification of resistance. Secondly, and more 
importantly in a wider European sense, temporal authorities began to find new 
arguments, and no longer relied exclusively on the Pauline doctrine to demand 
obedience. Instead, Bodin's absolutist theory of sovereignty provided a novel 
political justification of temporal authority, on the basis of a new comparative 
legal and historical methodology. Bodin's innovation was to move away from 
arguments based purely on religion or Roman law, towards an argument deriving 
legal principles from 'universal history'. This involved "three methodological 
departures of profound importance for the future: an exposition of jus gentium in 
the sense of a common law of nations, a system of comparative jurisprudence,
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and a sociological theory of legal history."(Franklin, 1963: 69) Bodin used this 
new approach to provide a novel foundation for absolutist political theories of 
obligation.
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that Bodin's innovation provided a 
key part of the methodological backdrop for Grotius's arguments.(Grotius, 1925: 
29; JBP, Proleg. §55)3 Indeed, it is because of his engagement with these 
background methodological arguments that many current scholars treat Grotius 
as a key thinker in the evolution of modern political thought, in that he thereby 
helped to found a modern scientific approach to the study of law, partly based 
upon what Tuck describes as a "descriptive ethical sociology".(Tuck, 1987: 115, 
& 1992) For our enquiry, it is noteworthy that the Bodinian methodological 
innovation helps to explain why Grotius devoted such attention to the question 
of the content of the law of nations, as part and parcel of his general political 
theoretical and legal enquiries: appeal to the common law of nations was a key 
part of early modern debates about resistance and obligations to obey. Of course, 
this suggests that it is anachronistic to make a strong distinction, as Bull does, 
between Grotius's 'domestic' resistance theories and his 'international' legal 
works. After Bodin, early modern political theorists saw the content of the jus 
gentium as having great bearing on their views regarding the proper organisation 
of a political community. A conscientious political theorist like Grotius would 
therefore feel bound to offer support for his views on domestic political authority 
with reference to the law of nations. There is, in other words, a strong 
methodological connection between the resistance-oriented and the international- 
legal elements of Grotius's work; contra Bull, they should not be read separately.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the implications of this point for Bull's 
reading of Grotius, the main political theoretical consequence of the sixteenth- 
century methodological revolution was that in the late sixteenth and early
3. To make it easier for readers interested in exploring Grotian ideas more closely, I will not only give 
page references to the edition of JBP that I have found most useful (the Carnegie edition), but will also 
give references by book, chapter and section.
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seventeenth centuries, resistance movements needed to find political, 
jurisprudential and historical justifications, as well as arguments based on 
accounts of the law of nations. In response to the new Bodinian arguments for 
absolutism, the Huguenots developed 'monarchomachic' political theory: a 
secularised constitutionalist theory of resistance, the most celebrated example of 
which was the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos.(Brutus, 1994; & Franklin, 1969) Two 
important features of monarchomachic theory concern us here. First, the theory 
departs from religious arguments by placing men and women in a condition of 
natural liberty. The doctrine of natural liberty was built upon a novel theory of 
property, modern theories of property thus being "part of a larger political theory 
which includes a right of resistance, and which is formulated in self-conscious 
opposition to absolutism."(Buckle, 1991: 3-4) According to Skinner, the 
Huguenots based their resistance theory on: "the inalienable and natural rights of 
the people to their lives and liberties—these being the fundamental and natural 
properties which everyone may be said to possess in a pre-political 
state."(Skinner, 1978: 328) This kind of argument was a staple of resistance 
theories of the period, and, as we w ill see, figures prominently in JBP.
Secondly, the Huguenots restricted some of the more populist implications 
of the natural liberty argument by putting it within the constitutional context of 
French society. Thus, the political right of resistance in defence of the peoples' 
liberties was placed exclusively in the hands of inferior magistrates. This provides 
the really distinctive core of monarchomachic resistance theory: "the magistrates 
and representatives of the people have the moral right to resist tyrannical 
government by force, a right which is founded on the prior and natural right of 
the sovereign people to treat the commonwealth as a means for security and 
improving their own welfare."(Skinner, 1978: 376-77) This gave the Huguenots 
a political theory which could appeal to non-Protestants through its invocation of 
popular sovereignty rather than religious duty, and which also conveniently 
emphasised the role of their principal constituency: inferior magistrates. The 
theory was thus tailor-made to suit the circumstances and needs of the Huguenot 
resistance movement.
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The innovations of Dutch political theorists
In this way, Skinner identified an important stage in the history of modern 
political theory in the emergence of a theory of resistance based upon a novel 
theory of property and natural liberty as well as a revised form of 
constitutionalism. He explained this largely in terms of the adaptation of the 
religious language of late medieval resistance theory to fit the specific 
circumstances faced by the French Huguenots. In so doing, he placed an 
overwhelming emphasis on the role played by the Huguenots in developing 
modern political thought, and claimed that Dutch political theorists deployed 
monarchomachic arguments that were essentially identical to those developed by 
the French.(Skinner, 1978: 337-38) Incidentally, in terms of the history of 
international relations theory, a similar account was offered by Wight, who 
identified early Revolutionist theories with monarchomachism. Again, like 
Skinner, Wight did not investigate the relationship between monarchomachism 
and early modern Dutch political thinkers like Grotius in any detail, thereby 
missing an extremely interesting and suggestive moment of contact between the 
Revolutionist and Rationalist traditions.(Wight, 1991: 8)4
In terms of our understanding of Grotius, this is a potentially critical 
omission. Using a Skinnerian methodology, Martin van Gelderen has recently 
shown that Dutch political theorists were more innovative than Skinner allows, 
and were important to the emergence of the modern political theory of resistance 
in their own right.(van Gelderen, 1992) Admittedly, there were some important 
general similarities between monarchomachism and the defence of Dutch 
resistance against Philip II. However, in certain key respects the Dutch revolt was 
justified by significantly different arguments compared with Huguenot resistance, 
and in large part this was a consequence of the peculiar legal and political 
circumstances within which resistance to Philip II was carried on, echoing
4. This offers an interesting counter-point to Andrew Linklater's argument that a radicalisation of the 
Rationalist tradition should be effected through a study of Kant's contribution to international theory. 
It suggests that one does not have to go to Kant to reconstruct Rationalism; one can do so simply 
through an engagement with Grotius's work in its Dutch Revolt context.
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Skinner's explanation of the sources of the innovations introduced by the 
Huguenots. Four differences in particular demand our attention: the relatively 
more popular nature of the Dutch resistance movement, compared with the 
Huguenots' stronger reliance on inferior magistrates; the different historical 
traditions of the Netherlands, allowing a stronger and, on Bodinian terms, 
methodologically more sophisticated case for the defence of contemporary 
political liberties; the more pronounced international dimension of the Dutch 
conflict with Spain; and, finally, the decidedly republican character of Dutch 
political theory, in contrast with the more monarchical tone of Huguenot thought.
First of all, the constituency of the Dutch Revolt was quite different from 
that of the Huguenots. Where the Huguenots enjoyed limited popular support, but 
could appeal to certain nobles and inferior magistrates, the Dutch revolutionaries 
could take a wide base of support more or less for granted. This is not to deny the 
importance of nobles like the Prince of Orange or Egmont in the revolt, nor is it 
to deny that the Dutch borrowed constitutionalist arguments from the Huguenots. 
However, it explains why Dutch authors were much more eager to adapt private 
law and radical Calvinist arguments to justify a more populist movement where, 
"the inhabitants [of the Netherlands] had the right actually to resist the forces 
Philip had sent to the Netherlands."(van Gelderen, 1992: 119) In this vein, the 
Dutch revolutionaries could turn the covenant argument of the radical Calvinists 
into a striking secularised contractarian defence of popular resistance: "The 
princes as well as the subjects of the country have always had to commit 
themselves by a formal contract...that they would maintain these rights and realise 
them. The inhabitants therefore owe obedience to the rulers only on condition 
that the freedoms are maintained".(Prince of Orange, 1974: 84) Thus, it is quite 
understandable that there was in the Dutch Revolt a much firmer insistence on 
the rights of ordinary people "to have recourse to what both divine and secular 
right allows...what nature commands, what reason prescribes and law permits, 
that is to taking up arms and providing for their prosperity and safety ".(States 
General, 1974: 152) In sum, in justifying the Dutch Revolt, theorists employed a 
much more individualistic and populist theory of resistance than French
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monarchomachic political theory, wherein the implications of the natural liberty 
argument were less restricted by constitutionalist qualifications.
Secondly, and relatedly, the account of 'natural liberties' given in the 
Dutch Revolt drew upon historical and jurisprudential arguments to support the 
attribution of individual properties in life and liberties, in a way that Huguenot 
theorists did not or could not. The key point here is that both Huguenot and 
Dutch political theorists could use natural liberty arguments as the theoretical 
basis for resistance. However, whereas in France constitutional, legal and 
historical arguments tended to support absolutist theories of obligation, and thus 
restricted the populist implications of natural liberty arguments, the reverse 
applied in the Netherlands. Arguments about natural liberty and self-possession 
in the Netherlands could be, and were, given an historical context in terms of the 
supposed ancient liberties and constitution of the Dutch. In other words, even 
where constitutionalist arguments were used, they proved less restrictive of the 
populist implications of the natural liberties argument than in the French case. As 
one example, "toleration, rationalised in political terms, was supposed to flow 
from the ancient constitution".(Kossman & Mellink, 1974: 29) In general, this 
allowed the Dutch Revolt to be portrayed as a defence of ancient liberties which 
were specific to the historical experience of the Dutch people. Therefore, in the 
Dutch Revolt, historical-jurisprudential arguments worked to enhance rather than 
mute natural liberty arguments. The political theorists of the Dutch Revolt could 
thus produce arguments that incorporated Bodin's methodological revolution, but 
which justified resistance against authority rather than absolutism, a remarkably 
robust and influential combination.
A third difference between the Dutch and the Huguenot resistance 
movements was that the Dutch Revolt was international in a way that the 
Huguenot movement was not.(see Israel, 1990 & Parker, 1976) In part, this rested 
on the importance of foreign intervention in the Revolt, such as the involvement 
of Leicester, and also on the situation of the Dutch at the heart of the international 
Protestant Reformation. However, more importantly for our purposes, the Dutch
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needed to develop a political right of resistance that was acceptable beyond 
Dutch society, and independent of the historical and constitutional traditions of 
Dutch society, because they needed to defend colonial settlements and 
commercial activity against Spanish and Portugese authorities. They needed to 
justify acts of resistance in places, like new colonies or the high seas, which 
lacked historically-identifiable constitutional privileges as the foundation for 
resistance. Consequently, the Dutch needed to extend the justification of 
resistance beyond the boundaries of the historical traditions of Dutch society. This 
is one powerful reason why accounts of natural law and the law of nations were 
so central to the Dutch Revolt, with Grotius's extract from De Jure Praedae, Mare 
Liberum, assuming special prominence.(Grotius, 1916) This was much more than 
a Bodinian methodological nicety; it was absolutely essential to the continuing 
security and prosperity of the United Provinces.
Finally, unlike monarchomachic theory, "the political thought of the Dutch 
Revolt should be qualified as republican."(van Gelderen, 1992: 281 & see also 
Bouwsma, 1968) The Huguenots did not substantially challenge the emergence 
of a discourse of reason of state in France, whereas the Dutch continued to cling 
to the older republican political vocabulary. Of course, this constitutes a 
significant difference between the Huguenot and Dutch conceptions of politics, 
and hence of resistance, to the extent that republican and statist political 
philosophies involve radically different understandings of the proper way of living 
in and governing a political community, involving "the distinction between 
politics as the art of preserving a res publica, in the sense of a community of 
individuals living together in justice, and politics as the art of the state—the art of 
preserving a state, in the sense of a person's or group's power and control over 
public institutions".(Viroli, 1992: 2-3) This can be seen very clearly in cases 
where, even when they did use constitutionalist arguments, the Dutch tended to 
subscribe to a republican goal of, "defending the right of resistance on behalf of 
the States as a fundamental principle of the art of politics, whose principal aim 
was to serve the common good of the res publica."{van Gelderen, 1992: 135) It 
should be noted that this defence of republicanism was to a degree circumstantial,
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in the sense that it followed on from the exhaustion of opportunities to install a 
suitable monarch.(Kossmann, 1991: 287-89) Nevertheless, whether from choice 
or necessity, the use of republican political language by the theorists of the Dutch 
Revolt constitutes a clear point of departure from monarchomachic theories, and 
one of great significance in terms of future resistance theories, especially in North 
America. This is a significant qualification to Maurizio Viroli's view that, by the 
end of the sixteenth century, an "ideological and linguistic 'revolution'" had taken 
place, at the end of which republicanism was "a sort of language of nostalgia or 
utopia—a language apt to dream about republics of the past or to long for a 
republic to come."(Viroli, 1992: 270, 9) While this may have been true for the 
French or Italians, for the Dutch, republicanism was a living political language.
In general, then, while the Huguenots made an "epoch-making move from 
a purely religious theory of resistance...to a genuinely political theory of 
revolution,"(Skinner, 1978: 335) "a similar 'epoch-making move', to the 
articulation of a 'genuinely' political ideology of resistance was made by the 
political thinkers of the Dutch Revolt."(van Gelderen, 1992: 275) Although 
monarchomachism was the main driving force behind the emergence of a modern 
language of rights in political theory, the theory of the Dutch Revolt diverged 
from monarchomachism in certain significant respects, to produce a specific 
dialect within which some theorists discussed these issues. This idiosyncrasy of 
the Dutch Revolt should be interpreted in four ways. First, the Dutch theory of 
resistance was more individualistic and less constitutionalist than 
monarchomachic theory. It was thgs closer to the later, more voluntaristic, 
theories of, inter alia, Locke. Secondly, the idea of natural liberty was, in the 
Dutch Revolt, linked to historical-jurisprudential forms of argument, because of 
the strong association between traditional political rights in Dutch history and the 
'natural liberties' invoked by monarchomachic resistance theorists. This produced 
an exceptionally powerful justification of the political right of resistance, and this 
way of arguing, combining natural and historical analysis, was of profound 
importance in terms of later theories; Locke and other British empiricists like 
Hume spring to mind.(see Buckle, 1991 & Westerman, 1988) Thirdly, the
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international character of the Revolt made some defence of resistance in the 
context of the law of nations a practical and immediate necessity, and explains 
why the Dutch theorists produced more significant accounts of the law of nations 
than the Huguenots. Fourthly, the Dutch ideology embraced a republican 
conception of politics, and thus contrasted with the emerging reason of state 
discourse. In general, then, "the political thinkers of the Dutch Revolt seemed to 
merge the language of jurisprudence with elements of the Republican 
language"(van Gelderen, 1992: 286), producing a more popular individualistic 
republican theory of resistance than monarchomachism, justified primarily through 
reference to natural law, the law of nations and historical freedoms.
The most obvious reason why the political theory of the Dutch Revolt is 
the appropriate context for making sense of the radical strands of Grotian political 
theory, is that Grotius was, as we have seen, a direct contributor to precisely this 
approach to justifying resistance, at least in his early works. Furthermore, this 
intellectual context makes clear how and why Grotius's work was so relevant to 
the concerns of resistance theorists, whether working in the Dutch or the fairly 
similar English and North American circumstances. In effect, Grotius pulled all of 
the threads of the specifically Dutch resistance theory together and articulated 
each of them in an unusually compelling way. He offered a highly sophisticated 
account of the theory of property required by the natural liberty argument, a 
seminal treatment of the relationship between the ancient and contemporary 
liberties of the inhabitants of the Netherlands, a celebrated version of the jus 
gentium that supported these claims (among others), and a powerful republican 
theory of sovereignty that rivalled both monarchomachism and absolutism. Quite 
simply, when one understands the content of the political language of the Dutch 
Revolt, Grotius's work, despite its many ambiguities and changes of tone, begins 
to make some sense as a whole, in that one can begin to see the relationships 
between apparently distinct parts of his political, legal and historical writings. One 
can also more easily appreciate why Grotius's work was held in such high regard 
by his contemporaries and successors as a significant contribution to seventeenth- 
century political and legal theory.
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§3. Grotius's account of the law of nations
The thrust of the above argument is that one should not try to make sense of 
Grotius's account of the law of nations as part of an emerging legal positivist 
appreciation of the realities of European diplomacy and state practice, but rather 
as part of an emerging discourse about rights and political obligations, conceived 
originally in direct opposition to absolutism, but ending up as a significant 
departure from monarchomachic ways of justifying resistance. This discourse did 
not embrace the language of reason of state, whether under the rubric of 
absolutist monarchical or popular sovereignty; instead it tried to keep alive or re­
develop republican conceptions of political community, to make them more 
consistent with the emerging legal, political and economic structures of modern 
societies. The discourse in which Grotius operated also offered a distinctive way 
of constructing the natural liberty argument, with a much stronger emphasis on 
the historical evolution of property rights. Admittedly, in Grotius's later works, this 
was offered only as a fairly minimal and unremarked right of resistance; other 
theorists were to enlarge on this basic structure to produce a more far-reaching 
and useful justification of resistance. Grotius, nevertheless, made important 
contributions to both of these elements of the discourse: he articulated a 
republican theory of sovereignty, and made its connections to resistance evident; 
and he gave a seminal account of the 'natural history'(Buckle, 1991) of property 
through his treatment of the concept of ownership. Let us now look more closely 
at JBP and see how these arguments were developed by Grotius.
Grotius's criticisms of monarchomachism
At first glance, however, Grotius's arguments seem like a blunt rejection of the 
possibility of resistance. He does not even see as arguable the point that "arms 
may be taken up against subordinates by those who are armed with the authority 
of the sovereign power."(Grotius, 1925: 138; JBP, l. iii.I. ii)  He simply accepts it 
as given that sovereigns have the authority to engage in war against their subjects 
in this way. Furthermore, in the reverse case, he argues that "as a general rule
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rebellion is not permitted by the law of nature", nor by Hebraic law, nor by the 
law of the Gospel, nor by early Christian practice.(Grotius, 1925: 139-46; JBP,
l.iv.2-6) Beyond these very general and, as we w ill see, carefully qualified 
comments, the primary reason why Grotius is so often regarded as an absolutist 
political theorist is his outspoken criticism of monarchomachic resistance theory 
in JBP. Certainly, Grotius attacked both of the planks of monarchomachic theory: 
the use of the idea of inalienable natural liberties to argue for popular sovereignty, 
and the constitutionalist argument for inferior magistrates' right of resistance. 
However, although Grotius was definitely opposed to monarchomachism, he 
should not, by that token alone, be regarded as an absolutist. Rather, he 
elaborates a concept of ownership which permits the natural liberty argument to 
be used to justify individual rights in the law of nations without the need for 
appeal to the proposition that popular rights of self-government are inalienable, 
and he develops a different kind of constitutionalist argument for resistance.
As a point of preliminary clarification, it w ill be helpful to note Grotius's 
fundamental distinction between public, private and mixed wars. "A public war 
is that which is waged by him who has lawful authority to wage it; a private war, 
that which is waged by one who has not the lawful authority; and a mixed war 
is that which is on one side public, on the other side private."(Grotius, 1925: 91; 
JBP, l.iii.1 .i)5 If we were to put the monarchomachic justification of resistance in 
these terms, we might say that the Huguenots offered accounts of resistance either 
as a just mixed war or as a just public war. The natural liberty argument offers a 
defence of private individuals waging a mixed war against public authorities, and 
the constitutionalist argument presents resistance as a kind of justified 'quasi­
public' war. What Grotius does is dispute each of these ways of thinking about 
and arguing for resistance, but not in such a way as to rule out legitimate 
resistance, nor private war, altogether. Incidentally, it is clear from this rather 
broad understanding of the concept of war that JBP is not intended to be 
exclusively about the just prosecution of war between sovereign entities; by
5. Note, just because private wars are waged by those who lack lawful authority does not mean that 
such wars are inevitably unjustifiable. See the discussion of 'private war' below.
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writing a book about the laws of war under this definition of different categories 
of warlike activity, Grotius is able to address practically all of the questions about 
obligation and resistance that were at issue in early modern political thought.
First, Grotius denies that the condition of natural liberty endows people 
with an inalienable set of rights for self-government. Thus, he denies that the 
condition of natural liberty necessarily leads to an ineradicable core of popular 
sovereignty. It is, so Grotius argues, legally possible for a people's natural 
freedoms to be entirely alienated.
To every man it is permitted to enslave himself to any one he 
pleases for private ownership.... Why, then, would it not be 
permitted to a people having legal competence to submit itself to 
some one person, or to several persons, in such a way as plainly to 
transfer to him the legal right to govern, retaining no vestige of that 
right for itself?(Grotius, 1925: 103; JBP, l.iii.8.i)
This claim is later bolstered by a version of the natural slavery argument, that 
"some men are by nature slaves...so there are some peoples so constituted that 
they understand better how to be ruled than to rule."(Grotius, 1925: 105; JBP,
l.iii.8.iv) According to this proposition, not only is it legally possible for a people 
to give away their entire right to govern, it is indeed natural for this to happen in 
certain cases. Although this adds force to the argument, it does not substantially 
change the basic proposition that it is legally possible for a people to give away 
all of their rights to self-government, resulting in the creation of a patrimonial 
sovereign authority. Thus, for Grotius, merely to assert the existence of a 
condition of natural liberty is not to provide an unanswerable defence of the right 
of resistance in the face of all particular claims to absolute sovereign authority, as 
the monarchomachs supposed.
Grotius follows this attack on theories of popular sovereignty with a strong 
rejection of the monarchomachic proposition that inferior magistrates have a 
constitutional right of resistance. To such a claim, Grotius gives the reply that
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from the point of view of those possessing higher authority 
[subordinate officials] are private persons. All governmental 
authority possessed by public officials is in fact so subordinated to 
the sovereign power that whatever they do contrary to the w ill of 
him who holds it is divested of authority and is, accordingly, to be 
considered as a private act.(Grotius, 1925: 146; JBP, l.iv.6.i)
In other words, there is nothing so special about the legal status of inferior 
magistrates that it permits them to engage in resistance. This indicates Grotius's 
shrewd understanding of the intentions of the monarchomachs in adapting 
constitutionalist arguments to their own purposes. Supposing that the natural 
liberty argument on its own was insufficient, the Huguenots sought to bolster their 
position by suggesting that resistance was not really a 'mixed' war at all, but was 
rather a kind of public war, since it could only be engaged in by public officials. 
Grotius recognises that this is a plausible interpretation of the category of 'public 
war', but nevertheless contends that "if the word public is understood in a higher 
sense as characterizing that which is done with due formality, as beyond question 
the word often is, such wars are not public, for the reason that both the decision 
of the sovereign power and other conditions are necessary for the fulfilment of the 
legal requirements involved."(Grotius, 1925: 98-99; JBP, l.iii.5.i) Therefore, he 
concludes that "a public war ought not to be waged except by the authority of 
him who holds the sovereign power".(Grotius, 1925: 100-101; JBP, l.iii.5.vii)
Obviously, this is a rejection of monarchomachic resistance theory. 
However, it is not sufficient reason to label Grotius as an absolutist, who denies 
a right of resistance altogether, since all Grotius has said up to this point is that 
the particular monarchomachic justifications of mixed and 'quasi-public' wars are 
ineffective: the.monarchomachic version of the natural liberty argument assumes 
that which has to be demonstrated, while the constitutionalist argument rests on 
a misunderstanding of the concept of 'public' war itself. These are criticisms of 
monarchomachic arguments, but they are not endorsements of the contrasting 
absolutist position. Indeed, having dispensed with monarchomachism, Grotius 
goes on to construct an account of natural law and the law of nations which 
justifies resistance in a different way from the monarchomachic argument.
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Grotius's theory o f property: 'occupatio' and 'dominium'
Let us begin by noting that Grotius's criticism of the monarchomachic version of 
the natural liberty argument is carefully limited so as not to deny the idea of 
natural liberty itself. In challenging the connection between natural liberty and 
popular sovereignty, Grotius makes it quite clear that he is only arguing that it is 
legally possible for a people to alienate all of their rights to govern to one 
individual. Although he is not so outspoken in his criticisms of absolutists as of 
monarchomachs (for fairly obvious circumstantial reasons), this open-ended 
proposition operates just as effectively against over-generalised arguments about 
political obligation that support princely absolutism. Grotius is not ruling the idea 
of natural liberty out of order altogether, but merely demonstrating its limitations 
as a tool of argument. As a lawyer, he seems understandably concerned about the 
monarchomachic attempt to use natural liberty arguments as a kind of trump card 
that would obviate the need for a painstaking examination of the precise legal 
situation that obtains in each particular case. In his view, whatever the status of 
natural liberty, one still has to ask questions about the historical development of 
the existing set of legal arrangements: had a people altogether ceded their right 
of self-government in the past, thus creating an absolute patrimony; or had they 
reserved any rights of government to themselves?
This is precisely what Grotius does, pointing out a number of cases in 
which sovereign authority is not held absolutely at all. Indeed, he argues against 
not only a blanket absolutism, but even against a presumption of absolutism in 
many cases, contending rather that, "In cases of kingships which have been 
conferred by the w ill of the people the presumption is, I grant, that it was not the 
w ill of the people to permit the king to alienate the sovereign power."(Grotius, 
1925: 119; JBP, l.iii.13.i) In other words, in cases where there is doubt about 
claims to absolute patrimony over a previously free people (as in the 
Netherlands), the burden of proof lies with would-be princely absolutists. In other 
cases, "it may happen that a people, when choosing a king, may reserve to itself 
certain powers but may confer the others on the king absolutely."(Grotius, 1925:
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123; JBP, l.iii.17.i) Thus, the king might have an absolute hold over certain 
elements of sovereign power, but not others. Grotius's position on this point may 
be summarised as follows. He does not accept the monarchomachs' easy 
transition from natural liberty to popular sovereignty, but this does not mean that 
he is necessarily endorsing an absolutist theory of political obligation. All it means 
is that he is leaving the question open, to be answered through case-specific legal 
and historical analysis. Furthermore, given the examples that Grotius uses, this 
gives us grounds for believing that he might still have been prepared to treat the 
Dutch Revolt as a justifiable act of resistance.
The ways in which Grotius uses his legal-historical analysis to support a 
non-monarchomachic constitutionalist justification of Dutch resistance as public 
war w ill be discussed later. First, however, it is important to explore some of the 
ways in which Grotius developed the natural liberty argument, through his 
discussion of just private war. It w ill be recalled that in his initial definition of 
terms, Grotius described private war as being 'waged by one who has not the 
lawful authority', and it might seem that this means that private wars are 
necessarily illegitimate. Grotius's answer to this problem is that private war is 
justifiable under two sets of circumstances: to ward off injury, and where no 
recourse to judicial proceedings is available. Both of these circumstances are in 
some senses independent of civil society. The former "would hold even if private 
ownership (as we now call it) had not been introduced; for life, limbs, and liberty 
would in that case be the possessions belonging to each, and no attack could be 
made upon these by another without injustice."(Grotius, 1925: 54; JBP, l.ii.I.v ) 
The latter might arise "if one finds himself in places without inhabitants, as on the 
sea, in a wilderness, or on vacant islands, or in any other places where there is 
no state".(Grotius, 1925: 92; JBP, l.iii.2.i) Here, Grotius is invoking the Roman 
concept of property as occupatio, which had in the past primarily been used to 
establish rights of ownership over w ild beasts.(Buckland, 1947: 139)
Two points are worth noting about this depiction of just private war. First, 
it is a development of the natural liberty argument, to the extent that it appeals
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to the natural possession of 'life, limbs and liberty'. Here, however, there is 
something very distinctive about Grotius's formulation. For Grotius, these liberties 
in the state of nature extend by virtue of the principle of occupatio so that "each 
man could at once take whatever he wished for his own needs, and could 
consume whatever was capable of being consumed."(Grotius, 1925: 186; JBP,
ll.ii.2.i) As Karl Olivecrona sums up, "According to Grotius, means of subsistence 
could be appropriated in the state of nature without any preceding 
compact."(Olivecrona, 1974b: 223) Subsequently, according to Grotius, this right 
of appropriation was superseded by dominium, in the sense of a consensual 
institution of private property, which was primarily arrived at through the 
acceptance of existing occupations of land.
This happened not by a mere act of w ill, for one could not know 
what things another wished to have, in order to abstain from 
them—and besides several might desire the same thing—but rather 
by a kind of agreement, either expressed, as by a division, or 
implied, as by occupation. In fact, as soon as community ownership 
was abandoned, and as yet no division had been made, it is to be 
supposed that all agreed, that whatever each one had taken 
possession of should be his property.(Grotius, 1925: 189-90; JBP,
ll.ii.2.v)
Thus, in his account of individuals' natural liberties, Grotius introduced a 
distinction between the civil institution of dominium  and the more 'natural' 
practice of appropriation based on occupatio. Admittedly, he is very cautious 
about the extent to which this constitutes a right of resistance in human society: 
appropriation does not guarantee rights into civil society, since it is over-ridden 
by the formation of a civil society and dominium  does not necessarily permit 
resistance. He does allow a small space for a naturalist justification of resistance, 
contending that "laws are formulated by men and ought to be formulated with an 
appreciation of human frailty."(Grotius, 1925: 149; JBP, l.iv.7.ii) However, this is 
in itself a very limited right of resistance, and strict constraints are specified as to 
how far such resistance may proceed, even when one is facing death.(Grotius, 
1925: 151; JBP, l.iv.7.vi; see also Tuck, 1979: 80) In Grotius's own hands, then, 
this story of natural liberty does not go very far: soon enough dominium  is
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instituted and effectively supersedes the rights of appropriation, depending on the 
precise legal principles adopted. However, the distinction proved highly 
influential among subsequent political theorists. As Olivecrona notes: "Grotius 
allowed appropriation without the consent of others only in the earliest stage of 
the world and presumably for very limited purposes; it lost its importance with 
the introduction of dominium  by way of convention. Locke, on the contrary, 
made appropriation the beginning and foundation of the right of 
property."(Olivecrona, 1974a: 223; see also Zuckert, 1994)
The second interesting point about Grotius's formulation is that it gives the 
natural liberty argument more contemporary relevance not by positing the 
inalienability of one's natural freedoms and rights (as under monarchomachism 
or Lockean political theory), but rather by identifying a specific set of legal 
circumstances in which natural liberties continue to hold good: namely, in 'any 
places where there is no state'. To this extent, Olivecrona seems slightly mistaken 
to suppose that Grotius only allowed appropriation 'in the earliest stage of the 
world', and this is one respect in which Grotius's account of property as 
appropriation rather than dominium  is even closer to Locke's than Olivecrona 
allows. The overlap even extends to their common use of America as a metaphor 
for a place in which appropriation might legitimately take place.(Grotius, 1925: 
187; JBP, ll.ii.2.i; Locke, 1924: Chapter 5) For our purposes, this is immensely 
significant, since it introduces a distinctively international strand into Grotius's 
account of property; indeed, it seems to represent colonisation as a species of just 
private war. This is the basis for Grotius's argument concerning the occupation 
of "many places hitherto uncultivated [and] islands in the sea".(Grotius, 1925: 
192; JBP, ll.ii.4) So long as such lands exist, appropriation on the basis of 
occupatio could proceed indefinitely and need never be superseded by 
dominium. What is even more fascinating about his account of the precise way 
in which such occupation takes place is that Grotius posits a distinction between 
sovereignty and ownership, wherein the former belongs to kings and the latter to 
individual settlers. On this point the link to colonisation is explicit. Grotius 
illustrates his point with a quotation from the classical author Siculus:
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When the lands assigned to colonies proved to be insufficient, 
those who were in charge of the allotment and division assigned to 
future citizens lands which they had taken over from neighbouring 
territories. The jurisdiction over the lands which were assigned 
nevertheless remained under the control of those from whose 
territory they were taken.(cited in Grotius, 1925: 207; JBP, ll.iii.4.ii)
As we w ill see later, this description has a striking similarity with the practice of 
colonising reclaimed land in late medieval Europe and with the scheme 
eventually adopted for Dutch and English settlement in North America.
Thus, although he rejects the monarchomachic argument from natural 
liberty to ineradicable popular sovereignty, Grotius does not reject the idea of 
natural liberty itself, and he makes some interesting moves within that argument 
which proved to be of great significance for the future development of resistance 
theory. In the first place, Grotius uses the well-established distinction in Roman 
Law between occupatio and dominium  to model the natural liberty argument; in 
the second place, he identifies the practice of colonisation as a way in which 
appropriation through occupatio can continue even despite the existence in the 
contemporary world of the institution of dominium. While this is hardly a fully- 
developed natural rights theory of resistance, especially when it is compared with 
Locke's, it would be fair to say that it contains many of the elements of such a 
theory. Before exploring the legal and political basis of Grotius's description of 
ownership, however, let us first consider a different aspect of his theory, in which 
he developed a non-monarchomachic constitutionalist justification of resistance 
as just public war.
Grotius's theory o f divided sovereignty: a republican justification o f resistance
One of the most interesting aspects of Grotius's work is his attempt to show that 
some instances of resistance—including the Dutch Revolt—are, in fact, just public 
wars. This argument is based on a theory of the divisibility of sovereignty, which 
lies, as Peter Borschberg has pointed out, between theories of absolute princely 
and absolute popular sovereignty; that is to say, between absolutism and
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monarchomachism.(in Grotius, 1994: 126) Thus, while Grotius does not accept 
the constitutionalist argument that inferior magistrates have a right of resistance 
against a ruler, he nevertheless recognises that this does not translate into a 
general constitutional ban on resistance. Indeed, here his qualifications of the 
general rule are so extensive that, as Hersch Lauterpacht has observed, they 
"render the major proposition [that resistance is unjustified] almost 
theoretical."(Lauterpacht, 1946:45) Grotius's arguments on this point fall into two 
categories.6
The first kind of qualification is theoretically unexceptional, and concerns 
cases where the king has abdicated the sovereign power or shown himself to be 
the enemy of the people.(Grotius, 1925: 157-58; JBP, l.iv.9, 11) These are, for 
Grotius, in practice the same thing, since "the w ill to govern and the w ill to 
destroy cannot coexist in the same person. The king, then, who acknowledges 
that he is an enemy of the whole people, by that very fact renounces his 
kingdom."(Grotius, 1925: 158; JBP, l.iv.11) Although, in a practical sense, this 
proved a very important way of justifying resistance, it is unexceptional in terms 
of its consequences for constitutionalist theory, because here the king simply 
reduces himself to the status of a private person, and the question of resistance 
against an authority does not really arise.
The second category of qualification of the general rule against resistance 
is more interesting. It connects back to the earlier point that legally there are 
several different ways in which a people may alienate some or all of its rights of 
self-government to a ruler, making some or no reservations on the absoluteness 
of that alienation. Grotius specifies three instances of this: where rulers are 
"responsible to the people"; where "sovereign power is held in part by the king, 
in part by the people or senate"; and where "in the conferring of authority it has 
been stated that in a particular case the king can be resisted".(Grotius, 1925: 156, 
158; JBP, l.iv.8, 13, 14) In all of these cases it is clear that the king's sovereign
6. This division into two categories is my scheme, and departs from the manner of Grotius's own 
presentation of the argument.
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authority is not absolute. On the contrary, either certain sovereign powers have 
been reserved by the people, and the king is thus accountable to them (as in the 
first case); or some sovereign powers have been granted by the people to other 
representative institutions than the king (as in the second case); or some sovereign 
powers have not been granted in an absolute way, but only conditionally (as in 
the third case). In each of these cases, resistance is justifiable as a form of just 
public war, since sovereignty is divided within the political community, and in 
which case "whoever possesses a part of the sovereign power must possess also 
the right to defend his part".(Grotius, 1925: 158, JBP, l.iv. 13) Thus, even though, 
as we saw earlier, Grotius denied the monarchomachic argument about inferior 
magistrates on the grounds that 'a public war ought not to be waged except by 
the authority of him who holds the sovereign power', this did not rule out all 
resistance, because of the divisibility of the sovereign power itself.
Grotius gives these three points a very cursory treatment in JBP. However, 
there is an extended discussion of this line of argument in the earlier 
Commentarius in Theses XI (C/T), where Grotius uses the second qualification 
(that sovereign power is divided between different representative institutions) 
explicitly to justify the Dutch Revolt. In C/T, as in JBP, Grotius states that in 
principle "it is possible for some marks [of sovereignty] to reside with...persons 
or assemblies, while others do not."(Grotius, 1994: 227) Further, his example of 
such an instance is the right of the States of Holland to raise taxes.(Grotius, 1994: 
219) This consideration is then used to justify the Dutch Revolt, on the grounds 
that the Duke of Alba unjustly removed this mark of sovereignty by levying taxes 
himself, and therefore the Dutch are entitled to defend that mark by waging a just 
public war.(Grotius, 1994: 281-83) The complete independence of the United 
Provinces is then justified by arguing that the States General legitimately acquired 
the other marks of sovereignty from Philip II through the successful prosecution 
of this just war.(see Grotius, 1994: 159-60)
We can therefore go beyond Lauterpacht's cautious suggestion that "It is 
unlikely that one or more of [Grotius's] exceptions [to the general principle of
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non-resistance] did not recall to the mind of the reader the various articles of the 
Dutch Act of Abjuration against Philip II of Spain."(Lauterpacht, 1946: 45-46) In 
fact, these exceptions clearly reflected the way in which Grotius had deliberately 
set out to produce an account of resistance as just public war that was more 
acceptable than the logically dubious Huguenot argument from the quasi­
sovereign status of inferior magistrates, and which was part of the project of 
justifying the Dutch Revolt. This account was predicated on the claim that it was 
legally possible for the various powers of sovereign authority to be divided 
amongst several different institutions within a political community, which is, as 
Borschberg argues in his introduction to C/T, "directed against Bodin, as well as 
other exponents of princely, or royal absolutism, who see Tull princely' 
sovereignty' as an inalterable and therefore universally applicable foundation of 
all political power."(Grotius, 1994: 122)
It is worth dwelling on this idea of 'divisible sovereignty' a moment longer. 
We have seen that Grotius's argument is negatively directed against theories of 
both princely and popular sovereignty; but does he have a more positive vision 
of the proper form of a political community, grounded on divided sovereignty? 
In answer to this question, Grotius's reflections on the appropriateness of a 
republican constitution become important. In De Republica Emendanda (RE), he 
makes clear how this is both a via media between and an improvement on the 
extremes of monarchical or popular absolutism:
Some support the idea of monarchy.... Some insist on investing the 
people with autonomy and assert that nature itself strongly suggests 
that all men are equal. But then there are men to whom neither the 
rule of a single man nor that of all men together is pleasing, and 
they maintain that it is inherent in human destiny that the best way 
always turns out to lie in the middle. Most sensible, indeed, are 
they who insist on a certain combination of these, in the sense that 
a single state embraces the majesty of a prince, the authority of a 
senate and the freedom of a people.(Grotius, 1984: 79-81; RE, §14)
Explaining this view, Grotius points out that absolute monarchy implies "a permit 
for all sorts of injustice", and it is therefore desirable to use "the innate strength
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of the people to keep a king in check acting at variance with the law."(Grotius, 
1984: 89, 91; RE, §§25,26) Although, as E.H. Kossmann notes, this enthusiasm 
was qualified later in Grotius's life,(Kossmann, 1991: 289) in JBP Grotius still 
maintains the idea of divided sovereignty against its many critics, observing in its 
defence that "in matters of government there is nothing which from every point 
of view is quite free from disadvantages; and a legal provision is to be judged not 
by what this or that man considers best, but by what accords with the w ill of him 
with whom the provision originated."(Grotius, 1925: 124; JBP, Mii.17.ii) 
Admittedly, this is rather a weak argument, but since in most cases Grotius talks 
about the people as having made the original grant of sovereign authority, it 
seems likely that this is a roundabout way of asserting the republican proposition 
that the organisation of government should be in the public, rather than the 
particular, interest.7
Arguably, this attachment to a republican conception of political 
community and divisible sovereignty is the correct way of making sense of 
Grotian solidarism, since it is in talking about divided sovereignty that Grotius 
offers his most distinctively solidarist comment on international relations: "not 
only did the peoples bind themselves to the kings, and kings to their peoples, but 
also the kings bound themselves to one another, and peoples to one another. 
Further, the kings bound themselves to neighbouring peoples, and peoples to 
neighbouring kings, and they promised to render aid, each to the other."(Grotius, 
1925: 124; JBP, l.iii.18.i) The point is that, when this is understood as part of 
Grotius's conception of divided sovereignty, it is clear that it is not simply a 
nostalgic appeal to medieval Christendom, either in Bull's or Viroli's senses. What 
Grotius is doing is using an idiom for arguing about the proper way of organising 
a political community which had not died out at the end of the seventeenth 
century, but which had flourished in the context of Dutch resistance theory. 
Grotius's combination of a theory of individual rights on the basis of
7. This feature of Grotius's thought is noted by Tanaka Tadashi, who treats it as a reflection of "the 
reality since the European Middle Ages."(Tadashi, 1993: 135) He does not, however, appreciate how 
this feature of Grotian political theory was related to the project of constructing a modern (i.e., post- 
Bodinian) political and comparative-legal justification of resistance.
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appropriation and a republican conception of divided sovereignty are the proper 
theoretical basis for the solidarist conception of international society.
By changing our understanding of the antecedents, context and content of 
Grotian thought, we also change our idea of who his successors were. If Grotius 
is seen as emblematic of the transition from natural to positive law, his eighteenth- 
century successors are those international lawyers like Emerich de Vattel and 
Christian Wolff, who elaborated the positive science of law in the society of 
states. This, certainly, is Bull's position, and he sees these lawyers as finally 
succeeding in shaking off Grotius's lingering nostalgia for the great republic of 
Christendom, and freeing themselves for a more realistic and practical account of 
the membership, norms, rules and institutions of the European society of states. 
If, on the other hand, we see Grotius as a participant in the discourse of property 
and sovereignty that evolved in the Netherlands in opposition to absolutist 
sovereignty and reason of state, our view of his successors is more likely to focus 
on Locke, as has been indicated in the foregoing discussion, and the political 
theorists of the American revolution.
§4. The Grotian tradition after Grotius
The connection between the Grotian theory of property and the subsequent work 
of Locke has already been mentioned above. However, a more complete 
illustration of how Grotius's ideas influenced subsequent thinkers can be found 
in attempts to justify the American Revolution. The concepts of ownership 
through appropriation (occupatio) and the possibility of distributing the marks of 
sovereignty within a political community conceived as a res publica were both 
used by American political theorists to justify the revolution, and in so doing, 
remarkably similar formulations were used to those developed by Grotius. In the 
first place, the old concept of occupatio was asserted to be a principle of natural 
law, and the links between that concept and the colonisation of 'vacant islands' 
were emphasised ever more strongly. Secondly, in the same way as Grotius, the 
Americans faced the problem of justifying resistance within a discourse of
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absolute sovereignty. They ended up not simply asserting a background right of 
popular sovereignty (although they certainly used that idea more enthusiastically 
than Grotius had done), but also claiming that sovereignty was divisible.
Appropriation and the justification o f the American Revolution
An especially illuminating discussion of the concept of appropriation in the 
context of revolutionary American thought can be found in Thomas Jefferson's 
famous 1774 pamphlet, 'A Summary View of the Rights of British America', the 
argument of which is closely related to previous European notions of ownership 
through occupation.(Jefferson, from 1950: i, 121-37 & see also Hargrove, 1980) 
Jefferson sought to justify resistance against the British on a number of grounds, 
one of the foremost of which was the nature of land ownership in the colonies. 
He explained the nature of the American tenurial system by comparing it with the 
Saxon colonisation of Britain, which was, significantly, similar to a 'vacant island', 
at least to the extent that it was "then less charged with inhabitants".(Jefferson, 
from 1950: i. 122) In establishing settlements, the Saxons established a land 
system under which they "held their lands, as they did their personal property, in 
absolute dominion, disencumbered with any superior, answering nearly to the 
nature of those possessions which the Feudalists term Allodial".(Jefferson, from 
1950: i, 132) It was only after the Norman invasion that the feudal system of 
tenure was introduced, but nevertheless, under the common law, allodial tenure 
predominated, and "Feudal holdings were...but exceptions out of the Saxon laws 
of possession, under which all lands were held in absolute right."(Jefferson, from 
1950: i, 133) With grinding logic, Jefferson went on to observe that, since 
"America was not conquered by W illiam the Norman, nor it's [sic] lands 
surrendered to him or any of his successors, Possessions there are undoubtedly 
of the Allodial nature."(Jefferson, from 1950: i, 133) The British were, therefore, 
unjustified in levying charges or imposing duties, which by definition 
presupposed feudal tenures.
This vision of the allodial landholding system of Saxon England and
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colonial America, and the consequent identification of tyranny with claims on 
individuals' property, was not peculiar to Jefferson, but was widely shared by both 
Americans and sympathetic Europeans.(Bailyn, 1967: 80-84) In terms of his 
understanding of the status of this right of appropriation in the law of nations, it 
is worth noting that Jefferson went further than this purely historical account, to 
claim the right of appropriation as a right given to men by nature, "of departing 
from the country in which chance, not choice has placed them, of going in quest 
of new habitations, and of there establishing new societies"; indeed, the Saxons 
had colonised Britain, so Jefferson claims, "under this universal law".(Jefferson, 
from 1950: i, 122) Going beyond Grotius, but not Locke, Jefferson then extended 
this right to include unappropriated land within already constituted civil societies. 
He argued that a society may allot land according to its own inclinations, but if 
this option is not taken "each individual of the society may appropriate to himself 
such lands as he finds vacant, and occupancy w ill give him title."Qefferson, from 
1950: i, 133) Thus, the political theory of the American revolution made extensive 
use not just of the idea of individual natural liberty, but of the extensions to that 
doctrine made by Grotius and his successors in terms of the theory of legitimate 
appropriation under the law of nature and in the law of nations.
Divisible sovereignty and the justification of the American Revolution
Let us now turn to the concept of sovereignty in revolutionary American political 
thought. As Bernard Bailyn shows, the dominant Whig doctrine of absolute 
parliamentary sovereignty posed an exceptionally difficult problem for those 
colonial political theorists who wanted to justify the revolution. If Parliament was 
indeed the repository of the theoretically ultimate supremacy of the people, how 
could the right of Parliament to impose taxation in the colonies be denied? 
Consequently, "How to qualify, undermine, or reinterpret this tenet of English 
political theory was the central intellectual problem that confronted the leaders 
of the American cause".(Bailyn, 1967: 202) As in the Dutch Revolt, the de facto 
circumstances of political authority in America offered a possible solution to the 
problem faced by the political theorists. The actual situation was that the powers
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exercised by the formally sovereign British Parliament and Crown
were far from total powers; together they did not constitute 
governance in depth, nor did they exclude the exercise of real 
power by lesser bodies or organs of government. They touched 
only the outer fringes of colonial life; they dealt with matters 
obviously beyond the competence of any lesser authority; they 
concerned the final review of actions initiated and sustained by 
colonial authorities. All other powers were enjoyed, in fact if not 
in constitutional theory, by local, colonial organs of 
government.(Bailyn, 1967: 203)
Bailyn summarises the situation that actually existed in the colonial societies as 
"extreme decentralisation of authority within an empire presumably ruled by a 
single, absolute, undivided sovereign."(Bailyn, 1967: 204)
Given the similarities in the nature of political authority in the sixteenth- 
century Netherlands and eighteenth-century North America, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that political theorists of the American revolution began to treat the 
concept of sovereignty in much the same way as had Grotius in his theory of 
resistance as just public war. Their key move in this respect was to propose a 
qualitative distinction between the nature of sovereignty over a single nation, and 
that of sovereignty in an empire. In the case of the latter, it was argued that the 
"sovereign body need not be supreme everywhere and in all matters in the 
territory it controlled, but only on some issues and in some ways, and that other, 
lesser bodies might exercise absolute and arbitrary powers—sovereign powers in 
effect—within spheres specifically allotted to them."(Bailyn, 1967: 216) As with 
the concept of appropriation, the principal difference between the Grotian 
position and American political thinking about sovereignty was that American 
theorists took the idea of the divisibility of sovereignty much further and 
elaborated it into an idea of "an imperial federation of sovereign states",(Bailyn, 
1967: 224) in a way that had not been anticipated by Grotius's much more 
humble conception of a mixed republican constitution. However, the similarities 
of these two anti-absolutist conceptions of sovereignty are far more significant 
than the differences. As with the concept of appropriation, it makes sense to see
160
the theory of sovereignty of the American revolution as an extension or 
consolidation of certain themes that were present in Grotius's conception of the 
law of nations.8
Thus, while the main achievement of the European positivist international 
lawyers following Grotius was to reconstruct international legal concepts to 
accord with established state practice in continental Europe, which meant 
dispensing with many of the tenets of medieval natural law or of the res publica 
of Christendom, the American revolutionaries saw the law of nations as a much 
more dynamic vehicle, with more potential for leading change in state practice. 
They continued to employ naturalist and republican concepts to that end. Their 
point of view is well illustrated by the following remark of John Adams, Benjamin 
Franklin and Jefferson:
By the original Law of Nations war and extirpation was the 
punishment of injury. Humanizing by degrees, it admitted slavery 
instead of death. A farther step was the exchange of prisoners 
instead of slavery. Another to respect more the property of private 
persons under conquest, and be content with acquired dominion.
Why should not this Law of Nations go on improving?Oefferson, 
from 1950: vii, 491)
This classically Grotian attitude to the historical development of the law of nations 
is an important reason why the American states-union was devoted to the 
realisation of quite different normative principles from those pursued by the 
framers of the Westphalian system. While the architects of the Westphalian system 
accepted the existence of independent sovereign states and merely tried to 
promote peaceful coexistence between them, the American system was directed 
towards the more ambitious goal of organising territory and political 
administration, in order, as Jefferson put it, "to produce the greatest degree of
8. I should note that Daniel Deudney disagrees with this interpretation of the American understanding 
of sovereignty. He prefers to use William Blackstone's definition of sovereignty as indivisible, and 
argues that to see sovereignty as divisible is merely to confuse sovereignty with authority.(Deudney, 
1995: 198) However, I think that this misses the point that both the Grotian and American 
revolutionary conceptions of sovereignty were worked out in conscious opposition to the absolutist 
or unitary doctrine asserted by Blackstone, and many others.
161
happiness to their inhabitants” .(Jefferson, from 1950: xviii, 164) In large part, of 
course, such an optimistic point of view was made possible by the opportunity 
for territorial and political manipulation offered by the western territories. It was 
the existence of these vast, supposedly unappropriated and ungoverned lands that 
allowed international society to be conceived of as "an expanding union of self- 
governing commonwealths, joined as a group of peers.”(Dumas Malone, cited in 
Jefferson, from 1950: vi, 582) Jefferson was certainly aware of the distinctiveness 
of this 'Jus gentium of America',(Jefferson, from 1950: vi, 487) and it may have 
been part of the reason behind his comment that "our geographical peculiarities 
may call for a different code of natural law to govern relations with other nations 
from that which the conditions of Europe have given rise to there."(cited in Beloff, 
1948: 257)
It should be noted that this constitutes only one, albeit very influential, 
strand of international political and legal thought in early American political 
theory. On this point, Daniel Lang has identified a distinction between what he 
calls the 'Hamiltonian' and 'Jeffersonian' approaches to early American foreign 
policy-making and, as the above discussion suggests, the Grotian ideas of 
appropriation and divisible sovereignty principally relate to the latter of 
these.(Lang, 1985) Lang gives an excellent analysis of the influence of Vattel on 
American thinkers, and the notion of the balance of power and sovereign equality 
more generally. Unfortunately, he does not undertake any extensive analysis of 
the relationship between specifically Grotian concepts and early American 
international political or legal thought, preferring simply to adapt Bull's idea that 
"Vattel is part of...the 'Grotian tradition' in international relations theory which 
describes international politics as a society of states".(Lang, 1985: 25) Broadly 
speaking, Lang describes the Hamiltonian approach as oriented towards military- 
strategic concerns, and as justified through an appeal to the realistic character of 
Vattel's ideas about international law. However, "While Hamilton generally 
stopped with Vattel in his interpretation of the law of nations, the Jeffersonians 
strove to go beyond him."(Lang, 1985: 128-29) In this regard, it is perhaps ironic 
that the Jeffersonians went 'beyond' Vattel only to return to more classically
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Grotian categories. The principal feature of the Jeffersonian approach that Lang 
identifies is their concern with the internal regimes of other states, in the sense 
of their correspondence with principles of republican and democratic government. 
Moreover, Jefferson held to the classically Grotian belief that "between society 
and society the same moral duties exist as did between the individuals composing 
them while in an unassociated state".(cited in Lang, 1985: 139) Although Lang 
does not go further to explore connections between Jefferson's democratic- 
republican attachment to the American yeoman and Grotian ideas of property and 
political community, Lang's account of these disagreements with Hamilton's 
Vatellian approach illustrates the importance of ideas of private property and 
republicanism in the Jeffersonian understanding of international law.
In other words, Jefferson did not reject Grotian naturalist ideas, and could 
instead be seen as adapting elements of Grotian legal naturalism to suit the 
peculiar demands of the American situation. Furthermore, his thinking about 
international relations inevitably compromised the rule of non-intervention, to the 
extent that it sought to build certain principles regarding domestic political and 
legal regimes into the rules of international law. In addition, the concept of 
ownership was defined through a natural right of private appropriation, thus 
allowing individuals a much more extensive form of international personality than 
was available under positive international law. This figured most obviously in the 
unique model treaties which Jefferson (among others) drafted, including 
unprecedented recognition of individual rights during wartime, as well as a 
project for reciprocal citizenship.Qefferson, from 1950: vii, 463-90 & viii, 318)
§5. Two Grotian conceptions of international society
We have then, two Grotian conceptions of international society, each of which 
is based upon one of the strands within Grotius's political and legal thought. As 
Bull was well aware, one of Grotius's lasting achievements was to provide a 
relatively scientific basis for international legal scholarship, by showing how the 
principles of the law of nations were based on natural reason, rather than divine
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revelation. This was allied to Grotius's partial awareness of the importance of state 
practice in determining the content of the law of nations. Although this remained 
in rather a confused state in Grotius's own work, it anticipated the subsequent 
development of a positive science of international law by Vattel and others. Thus, 
we have a 'Grotian tradition' of international law cast in terms of the development 
of positive international law in the society of states. This lends support to Bull's 
claim that the Grotian conception of international society is really an idea of a 
society of states, within which a relatively rich notion of solidarity could perhaps 
be posited, but which can nonetheless be seen as an anticipation of the more 
pluralistic modern European 'anarchical society' of sovereign states.
On the other hand, another of Grotius's achievements was to provide a 
compelling reformulation of early modern resistance theories, taking full account 
of the methodological revolution in political theory inaugurated by Bodin. Here, 
Grotius introduced two arguments that were picked up by subsequent resistance 
theorists, especially in the context of the American Revolution: a theory of private 
property based on appropriation, instead of consent; and a theory of political 
authority based on a modernised republican conception of political community. 
Jefferson was probably the most important thinker to use both of these notions to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of international society as an 'expanding 
union of self-governing commonwealths', or, in true Rationalist fashion, as a 
society comprising individuals, states and a number of different political 
institutions, within a general republican idiom and dedicated to protecting the 
rights and freedoms of the individual.
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Chapter 5
A Reappraisal of the Origins of Modern International Society
It is obvious that Hedley Bull's reading of Grotian international political and legal 
thought has the advantage of being associated with a well-known story of the 
historical origins of modern international society. As we saw in Chapter 3, this 
story is focused on the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 as the founding moment of 
modern legal principles and diplomatic protocols, established on the basis of the. 
mutual recognition of the 'internal freedom' of sovereign states. By contrast, to the 
extent that it lacks association with an historical narrative, the more individualist 
and republican reading of Hugo Grotius presented in Chapter 4 might be seen as 
ungrounded in any concrete international practices, and might therefore be 
dismissed by theorists interested in the mechanisms that actually did uphold order 
in modern world politics. The concepts associated with this reading of Grotius, 
such as the idea of divisible sovereignty, therefore appear as part of a fanciful, 
perhaps nostalgic, perhaps idealistic, account of international society, either 
looking back to Christendom, or looking forward to a utopian vision of a great 
commonwealth of mankind. The purpose of this Chapter is to present an 
alternative historical narrative of the origins of modern international society, in 
order to demonstrate the relevance of the liberal and republican themes in 
Grotius's thought to modern world politics. In other words, the aim of this 
Chapter is to identify the sixteenth and seventeenth-century international practices 
within which the legal and political concepts of appropriation and divisible 
sovereignty were developed. This w ill show that Grotius's view of the law of 
nations was neither nostalgic nor idealistic. Rather, it was, like Bull's conception 
of a society of states, an expression of normative, legal and institutional forms 
embedded in actual modern international practices.
The main thrust of the argument is that Grotius's ideas of appropriation and 
divisible sovereignty exhibit an affinity with the forms of land tenure and 
constitutional arrangements embedded in the practice of colonisation. This should 
not be surprising, since the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Netherlands was
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a colonial society par excellence: partly in the sense that Dutch prosperity in the 
'Golden Age' was built on colonial adventures in the East and West Indies, but 
also in the deeper sense that the legal and political basis of Dutch society was 
itself influenced to a considerable degree by the establishment of communities 
through the colonisation of reclaimed land. Thus, the normative, legal and 
institutional milieu within which Grotius developed his ideas was steeped in the 
practice of colonisation, almost as a way of life. After identifying the 
distinguishing features of colonisation in the Netherlands, the Chapter then 
examines how the practice was carried forward within another quintessential early 
modern colonial society: pre-revolutionary North America. In the context of Dutch 
and British colonial settlements in North America, one can seethe replication and 
consolidation of the tenurial and political forms of the practice of colonisation 
previously established in medieval Europe. Since the practice of colonisation 
described here was an undeniably important part of modern international 
relations, this demonstrates that Grotius's ideas of appropriation and divisible 
sovereignty are important features of the element of society in modern world 
politics.
As section 1 explains, the argument of this Chapter thus sheds new light 
upon an old controversy about the significance of natural law conceptions of 
international society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, between Bull and 
Gerrit Gong on one side and Charles Alexandrowicz on the other.(Bull, 1977 & 
1984a; Gong, 1984; Alexandrowicz, 1967) Alexandrowicz thought that a 
universal international society had formed in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries on the basis of natural law and early commercial or diplomatic contacts 
between European and Asian societies. Against Alexandrowicz's account of early 
modern European-Asian trade and treaty relations, Bull and Gong questioned the 
extent to which the universalist conceptions of international society contained in 
natural law theory really did find a practical embodiment in sixteenth and 
seventeenth-century world politics. The argument of this Chapter suggests that 
Alexandrowicz's broad position can be defended, but only on the terms of a 
rather different account of the normative, legal and institutional components of
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the naturalist international society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To 
identify these features of early modern international relations, the rest of the 
Chapter examines the tenurial and political dimensions of the practice of 
colonisation: section 2 looks at the colonisation of reclaimed land in the medieval 
Netherlands, section 3 looks at Dutch colonisation in the East Indies, and section 
4 looks at Dutch and British colonisation in pre-revolutionary North America. The 
conclusion w ill then return to the debate between Alexandrowicz and Bull and 
offer a new perspective on the relationship between the Grotian law of nations 
and the sixteenth or seventeenth-century origins of modern international society.
§1. Problems with the Westphalian focus: the Alexandrowicz-Bull debate
The conventional account of the origins of modern international society, which 
draws attention to the foundational significance of the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648, has already been explained in Chapter 3. Here, then, there is no need to 
go into this historical narrative in any detail. It w ill suffice merely to recall 
Alexander van Heeren's claim that the Peace inaugurated a system of states 
characterised by " internal freedom; that is, the stability and mutual independence 
of its members."(Heeren, 1873: 5, emphasis original) As we saw earlier, this was 
developed by the members of the English school into two main propositions. The 
first identified the distinctiveness of the European society of sovereign states: 
"Among the regional systems into which the world was divided that which 
evolved in Europe was distinctive in that it came to repudiate any hegemonial 
principle and regard itself as a society of states that were sovereign or 
independent."(Bull & Watson, 1984: 6) Secondly, this society of states expanded 
to its current global proportions through a process whereby "non-European states 
entered an originally European club of states as and when they measured up to 
criteria of admission laid down by the founder members."(Bull, 1984a: 123) This 
affirms Bull's idea of the Grotian tradition against the alternative account, to the 
extent that "in their broad impact on the course of international history the theory 
of Grotius and the practice of the Peace of Westphalia marched together."(Bull,
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1992: 77)1
As several international relations theorists have pointed out, the focus on 
the two Westphalian Treaties between France, Sweden and the Empire leads to 
certain important lacunae in the conventional historical narrative. For example, 
Justin Rosenberg notes that "one major state was not represented at [the 
negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia]...England. And yet it was Hobbes's 
England, not Bodin's France, which was to go on to play the leading role in 
extending the sovereign form of rule beyond Europe and defining the institutional 
form of the global states-system of today".(Rosenberg, 1994a: 138) One might add 
that, as well as Hobbes's England, Grotius's United Provinces and Jefferson's 
United States also had something to do with this process. Daniel Deudney has 
offered a further illustration of how modern world politics may contain 
dimensions ignored by the conventional historical narrative, pointing out that the 
'Philadelphian' system of the pre-Civil War American states-union was "an 
alternative to the European Westphalian system rather than an oddly constituted 
state within it."(Deudney, 1995: 193) For the most part, Rosenberg explores 
England's place within the broader social formation of capitalist combined and 
uneven development, while Deudney's analysis juxtaposes the Philadelphian and 
Westphalian systems as different kinds of security systems. However, one could 
equally well ask how they compare as international societies.
1. It should be noted that agreement on the significance of the Peace of Westphalia was neither 
universal nor unqualified in the English school. Indeed, many of the members of the school would 
probably agree with Stephen Krasner's objection that the Westphalian Treaties did not produce all of 
the changes that are sometimes attributed to them.(Krasner, 1993) As Martin Wight observes, "the 
Westphalian starting point is itself eroded by the historiographical desire to establish continuity and 
the tendency for'origins'to slide ever backwards in time."(1977:114) Keeping track of this backwards 
drift, Wight draws attention to the emergence of the regional states-system in northern Italy during the 
renaissance, the point being that this marks the emergence of a system of power politics between 
territorially-consolidated states, a crucial prerequisite of the emergence of the diplomatic and legal 
practices that mark the emergence of international society. Alternatively, some theorists prefer to delay 
the origin of the modern international society until the French Revolution, which is perhaps a more 
conventional demarcation of the origin of modern terms of political discourse.(Hinsley, 1986) The 
point is that the Peace of Westphalia should be seen as no more than a part of a broader process of 
historical development, expressing only some of the wider changes that gradually constituted modern 
international society. Nevertheless, the English school's main point was that the Peace retains a crucial 
role in the legal and diplomatic consolidation of international society, and is therefore deserving of 
study as part of a broader comparative-historical research programme. This is, in other words, less a 
criticism and more a refinement of the Westphalian focus of the English school.
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Furthermore, to continue this point about the lacunae of the conventional 
narrative, the focus on the two Westphalian Treaties between France, Sweden and 
the Empire ignores a third, roughly contemporaneous, treaty between the 
Netherlands and Spain, which also had profound international implications. The 
conventional perspective therefore risks ignoring the Dutch Revolt altogether as 
a formative influence on early modern European politics, and this is obviously 
significant from the point of view of the relationship between Grotian thought and 
modern international society. To this one might also add the point that 
conventional treatments of the Peace, which emphasise the formation of the 
balance of power and the emergence of the principle of cuius regio eius religio, 
neglect other important aspects of the Peace settlement itself. For example, it is 
true to say that one of the most distinctive achievements of the Peace of 
Westphalia was the development of a detailed and systematic application of cuius 
regio eius religio, taking the 1st January 1624 as the decisive date for this 
religious partition of Europe.(Osnabruck V, Munster XXVIII) However, the Peace 
went beyond simply stating this principle, and urged understanding for those who 
"embrace a Religion different from that of the Lord of the Territory," asking that 
they be, "tolerated, without any Hindrance or Impediment to attend their 
devotions in their Houses and in private".(Osnabruck, V) This strikes a very 
different, more individualistic note from Heeren's principle of 'internal freedom', 
suggesting the existence of an internationally supported normative principle of 
individual rights and freedom of conscience in the Westphalian settlement. In 
other words, the Westphalian Treaties themselves do not offer unequivocal 
historical evidence for the emergence of a society composed exclusively of 
sovereign states.
Alexandrowicz has given perhaps the most sustained account of the 
shortcomings of the Westphalian focus. His argument relates directly to the 
question of the practical context of Grotius's thought, and w ill therefore be 
accorded most attention here. The centrepiece of Alexandrowicz's argument is the 
complaint that "to consider the European nucleus of states as the founder group 
of the family of nations was to view the origin and development of that family in
169
the light of positivist conceptions which were only born at the turn of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."(Alexandrowicz, 1967: 11) The trouble with 
this widely-held but misconceived view of the origins of modern international 
society, according to Alexandrowicz, is that it ignores the existence of a universal 
system of ethical and legal principles based on natural law, which regulated inter­
state dealings from as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One of the 
main implications of this point is that the development of international society in 
the nineteenth century is not a story of expansion at all; in fact, quite the reverse 
is true.
Paradoxical as it may seem, [international society] started 
contracting into a regional (purely European) legal system, 
abandoning its centuries-old tradition of universality based on the 
natural law doctrine. While European-Asian trade was still 
expanding, European egocentricity left the sovereigns of the East 
Indies, which had largely contributed to the prosperity of the 
European economy, outside the confines of 'civilisation' and 
international law shrank to regional dimensions though it still 
carried the label of universality.(Alexandrowicz, 1967: 2)
In other words, the geographical focus on the formation of a European society of 
states is the result of a chronological error, superimposing-^ nineteenth-century 
system of classifying sovereignty onto sixteenth and seventeenth-century practices. 
This error causes conventional theorists to misinterpret normative, legal and 
institutional structures in the early modern period, under-estimating the practical 
significance of naturalist ideas and the universal scope of intenational society.
This re-interpretation of the origins of modern international society led 
Alexandrowicz to offer a different assessment of the importance of Grotius in 
early modern international legal thought. According to Alexandrowicz, Europeans 
initially met Asians on roughly equal, or sometimes inferior, terms, and were 
consequently forced to agree treaties acknowledging this fact. The universalist and 
often egalitarian terms of these treaties were well-suited to the precepts of natural 
law, and thus there emerged a relatively robust treaty system between European 
and Asian states, grounded in both legal theory and diplomatic practice. In part,
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this involved Grotius's attempt to open up access to the Indian Ocean to Dutch 
traders, which rested on his natural-legal argument about the impossibility of 
appropriating the sea.(Alexandrowicz, 1967: 61-82) More interestingly, however, 
it also related to questions about how to conduct relations with East Indian rulers. 
Here, Alexandrowicz depicts Grotius's position as follows:
[Grotius] eliminates the possibility of conceiving the East Indies as 
a legal vacuum as far as the law of nations is concerned. What he 
stresses most emphatically is the existence of organised political 
entities in the East Indies which he considers independent and 
sovereign.... The immediate consequence to be drawn from this 
statement was that European powers coming to this part of the 
world could not acquire territorial or other rights by discovery, 
occupation of terra nullius, by papal donation or any other 
unilateral act carried out in disregard of the sovereign authorities 
governing the countries of the East Indies. They could consider 
themselves sovereigns only over territories acquired by cession or 
conquest in accordance with the rules of the law of 
nations.(Alexandrowicz, 1967: 45-46)
In other words, Grotius treated the East Indian rulers as the c/e jure equals of 
European sovereigns. In order to ensure access to trade with the East Indian rulers, 
Grotius appealed to the natural right of freedom to trade.(Alexandrowicz, 1967: 
45-46) Thus, Grotius "classified East Indian rulers as sovereigns in the meaning 
of the law of nations and...opened to them the doors of the universal and natural 
family of nations."(Alexandrowicz, 1967: 229) However, the nineteenth century 
saw a widening disparity between European and Asian societies, partly military, 
but also partly commercial as East Indian rulers were drawn into a web of 
monopolistic commercial relations, isolating the rulers and increasing their 
dependency on European sovereigns.(Alexandrowicz, 1967: 129) The legal 
prescriptions of the natural lawyers slowed down the eventual process whereby 
the East Indian rulers were robbed of their equal sovereign status and forced to 
petition for admission into the new, much smaller society of 'civilised' states, but 
they could not stand against the rise of positivist European legal orthodoxy in the 
nineteenth century, based as it was on the military and economic dominance of 
the European states.(Alexandrowicz, 1967: 156)
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Bull and Gong both take issue with Alexandrowicz's claim that a universal 
international society existed on the basis of trade and treaty relations and natural 
law in the sixteenth century. According to Bull:
A pattern of economic, military, and political interaction had grown 
up in which not only European states and their colonies of 
settlement but Asian, African, and Amerindian rulers and peoples 
were involved -  in different ways and to different degrees. But they 
were not united by a perception of common interests, nor by a 
structure of generally agreed rules setting out their rights and duties 
in relations to one another, nor did they co-operate in the working 
of common international institutions.(Bull, 1984a: 117)
In other words, Alexandrowicz mistakes a universal international system for a 
universal international society. Even if Alexandrowicz's argument is seen to be 
making a more limited claim about European-East Indian relations, "there was no 
single, agreed body of rules and institutions operating across the boundaries of 
any two regional international systems...such as we imply when we speak of an 
international society."(Bull & Watson, 1984: 6) Gong's criticism of Alexandrowicz 
is based on the even more sweeping claim that before the nineteenth century "the 
countries of the world did not behave as related parts of a single international 
system prior to that time."(Gong, 1984: 4)
Although this reply does raise a very real concern with Alexandrowicz's 
rather ambitious claims, it misses one of the main points of Alexandrowicz's 
argument: his claim that the naturalist approach to international law had a 
practical embodiment through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, not in 
Europe, but beyond Europe. Whether or not this provides the basis for the 
existence of a genuinely universal international society in the period, it calls the 
conventional account of the medievalism of natural law into question. Bull and 
Gong do not appear to realise the extent to which Alexandrowicz's argument 
provides a completely different historical way of contextualising the diverse 
themes of Grotian thought, compared with the simplistic affinity between 'the 
Grotian law of nations and the Westphalian international system' upon which 
C.G. Roelofsen poured such scorn.(Roelofsen, 1990: 8 & see Chapter 4 above)
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The point is that what is important about Alexandrowicz's argument is not its 
attempt to establish the existence of a sixteenth-century universal international 
society; its importance lies in the interpretation it suggests of early modern 
international thought and practice, in terms of the significance of the naturalist 
conception of equality in the law of nations.
This is not to say that Alexandrowicz's argument is beyond reproach. On 
the contrary, he does not engage in a detailed study of Grotian thought in its 
intellectual context. He merely sets it in terms of the debate about dealing with 
East Indian rulers, and neglects to put it into its wider political theoretical context 
in European debates about resistance, as was discussed in the previous Chapter. 
The problem with this is that, although Alexandrowicz correctly recognises the 
importance of looking at sixteenth century ways of classifying East Indian rulers 
as sovereigns, he does not appear to appreciate the importance of looking at the 
meaning given to the concept of sovereignty itself by early modern international 
lawyers like Grotius. Nor does Alexandrowicz canvass the possibility that 
Grotius's account of the law of nations contains concepts other than sovereignty; 
although in the previous Chapter we saw the importance of a concept of 
appropriation in Grotius's views about the legitimacy of private war, a key aspect 
of the legal basis of European activities beyond Europe. Therefore, while 
Alexandrowicz's account illustrates the inadequacy of the conventional 
Westphalian focus, it does not then go on to offer a proper alternative treatment 
of the norms, rules and institutions in which the naturalist themes of Grotian 
thought were realised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. His work 
therefore sets us a challenging historical task, which we are now, thanks to the 
analysis of the previous Chapter, in a better position to attempt.
§2. Tenure and political authority in Dutch reclamation agreements
To begin with, it is interesting to reflect on what it was about early modern Dutch 
society that encouraged the particular political theoretical innovations of the 
Dutch revolt and Grotius's work. Why were the Dutch generally able to reinforce
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the standard natural liberty argument with references to ancient liberties, and why 
were they so committed to a republican political language? Why did Grotius 
develop an account of appropriation in the contemporary law of nations through 
an idea of the occupation of uncultivated wildernesses; why did he posit such a 
strong distinction between the rights attendant on sovereignty and those derived 
from private ownership; and why did he come to see sovereignty in the 
Netherlands as divided between different individuals and institutions, so justifying 
the Dutch revolt as a just public war? The best single answer to these questions 
is that the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Dutch legal and political systems 
were powerfully influenced by the practice of the colonisation of reclaimed land. 
The forms of land tenure and political authority generated by this practice 
furnished the basic legal and political materials for the distinctively Dutch version 
of resistance theory and for these elements in Grotius's account of the law of 
nations.
Probably the most momentous feature of the colonising activities practiced 
in the medieval Netherlands was the ability of colonists to secure exceptionally 
free land tenures for individual occupiers and extensive political rights and 
privileges for local communal institutions. This combination of permissive tenurial 
and political rights provided both the means and the justification needed to 
undertake resistance successfully. Certainly, the prevalence of settlements on 
reclaimed land in the Netherlands helps to explain why Dutch political theorists 
were in an unusually good position to produce relatively robust and sophisticated 
justifications of resistance by connecting natural liberty arguments to appeals to 
customary liberties. In effect, what they were doing was invoking a legal concept 
of ownership rooted in a long-standing tradition of reclamation and settlement, 
which was especially resonant in the circumstances of the early modern 
Netherlands. Furthermore, by looking at the unusual character of the political 
systems established in communities founded on colonised land, especially in the 
northern and western districts of the Netherlands, one can discern certain features 
that go some way towards explaining the predisposition to a republican 
conception of politics demonstrated by the political theorists of the Dutch revolt,
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and hence Grotius's idea of divisible sovereignty.
The non-feudal character o f early modern Dutch society
Probably the most striking feature of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Dutch 
society was the sheer extent of its divergence from the conventional picture of 
medieval European agrarian society as a society of oppressed tenants, holding 
their land under heavy obligations and capricious landlords. In the Netherlands, 
by contrast, "The peasants as a class owned a considerable portion of the land 
and the privileged classes...rarely possessed the power to hold them in 
subjection."(de Vries, 1974: 55) Indeed, "feudal institutions were either never 
established or attained only a precarious existence in the first place."(de Vries, 
1973: 194) This raises an important question: given that medieval peasants were 
not always in as miserable a condition as is often supposed, what is the historical 
background to the freedoms and rights that they did actually possess; and why 
were these freedoms and rights so widespread, pronounced and long-lasting in 
Dutch society?
This question calls to our attention a debate between classical political 
economists and historical materialists, which has an echo in international relations 
theory. Classical political economists often represented medieval Europe as a 
world of forced labour services, of lands held as fiefs by seigneurial elites and 
worked by legally-unfree peasants, bound by numerous obligations to a variety 
of overlapping political authorities. Although this picture of feudal society is very 
familiar, there is, as Karl Marx perceptively observed, something rather dubious 
about it: "It is far too easy to be 'liberal' at the expense of the Middle 
Ages."(Marx, 1976: 878n) What he meant by this remark was that classical 
political economists extolled the purported relationship between capitalist market 
economics, private property, 'free' labour and political freedom by deliberately 
presenting an over-simplified and historically inaccurate picture of property and 
political relations in medieval Europe, which exaggerated the unfreedom of the 
medieval peasant. This fiction allowed the eventual commutation of labour
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services via the cash nexus to appear as a moment of emancipation, rather than 
expropriation and proletarianisation. The story told by classical political 
economists obscured the way in which proto-capitalists systematically and 
deliberately ignored or trampled on the previously existing rights and freedoms 
of the medieval peasantry.2 The point is that medieval peasants often held 
extensive rights over the land on which they worked, and often enjoyed
2. Unfortunately, although the Marxist critique of classical political economy is very useful in 
highlighting the inadequacy of the classical view of the feudal system, its historiographical focus on 
the rise of capitalist social relations does not help us in exploring the roots of Grotius's conception of 
the law of nations. This is because Marxists' exclusive concentration on the origins of the capitalist 
mode of production prevents them (and us) from achieving a proper understanding of the tenurial and 
political forms that served as the background to the Dutch Revolt. The crucial point here is that 
Marxists generally do not investigate the role of land-reclamation in helping to establish certain of the 
freedoms enjoyed by the peasantry in some areas during the early Middle Ages, and do not pay 
sufficient attention to the role of. reclamation and colonisation in societies like the Netherlands where 
the sixteenth-century feudal reaction was more or less successfully resisted. This can be seen in the 
way that Marxist historians have often been quick to dismiss the salience of colonisation and 
reclamation in medieval Europe; as, for example, in Maurice Dobb's casual assertion that in response 
to European population growth up to 1300, "There were some brave efforts at colonisation and land- 
reclamation.... But generally there was little incentive or means to improve the land".(Dobb, 1963: 47) 
Admittedly, Dobb's claim might well stand up for feudal Germany, and it might well apply to France, 
or even to England, although there some local historians would suggest that it should be treated with 
caution for particular regions, such as Kent.(Everitt, 1986) I submit, however, that its applicability to 
the Netherlands is highly questionable. Of course, Marx does theorise colonisation, but only in its 
nineteenth-century context, to the extent that it posed a limiting problem for capitalist development 
through the availability of free land in colonies like Australia.(Marx, 1976: Chapter 33; & see Chapter 
6 below) This is, in itself, a fair point, but it ignores the consideration that colonisation had posed this 
sort of challenge to both absolutist and bourgeois attempts to establish control over the peasantry 
(through political or military means in the former case and through economic or social means in the 
latter) from a much earlier date, and that it developed unique, non-capitalist legal and political forms 
out of itself. A very good example of this point is North American economic history. Here, Allan 
Kulikoff has drawn attention to the very peculiar and awkward relationship between colonial settlement 
and the emergence of capitalist political economy in England, observing that "Settlers in the English 
colonies left [behind them] a dynamically growing capitalist economy but rejected the commodification 
of labour already occurring there. Controlling their own labour, they became independent producers, 
the sturdy yeomanry".(Kulikoff, 1992: 59) Thus, as he points out, "The British North American colonies 
were born in a capitalist Atlantic economy. However antagonistic to capitalism they were, they should 
not be called precapitalist but noncapitalist social formations."(Kulikoff, 1992: 7, emphasis original). 
The same problem of categorisation arises for early modern Dutch society: it was neither feudal, nor 
capitalist; not pre-capitalist, but non-capitalist. It might be replied that this is explicable in terms of 
Marx's distinction between commercial and industrial capital.(Marx, 1981: Part 4) The capitalist mode 
of production depends upon the domination of the latter over the former, while "a striking example 
[of the domination of commerical capital] is given not only by colonial trade in general (the so-called 
colonial system), but quite particularly by the operations of the Dutch East India Company."(Marx, 
1981: 446-47) However, it seems to me that the problem with this is that it is an explanation of one 
social system entirely in terms of another. It does not really investigate the alternative, possibly non­
capitalist, logic by which a 'commercial capitalist', and hence colonial, system operates. Because of 
this, a Marxian form of historical materialist analysis has serious shortcomings in analysing early 
modern Dutch rural society, North American colonial society, or the Dutch colonial system in the East 
Indies.
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considerable protection against the over-exercise of seigneurial power. These 
rights, protections and freedoms were systematically dismantled by early 
capitalists, thereby creating the mass of landless people that would come to 
constitute the urban proletariat. The outcome of this process of expropriating the 
medieval peasantry was determined by the relative power resources of peasants 
and landlords, both in terms of their own means and organisation, and in terms 
of their relative abilities to appeal to other actors or institutions in society.(see 
Marx, 1976: Part 8 & Brenner, 1985)
These Marxian criticisms of classical political economy have important 
implications for conventional historiographies of international relations, which see 
feudalism as the basic organising principle of medieval European international 
relations. The classical view here is that "The political map of thirteenth century 
Europe revealed not a clearly demarcated set of territorial units, but a tangle of 
overlapping feudal jurisdictions, plural allegiances and asymmetrical 
suzerainties."(Holzgrefe, 1989: 11) Therefore, the transition to modern 
international relations supposedly involves "the consolidation of all parcelized and 
personalized authority into one public realm."(Ruggie, 1993: 151) As with 
classical political economy, the worry here is that an over-simplified view of 
medieval international relations is presented as the basis for justifying one 
particular theoretical approach to modern international relations: it is, one might 
adapt Marx's phrase, far too easy to be 'Realist' at the expense of the Middle 
Ages. Land reclamation and colonisation were significant practices in medieval 
and early modern international relations, and they offer a different way of 
conceiving of the relationship between territoriality and political authority in both 
medieval and early modern international relations.
To begin with, it is important to note that a truly dramatic change in the 
scope of agricultural activity in Europe was effected during the middle ages 
through colonisation. As William TeBrake puts it,
As late as the tenth century large portions of the Continent
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consisted of what might be termed wilderness, where the imprint 
of human culture, if it existed at all, was fleeting and slight. This 
was true particularly of temperate Europe, north of the 
Mediterranean basin, where vast areas remained unaffected by 
human activity, largely covered by deciduous forest but including 
enormous tracts of freshwater swamp and salt marsh as well. By the 
early fourteenth century, in contrast, this situation had been 
dramatically reversed. Only small patches of wilderness remained 
in a landscape that had become characterized by pastures, fields, 
and villages.(TeBrake, 1985: 10-11)
This is often held to be relevant to the existence of areas of relatively 
unencumbered land ownership in 'feudal' Europe, in contravention of the normal 
story of the encumbered peasant. For example, Bryce Lyon observes that "the vast 
land reclamation characterizing the eleventh and twelfth centuries in western 
Europe contributed to the emancipation of the common man."(Lyon, 1957: 47) 
Similarly, but speaking more generally about Europe as a whole, Richard Koebner 
argues that, "the economic advancement of the labouring man served to promote 
his social advancement—and that through the colonizing process."(Koebner, 1966: 
5) Admittedly, Koebner goes on to maintain that the ultimate significance of this 
development is questionable, because "The gains which the settlement movement 
had brought to [the peasant] class were gradually nullified by fresh applications 
of governmental and seigneurial pressure."(Koebner, 1966: 5) In this regard, 
however, and of great significance for our present discussion, the Netherlands 
seems to have been an outstanding special case that defied the general European 
trend.
Before looking at the practice of reclamation in the Netherlands in more 
detail, it should first be noted that international relations theorists have typically 
ignored the practice of the colonisation of reclaimed land within Europe. O f 
course, this is not to say that international relations theorists have ignored 
colonialism. On the contrary, we have already seen that Alexandrowicz has 
looked at the links between sixteenth century international law and European- 
Asian contacts, while a great deal of work has explored the significance of 
colonialism in America for the development of European political thought and
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modern international law.(see Green & Dickason, 1989; & Wight, 1991: 
especially Chapter 4) Typically, however, such work investigates the impact of the 
colonial encounter on European thinking, and pays very little, if any, attention to 
the ways in which unoccupied wastelands were colonised within Europe, and 
later beyond Europe. This latter practice began well before the colonial encounter 
in the Americas or Indies took place, and, as w ill be argued later, it was this 
chronologically prior practice of reclamation within Europe that furnished the 
basic legal and political framework within which English and Dutch colonial 
settlements in North America or the East Indies were subsequently made. To be 
sure, the colonial encounter was significant in the development of modern 
international society. However, it is from the practice of the occupation and 
cultivation of reclaimed land that we can trace the development of the main 
features of the legal and political concepts that were integral to Grotius's account 
of the content of the law of nations.
Reclamation agreements in the Netherlands
Let us begin with Koebner's observation that coastal reclamations in the 
Netherlands produced "a class of economically independent farmers."(Koebner, 
1966: 75) Disappointingly, but perhaps because of the extraordinarily ambituous 
scale of his historical survey, he does not go on to offer a proper analysis of the 
rather unusual legal and political circumstances in which these farming 
communities found themselves. Furthermore, contrary to Koebner's view that 
seigneurial authorities reasserted their prerogatives over such settlements, in the 
Netherlands (especially in the northern and western regions) seigneurial claims 
were always seriously compromised by the exceptionally weak material and 
political basis of feudal elites. Typically, as de Vries observes, seigneurs had very 
limited claims to tithe or excise rights and played only a very minor governmental 
or judicial role. Ultimately, the "concentration of weak seigneuries in the hands 
of distant lords engendered a purely businesslike relationship between the rural 
population and the seigneur."(de Vries, 1974: 39)
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The primary reason for the weak seigneurial system in the Netherlands was 
that, even in those regions that were relatively well-integrated into the European 
seigneurial system, the sheer extent of reclamation and colonisation assumed such 
proportions that seigneurial claims to lordship and authority were simply 
outweighed by other forms of traditional tenurial practice. For example, "The 
dozens of peat reclamation settlements in Holland outnumbered the villages of 
the old land and were a dominating factor in the political system.... In Holland 
it proved customary for a farming community to be free."(van de Ven, 1994: 61) 
The relative extent of colonisation in more outlying parts of the Netherlands was 
even more dramatically pronounced. For example, in Rijnland, a district in the 
western Netherlands, by 1369 no less than two-thirds of the households occupied 
reclaimed land.(TeBrake, 1985: 205 & see also van de Ven, 1994: 41-43) This 
was strikingly different from reclamation projects elsewhere in Europe, where the 
evidence supports Koebner's argument. For example, in cases where reclamations 
were carried on in Germany, the colonists received the exemptions and freedoms 
included in what was revealingly known as the 'Dutch' or 'Flemish 
Right'.(Masselman, 1963: 10)3 However, those German communities then often 
subsequently lost their privileges because "they [were] surrounded by feudal 
relationships; unlike the Netherlands, where reclamation [was] more normal."(van 
de Ven, 1994: 87)
It is fairly easy to see that the Netherlands was unique by virtue of the 
sheer proportion of land settled through colonisation, but it is not yet clear why 
this qualitatively altered the legal and political customs of the society. To 
understand why colonisation had far-reaching implications for the legal and 
political status of peasants, we need to look a little more closely at the practice 
itself. In Europe as a whole, the process of reclamation and colonisation that
3. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that many of these reclamation projects were carried on by 
Dutch people, not Germans.(van de Ven, 1994: 84) This adds an intriguing dimension to Bernard 
Bailyn's point about the ultimately Dutch origin of many of the supposedly German 'Pennsylvania 
Dutch (or Deutsch)'.(Bailyn, 1986: 34) Not only were the 'Pennsylvania Dutch' actually wandering 
Dutch people, as Bailyn points out, they may well have been Dutch people who had previously been 
involved in reclamation projects in Europe, and were probably therefore familiar with the tenurial and 
political rights therewith associated.
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drove the profound changes in medieval agrarian society took place in two, very 
broad phases. In the first place, between ca. 650 and 950, reclamation was 
carried on more or less within existing agricultural settlements. This involved 
turning sa/tus—woodlands already'used for "noncrop forms of environmental 
exploitation"(TeBrake, 1985: 35)—into ager, or permanent fields. To a certain 
extent, this meant a change in the manner and intensity of cultivation of lands that 
were already integrated into a system of cultivation. The second phase, between 
ca. 950 and 1350, was quite different, during which previously completely 
uncultivated wilderness areas (s/Yva) were converted into permanent fields. 
"Towards the end of the tenth century Europeans began to spread on a large scale 
into the still-massive wilderness areas between and especially beyond their 
traditional areas of settlement and agriculture."(TeBrake, 1985: 47) The second of 
these two phases was more momentous, because it involved the creation of 'new' 
cultivable land, and thus opened up the opportunity to establish new forms of 
tenure over the 'new' land. In the Netherlands, this dual process intersected with 
a further, geographical distinction. Reclamations in the northern Netherlands were 
generally undertaken by farming communities acting on their own account, and 
this remained the case right through even the late middle ages. Initially, this was 
also the case in the South, in Utrecht and Holland. However, after about 1000 
in the southern regions, the reclamations began to be led, or at least coordinated, 
by local counts and monasteries.(van de Ven, 1994: 45)
The legal and political form of the count-led colonisation of wilderness or 
silva is quite fascinating. According to TeBrake, by and large, political lordship 
over the wildernesses was claimed by princes, counts and other authorities within 
existing social structures. These seigneurial elites then allotted the wilderness in 
parcels to particular groups of colonists, who undertook to reclaim the land and 
prepare it for cultivation. This was the procedure followed in the reclamations 
carried out in Utrecht and Holland after 1000. Often, "the wilderness would be 
staked out in parcels of identical size and shape", each of which was "designed 
to be reclaimed, occupied, and exploited by a single household".(TeBrake, 1985: 
225, 207) This homogeneity was achieved by virtue of the fact that "not only the
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width of the reclamation farms was agreed upon, but also the rear boundary up 
to which reclamation was allowed, was determined."(van de Ven, 1994: 59) In 
the case of the Netherlands, this can be seen in the 'parcellized' nature of the 
agrarian landscape: "In the newly-colonized areas of the polders, the countryside 
became covered with large numbers of medium-sized farmhouses...on small 
parcels of land, of standard size, deemed sufficient to support individual 
families."(Israel, 1995: 106; see also de Vries, 1974: 55-70) The normal size for 
one of these farms was just over fourteen hectares.(TeBrake, 1985: 227)
However, this parcel I ization of land did not involve the consolidation of 
political authority, as most international relations theorists suppose. Of course, the 
reclamation, settlement and cultivation of wildernesses was an exceptionally 
arduous and unpleasant activity, even compared with the exactions of the 
everyday agricultural work of a medieval European peasant.
To secure the needed colonists, the new rulers often drew up 
agreements with representatives of prospective colonists, offering 
them very favourable terms that stood in sharp contrast to the 
restrictions placed on peasants in the old population centres. In 
exchange for the payment of a very small tax per homestead and 
about 10 per cent of everything they produced, colonists in the 
frontier areas usually received ownership of the land they 
reclaimed, the right to dispose of such land, and complete personal 
freedom.(TeBrake, 1985: 50)
These agreements were known as 'copes'. They typically imposed limited duties, 
especially in the form of taxation rather than labour services, and granted rights 
to adminster low justice and self-government, normally through a sherriff 
system.(van de Ven, 1994: 60; see also Koebner, 1966: 75-76; Lyon, 1957: 52-55) 
Thus, the local counts, while claiming sovereignty over the wastelands, typically 
abandoned 'normal' feudal land-holding arrangements and instead moved to a 
new set of less encumbered tenurial arrangements, granting "settlers the right to 
acquire the land they reclaimed on a perpetual leasehold against payment of a 
yearly rent."(Masselman, 1963: 10) While claiming formal sovereignty, then, they 
also in practice accepted a very considerable diminution of the 'normal' rights
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enjoyed by a feudal sovereign, by granting the land to its actual occupants on 
extremely generous terms. This situation of de facto, and partly de jure, political 
independence allied to more or less allodial land tenures was also predominant 
in the northern Netherlands, where reclamation projects had been carried out on 
the initiatives of local farming communities themselves. Here, however, there was 
an interesting additional feature of the emergent political systems. These 
reclamations were even further outside of the feudal system, and often took place 
in the absence of feudal sovereign claims on the reclaimed lands altogether, 
"peasant republics developed in these regions, which were governed by the 
people from the farmsteads, who were entitled to the lands."(van de Ven, 1994: 
43)
A further intriguing feature that is peculiar to Dutch reclamation and 
colonisation concerns the character of the wildernesses that were settled. In the 
first instance, the Dutch reclaimed peat bogs or areas of clay on peat, by cutting 
and removing the peat. Naturally, the eventual result of this was a general 
lowering of the land in the Netherlands relative to sea level, in some cases "the 
surface level was lowered some metres as a result of reclamation.... Due to this 
lowering of the surface level, large areas fell prey to tidal forces."(van de Ven, 
1994: 33)4 Thus, having reclaimed the lands, the inhabitants were then forced 
to construct dikes and drainage systems to protect their new farmlands from 
flooding and to make them productive. This imposed considerable demands on 
the administrative organisation of the relevant communities, which served by and 
large to enhance the voice of freeholders in their government, especially in non­
cope peat reclamation areas, i.e., especially those areas in the northern and 
western Netherlands.(de Vries, 1974: 36 & see also Dekker, 1975) The point of 
this is that, as a consequence of the practicalities of sustaining land productivity
4. Note that this goes against the commonsense view that these lands were reclaimed from the sea, 
and that large areas of the Netherlands have always been below sea level. It is also worth noting that 
this contradicts the account of Netherlandish colonisation given by Koebner. He seems to suppose that 
the coastal reclamations were prey to tidal forces from the outset, although admittedly this point is 
rather unclear in his account.(see Koebner, 1966: 75) G.P. van de Ven convincingly demonstrates that 
this was not the case, and that the activity of peat-reclamation in these areas actually caused these 
lands to become subject to extensive innundation.(van de Ven, 1994: 33)
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after reclamation in these low-lying regions of the Netherlands, colonial 
settlements did not just develop a surprising degree of self-government, but they 
also combined a practice of strongly individualistic freeholder representation with 
a philosophy of local government and collective responsibility for the common 
weal.
Let us conclude this discussion with TeBrake's description of Netherlandish 
society in the late middle ages, which w ill serve as a good summary of the 
tenurial and political system associated with colonisation in the Netherlands, and 
which formed the backdrop for subsequent justifications of Dutch liberties against 
Philip IPs absolutism. The colonisation of reclaimed land "shaped a new society 
of free and equal agriculturalists who decided many of their own affairs 
themselves in the context of their communes and exploited their own property 
without the intervention of landlords."(Tebrake, 1985: 226) This society was 
simultaneously individualistic and communal, an apparent paradox largely 
explained by the administrative necessities of maintaining the productivity of 
reclaimed land and by the homogeneity of the tenures under which land was held 
in these areas. Representation in these political systems was based on property 
ownership: "the individual peasant exercised a voice in local affairs through sole 
possession and use of a farmstead, In fact, originally there were no 
nonlandowners in the reclaimed areas.... If they were to leave their lands, they 
would lose their voice in this new society."(TeBrake, 1985: 228) This illustrates 
the extent to which legal and political institutions in early modern Dutch society 
were profoundly influenced by the practice of colonisation, with obvious 
implications for the justification of the Dutch Revolt: these aspects of colonisation 
were probably one source for the 'ancient liberties' of the Dutch people and their 
contractarian view of the ruler's authority. Another crucial respect in which the 
Netherlands of Grotius's time was a colonial society was in its expansion and 
settlement beyond Europe, and it is to these activities in the East Indies that we 
now turn. The discussion of Dutch colonisation in the Americas under the West 
India Company is continued in the subsequent section.
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§3. Seventeenth-century Dutch colonisation in the East Indies
The earliest territorial settlements of the Dutch in Asia were in Amboina around 
1604 to 1609, and began more generally after 1612, when the East India 
Company (VOC) permitted families of Company workers to settle in the East, on 
plots of land granted to them by the Company with some limited trading 
privileges. The main point of this (rather unsuccessful) policy was to establish a 
loyal population in the region, especially to assist in the defence of trading 
stations and factories against hostile local rulers.(Goonewardena, 1959: 203) This 
policy was given its most ambitious formulation by the early seventeenth-century 
Governor-General of Batavia, Jan Pieterszoon Coen. Coen's idea was to establish 
a "society of vrij burghers (free citizens) in the Dutch stations in the East, trading 
side by side with the Company, their function being to supplement the 
Company's commercial activities, and thus share in reaping the benefits of trade 
in the East."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 195) Although Coen's plan called for free 
citizens to be Dutch settlers, this was not always the case. In Malacca, for 
example, the vrij burghers were "often descendents of the old Portuguese families 
that had intermarried with local families of similar rank" as well as ex-VOC 
employees.(Lewis, 1995: 140)
In his first attempt, Coen initiated such a scheme in Banda. Under a rather 
flimsy pretext (the local peoples' failure to fill their contracts to deliver nutmegs 
to the Company), Coen invaded and massacred or enslaved the population, 
extinguishing their claims on the land. "Thus, nearly the whole population of 
Banda, numbering about 15,000 inhabitants, was exterminated, whereafter the 
land was divided into allotments, called perken, i.e. plots of nutmeg-trees, which 
were assigned to Dutch private persons who were pledged to plant nutmegs and 
sell their products to the Company at fixed prices."(de Klerck, 1938: i, 229-30). 
Whether out of disgust at his brutal practices, or out of a desire to prevent private 
trade from undermining their monopoly on European-Asian and inter-Asian trades, 
Coen's ideas were only applied to other Dutch trading stations in a very limited 
way, and were decisively rejected by the Directors of the VOC in their
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Regulations of 1631.(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 195; de Klerck, 1938: i, 230; 
Goonewardena, 1959: 205-206)
More concerted efforts by the VOC to establish a colony in Ceylon arose 
not as the result of deliberate colonising projects such as Coen's, but rather as the 
by-product of the VOC's monopolising commercial activities. As Sinnappah 
Arasaratnam puts it: "The territorial expansion of the Dutch in Asia was a direct 
result of their commercial policy. The attempt to monopolise spices by controlling 
the areas which produced them logically resulted in the conquest and 
administration of land."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: xx; see also Grossholtz, 1984: 37-38; 
& Vandenbosch, 1944: 52) To a certain degree, this had been recognised even 
as early as 1602, when the Charter of the VOC was granted, and which included 
rights to conclude treaties, wage wars, build fortresses and so forth. "It was the 
expressed intention that these clauses were for the promotion of trade only but, 
considering the conditions in the East Indies, it was almost inevitable that they 
would pave the way for territorial acquisitions."(Masselman, 1961: 460) This fact 
was even more explicitly acknowledged in the 1621 Charter of the Dutch West 
India Company (WIC), where the "Colonisation of suitable regions was 
specifically envisaged".(Boxer, 1965: 49)5 However, early Dutch acquisitions of 
territory, at least in Ceylon, and their dealings with local rulers were generally 
rather ad hoc, and did not follow any clearly laid down legal or ethical codes, 
beyond very general and rather disingenuous injunctions to trade fairly and not 
to impinge on the sovereignty of indigenous rulers.(see, for example, Boxer, 1965: 
23 & Gonnewardena, 1958: 33)
There are two outstanding features of Dutch colonisation under the VOC 
in Ceylon. First, the way in which colonial settlements were established is 
reminiscent of many of the features of the practice of colonising reclaimed land 
reviewed above. This resemblance is especially marked with regard to the form
5. Colonisation under the W IC was very minor, because of the commercial considerations involved. 
Put bluntly, access to the fur trade did not require a great deal of territorial control, in the same way 
that access to cinnamon did.(see Bachman, 1969) Nevertheless, colonisation under the W IC was 
undertaken through the patroonship system, which is discussed in the next section.
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of land tenure adopted: because of the undesirability of colonial settlement, grants 
were made by the VOC under very liberal conditions to individual settlers, thus 
establishing ownership rights on the basis of occupation and separating them from 
the political obligations owed to the formal sovereign of the region. Secondly, the 
Dutch attitude towards the sovereignty of local rulers reflected the concept of 
divisible sovereignty. In establishing themselves as a territorial power, what the 
Dutch in effect did was to try to reserve for themselves as many marks of 
sovereignty as possible, leaving other aspects of the indigenous ruler's sovereignty 
intact but diminishing his competence in certain areas. Their practice in this 
regard only made legal sense if one granted the assumption that the marks of 
sovereignty could potentially be distributed between different institutions.6 
Relations between the VOC and East Asian sovereigns were thus practical 
instances of the Dutch (and Grotius's) rejection of the theory of indivisible and 
absolute princely sovereignty. It should be stressed that these features of Dutch 
colonisation were not instituted in order to correspond with an established set of 
rules for conducting relations with foreign powers; they were practical responses 
to the circumstances in which the Dutch found themselves in the East Indies. 
Nevertheless, the point is that they developed as the Dutch found themselves 
engaged in a practice with a direct continuity with the earlier practice of 
colonising reclaimed land. They should therefore be seen as part of the ongoing 
practice of colonisation through which an international society was emerging in 
the seventeenth century.
Dutch colonisation and land tenure in Ceylon under the VOC
One of the main reasons why the Dutch monopolisation of trade in Ceylon 
involved territorial expansion was that production was rooted in territorial control 
prior to the arrival of the Dutch, or the Portuguese for that matter. In the 
seventeenth century, the King of Kandy had a monopoly over trade, by virtue of
6. As a suggestion for further work on this point, it might prove to be interesting to explore the 
similarities and differencies between this aspect of early Dutch practice and the way in which the 
British insinuated themselves into hierarchical networks in India. I am grateful to Sudipta Kaviraj and 
David Taylor for pointing this out to me, in a presentation to the SOAS Department.
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the indigenous system of land tenure, which vested all ultimate rights to land in 
the sovereign and thus imposed ob ligations on in d iv id u a l 
peasants.(Goonewardena, 1958: 1; Grossholtz, 1984: 11-26; Masselman, 1961: 
457) This system of land tenure was not an ancient feature of Kandyan society. 
Rather, it had gradually evolved between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries, 
from an early, relatively loose system based on a produce tax (which persisted in 
the northern and eastern Tamil regions), to "one where service replaced [the tax] 
as a connecting link. The principle which...evolved was that every plot of land 
had some obligatory service attached to it, which the owner had to perform to the 
sovereign."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 128) Thus, for the Dutch to take over the King's 
monopoly privileges, they needed to weaken, or ideally take over, the King's 
control and authority over the regions where the relevant products were 
produced.
In Ceylon, an excellent opportunity to insinuate Dutch control over the 
spice-producing territories was created by the weakness of King Raja Sinha II, 
especially in terms of sea-power, and his consequent need for allies against the 
Portuguese. The Dutch offered their services to Raja Sinha in this regard, and, 
after securing a victory over the Portuguese at the battle of Gannoruwa, a treaty 
between the Dutch and Raja Sinha was concluded in May 1638. As K.W. 
Goonewardena drily observes, "it appears that this treaty was a most 
advantageous one for the Dutch."(Goonewardena, 1958: 18) In terms of 
establishing the Dutch territorial presence, the most important parts of the treaty 
were Articles 3 and 4, which allowed the Dutch to garrison forts captured from 
the Portuguese at the King's expense, a right of which the Dutch promptly took 
advantage.(Goonewardena, 1958: 18) This was a hotly disputed part of the treaty, 
with Raja Sinha's version of the treaty permitting Dutch garrisons in the forts "only 
if his Majesty thought it fit."(Goonewardena, 1958: 33, emphasis omitted) After 
this disagreement was made evident and their own interpretation of the treaty 
undermined, the Dutch began to rely instead on Article 8, concerning the 
repayment by Raja Sinha of their expenses incurred in the war with the 
Portuguese. Here, the Dutch were in a much stronger, if hardly more moral,
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position. In the first place, the VOC controlled the statements of the King's level 
of debt, which unsurprisingly proved to be "very much of a concoction, turned 
out by the commission, which was specially appointed for that 
purpose."(Goonewardena, 1958: 43) Secondly, the Dutch refused to be paid off 
in cash, and instead insisted on payment in cinnamon for which they offered a 
lower and lower price. Thus, "the Dutch could not only get the cinnamon...for 
a mere song, but they could also keep the king in their debt as long as they 
wanted to."(Goonewardena, 1958:45) Although this was an effective strategy, the 
VOC desired more cinnamon than it could get through these means alone, and 
thus retained an interest in establishing control over the cinnamon producing 
regions.
Having initially established a territorial presence in the old Portuguese forts 
on Ceylon through their manipulation of the treaty of 1638, the Dutch 
subsequently converted this into a broader control of the spice-producing areas 
through conquest from the Portuguese in an expedition of 1644. Having gained 
control from the Portuguese of the land around the key strategic fort of Galle, the 
Dutch agreed a truce with the Portuguese, wherein the latter recognised the 
former's control over Galle. Raja Sinha's response to the Dutch-Portuguese truce 
and Dutch de facto control over these lands was simple, but far-reaching: he 
withdrew the people from the lands, resettling them on his own lands in the 
interior. This posed a serious problem for the Dutch, since, in the absence of the 
indigenous farmers, no cinnamon could be obtained at all. In desperation, they 
declared war on Raja Sinha. The ensuing conflict resulted in serious military 
reversals for the Dutch, and they were forced to agree terms with Raja Sinha on 
a revision of the 1638 treaty in the latter's favour, especially in terms of the 
erosion of the Dutch cinnamon monopoly. On the pretext that Raja Sinha still had 
outstanding debts to the VOC, however, some of the cinnamon-producing 
territory around Galle was retained by the Dutch.(Goonewardena, 1958: 96-124)
For our purposes it is highly significant that, by depopulating the lands 
under Dutch control, Raja Sinha had in effect turned the areas around the Dutch
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strongholds into Vacant islands', recreating the classic situation of the practice of 
colonisation we saw earlier in the case of the reclaimed lands: "What was 
lacking...was not land but men."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 130-31) More through 
circumstance than design, and more through necessity than desire, the Dutch 
were now in a position to plant a colony in the area, and began to do so in 1646 
under the leadership of Jean Maetsuijcker. The previous objections to Coen's 
grandiose schemes fell away, in light of the simple fact that "the Dutch had 
become a big territorial power for the first time and it was but natural that their 
lands should be populated by some of their own people."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 
196) So began a new phase of colonial consolidation and expansion in Ceylon, 
which followed the classic tenurial logic of reclaiming and colonising empty land 
outlined above: "Land belonging to the state was lavishly distributed to those who 
agreed to cultivate it. Thus 'free-burghers' and Dutch officers were encouraged to 
undertake agriculture on their own and given large grants."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 
131) As with reclamation in Europe, this involved hard work, privation and no 
little danger, and "Some really promising bait had to be held before the men to 
make more of them accept the ideaof'becoming free'."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 198) 
The government "was prepared to grant any amount of land on very favourable 
terms in hereditary possession to anyone who would accept it and cultivate 
it."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 203)
What was different about the situation in Ceylon was that, unlike in the 
medieval Netherlands, free land itself proved not to be enough of an attraction: 
"Most of the land offered was waste land which had to be cleared and prepared 
for cultivation. This involved much labour and the burghers did not come forward 
to accept such land."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 203) To have any hope of attracting 
settlers, the VOC had to go even further, and this meant allowing burghers to 
engage in private trade, diminishing the Company monopoly. In 1659 certain 
trading privileges were extended to the Burghers, and they were offered more 
opportunities after 1670. By then, however, it was too late for the colony, which 
had never grown larger than 500 people anyway,(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 212) and 
the Company itself was beginning to run into financial difficulties under pressure
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from the English. The colonists were never able to earn a proper living, since their 
participation in private trade was limited, and their agricultural produce had to be 
sold at fixed prices to the Company. The colony also had a serious gender 
imbalance, with few Dutch women emigrating, and the result was an emerging 
mestizo colonial culture of Dutch men marrying Sinhalese women that was 
unappealing to the Directors of the VOC; this feature, incidentally, was echoed 
in all the Dutch colonies, including Batavia.(Boxer, 1965; 224-25;
Goonewardena, 1959: 239; Taylor, 1983) The result of this particular attempt to 
found a colony was thus a more or less unmitigated failure. It did, however, have 
at least one powerful implication. As Jean Grossholtz puts it: "the Dutch in the 
maritime regions [of Ceylon]...created 'ownership of property'".(Grossholtz, 1984: 
56, emphasis original) In their effort to establish a colony, the VOC had 
inadvertantly recreated the classic conceptual structure of the theory of property 
embedded in the Grotian law of nations, in the sense of a right of appropriation 
distinct from the reach of political authority.
Divided sovereignty in seventeenth-century Ceylon
The second striking feature of Dutch colonisation in Ceylon was the attitude of 
the VOC towards the sovereignty of Raja Sinha. As we have already seen, the 
Dutch had acquired their ports and territories in Ceylon through their 
manipulation of the provisions of the treaty of 1638, conquest over the 
Portuguese, and accomodations with Raja Sinha. In this respect, the Dutch faced 
a tricky legal problem. Throughout all of their colonising activities, the Dutch 
continued to observe, if only formally, Raja Sinha's sovereignty over the whole 
of Ceylon, however, they needed to acquire as strong a legal title as possible to 
the lands under their control, "in order to uphold it both against the intrusions of 
other European rivals, and the claims of the indigenous authorities."(Arasaratnam, 
1958b: 105)
The representatives of the VOC in Ceylon suggested that they should 
secure "a new contract with Raja Sinha, where he would recognise the new
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changes [after the final expulsion of the Portuguese in 1658] and give a de jure 
sanction to what was already a de facto sovereignty of the Dutch over the 
lowlands."(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 5) However, as far as the Directors of the VOC 
were concerned, such a new contract was unneccesary, and in the end the 
Company simply fell back on the argument that the lands were held in trust from 
Raja Sinha, who remained the formal sovereign, until such time as their expenses 
had been fully paid.(Arasaratnam, 1958a: 5-6) As we have already seen, this was 
an ingenious device, which could be extended at the Company's desire more or 
less indefinitely, but as a legal argument it fell well short of having full authority 
over the land. Consequently, "Dutch power found it difficult to shake off the 
stigma of usurped authority over the lowlands."(Arasaratnam, 1958b: 110) As 
pressure on the cinnamon trade increased from other European powers, notably 
the English and the French, so the Dutch began to introduce other arguments, 
such as length of occupation and conquest, to justify their control, and they began 
to assert their claims in an increasingly exclusive manner, denying Raja Sinha any 
rights in the coastal regions. Although these arguments were much more far- 
reaching than had hitherto been the case, they still stopped short of declaring 
Dutch sovereignty. This continued well into the eighteenth century. Arasaratnam 
cites Baron van Imhoff, Governor-General in Ceylon from 1736-1740:
The great number of years during which we have been in exclusive 
possession gives us the right to maintain our right, if necessary even 
by force. Our rights have been legalised by the undisputed exercise 
of them by the Company's possession of West and east, and this 
w ill serve also as proof of proprietorship, of other parts, so far as it 
concerns a third party, although the King is and remains the 
sovereign^in Arasaratnam, 1958b: 117, emphasis added)
It was not until after a further war with the Kandyans that the Dutch managed to 
gain a treaty, in 1766, formally recognising their sovereignty over the coastal 
lands. The point to notice is that, even well into the eighteenth-century, the Dutch 
did not claim sovereignty over the coastal regions, but they nevertheless claimed 
certain rights, including the right to dispose of unoccupied cultivable waste land 
as they saw fit. These prerogatives were, on any early modern understanding, part
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of the sovereign power over the lands. In effect, then, the VOC were arguing that 
they possessed certain marks of sovereignty, but simultaneously maintained that 
this did not compromise the King's sovereignty. This position could only have 
made sense within a legal framework that permitted sovereignty to be so divided.
The Dutch did not merely assert their rights as creditors of the sovereign 
lord of Ceylon, nor as long-standing occupiers. Another important feature of the 
Dutch strategy was that the coastal lands that they occupied were vital to 
communications between the Kingdom of Kandy and the outside world, and "it 
was their intention to channel all foreign intercourse and commerce of the 
Kandyans through Dutch sources and maintain the Kandyan Kingdom in 
subordinate isolation—a sovereign entity but deprived o f the right o f foreign 
control."{Arasaratnam, 1960: 114, emphasis added) Thus, overall, the attitude of 
the Dutch was to accede to the formal sovereignty of the Kandyans, but chip 
away at the marks of sovereignty contained therein, until they were in a position 
to begin to claim complete sovereignty for themselves. Arasaratnam gives a good 
overall summary of the policy:
The indigenous state claimed total de jure sovereignty and this 
claim was not challenged. But it was not allowed the full exercise 
of all attributes of sovereignty in view of the superior power of the 
Dutch. In actual practice, the Kandyan Kingdom though exercising 
all aspects of internal sovereignty w ithin its own dominions was 
externally dependent on the Dutch. It could not carry on freely its 
trade, its foreign relations or its foreign contacts without the tacit 
consent of the Dutch power.(Arasaratnam, 1958b: 121)
Once again, as we saw in the case of the political institutions in the medieval 
Netherlands, the marks of sovereignty were divided between different institutions. 
This could be used to justify waging war against the Kings of Kandy, since, as we 
saw in Chapter 5, Grotius had pointed out that, according to the law of nations, 
"whoever possesses a part of the sovereign power must possess also the right to 
defend his part".(Grotius, 1925: 158, JBP, l.iv.13) This constitutes an important 
revision of Alexandrowicz's claim of the equality of sovereign rights granted to 
East Indian rulers under the law. of nations. W hile they may have been treated as
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equals with European sovereigns, this still left them vulnerable (as was also the 
case for European rulers) to the division of their powers with respect to different 
issues.
To sum up thus far: both the colonisation of reclaimed land in the 
medieval Netherlands and the establishment of the VOC as a territorial and 
colonising power in the East Indies in the seventeenth century were part of a 
single practice of colonisation that was expressed in distinctive tenurial and 
political forms. The main aspect of land tenure in colonisation was that grants of 
unoccupied wasteland were made under exceptionally free and easy terms, 
unencumbered with the 'normal' obligations of feudal land tenure. This meant 
that individual settlers held their property in such a way that it gave them rights 
that were, in effect, untouchable by the sovereign authority in the region. In 
political terms, the sovereignty of East Indian rulers was respected, as 
Alexandrowicz pointed out. However, their sovereignty was treated as divisible, 
and thus a political dynamic was introduced which would lead to a considerable 
erosion in the authority of the East Indian sovereigns.
§3. Dutch and British colonisation in North America
In the context of colonial settlement in North America, it is also important to 
begin by noting the significance of the legal and political forms assumed by 
medieval European reclamation. For example, Marshall Harris observes that "The 
early grants to the colonial trading and colonizing companies [in North America] 
were similar to those granted by the Crown for drainage and irrigation schemes 
in England."(Harris, 1953: 73) As in the medieval practice of colonisation, 
sovereign title over North American lands was claimed by distant rulers. 
However, when it came to establishing settlements, grants of land were made 
under exceptionally free and easy terms, and local proprietors and settlers were 
often given extensive rights to self-government and to administer justice. The 
tendency towards relatively extensive communal local self-government was 
enhanced by the peculiar needs of colonial settlements: the difference from the
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Netherlands case is that the American settlers' need for self-defence was against 
the indigenous inhabitants of the continent, or for ideological reasons of religious 
doctrine, rather than against flooding. At the outset, it should be noted that 
colonisation in North America was much more diverse than the medieval practice 
of colonising reclaimed land. It is impossible to offer anything approaching a 
complete survey here, and all that can be given is an outline of some general 
features of the systems of granting land and establishing political and judicial 
administration, to show how ownership rights and the organisation of political 
authority followed certain patterns in the course of colonial settlement that were 
similar to those described above.
Land tenure systems in the North American colonies
In British North America, all settlement agencies and many proprietors held their 
land under a tenure described as of the Manor of East Greenwich, in free and 
common socage, the exceptions being the grants of Maryland in 1632, 
Pennsylvania in 1681 and Georgia in 1 732.(Cheyney, 1906: 29) In seventeenth- 
century England, this particular formula of 'the Manor of East Greenwich' was an 
increasingly common way of establishing tenurial rights and obligations.(Cheyney, 
1906: 30)7 Its primary importance was that it represented "a neat way in which 
traditional feudal obligations—such as feudal marriage clauses and Knight service 
in capite—could be excluded from the contractual duties of thetenant."(Hamilton, 
1976: 23) In other words, the East Greenwich formula was an especially 
unencumbered kind of land grant, and it was used in colonial land grants for very
7. It should be noted that Edward Cheyney dismisses the significance of this way of wording the 
original land grants, maintaining that "So far as the colonial charters are concerned, East Greenwich 
was merely an empty name."(Cheyney, 1906: 35) His argument is based on the claim that the use of 
this formula merely signified that the American lands were viewed as "simply an extension of the soil 
of England. Actual conditions and the logic of events brought about a very different relation between 
the colonies and the mother country from that which was anticipated in the forms used in the royal 
grants of land."(Cheyney, 1906: 34-35) As will become clear, I agree with Cheyney that tenurial and 
political arrangements on the ground in America moved on considerably from the original grants. 
However, I would make a quite different assessment of the significance of the original grants. In terms 
of the specific obligations that were imposed on grantees, and the degree of independence they could 
enjoy under the terms of the grants, I would concur with Marshall Harris that the comparison between 
reclamation projects and colonial settlement is a very instructive one.
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similar reasons to the grants made in the cope reclamations of medieval 
colonisation: to wit, "the English were greatly interested in encouraging 
emigration, and this could best be accomplished by granting the land under the 
easiest of English tenures."(Harris, 1953: 148) This was how agencies and 
proprietors held their lands. However, the logic of colonisation also had an 
impact on the tenures under which actual settlers held their lands. Here, it is 
helpful to distinguish between systems adopted in colonies settled under the 
auspices of corporate settlement agencies (like the Massachusetts Bay Company), 
and royal colonies or those settled by the efforts of individual proprietors (like 
W illiam Penn or Lord Baltimore).
In New England, the corporate settlement agencies which were granted 
tracts of land organised settlement according to a system of establishing 
townships. Beyond this official system, however, colonies were also established 
by squatting (as at Plymouth) and by unauthorised purchases from the local 
Indians (as at the Rhode Island and Providence Plantations). In the townships, and 
in many of the unofficial settlements, land was held by settlers under 
exceptionally free tenures, and with considerable homogeneity of landholdings. 
On the first point, colonial practice antedated the freeing of tenures in England. 
In other words, before equivalent developments in England (except in areas of 
extensive reclamation, like Kent or the Fens), the general tenurial arrangement of 
individual land-holding by New England settlers "could be called allodial, and it 
was in most essentials very similar to present fee simple absolute tenures."(Harris, 
1953: 116) On the second point, as Kenneth Lockridge observes, "differences in 
landholdings were small, and were chiefly related to the size of the family a man 
and his sons had to feed."(Lockridge, 1981: 20) In general, then, despite certain 
very large tracts of land in New England being held by individual proprietors, 
ultimately "New England granting was characterized by small grants to actual 
settlers."(Harris, 1953: 287) These small grants led to a society composed of 
townships rather like the Netherlands farming communities of 'free and equal 
agriculturalists', with allodial and homogenous land holdings.
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The situation in the proprietorial colonies was different, in that "the settlers 
were in a distinctly secondary position, being subject at every turn to the 
proprietary forms of holding land".(Harris, 1953: 11 7) What this means is that in 
the proprietary colonies the owners were initially in a position to establish more 
or less whatever scheme of granting land they desired. Indeed, some large-scale 
English proprietors tried to use their original grants to establish feudal land 
systems within their domains; this was the case in Maryland (held by Lord 
Baltimore under a palatine fief from the King) and in the Carolinas (in which John 
Locke himself played an important constitutional role). However, they quickly 
discovered "that feudal tenures were not adapted to the planting of a 
colony."(Harris, 1953: 135) This was not simply, as had been the case in the 
medieval Netherlands, because settlers were not attracted by offers of land bound 
by feudal tenures, but also because the availability of free land in the colony and 
non-feudal land systems in other colonies made it difficult to sustain feudal 
tenures in the face of these rival attractions.(Harris, 1953: 214) Sometimes these 
rival systems were even within the same colony, as in the contradictory land 
system of the Carolinas after 1663, where around two-fifths of the land were held 
as feudal estates and three-fifths owned by settlers under freehold.(Harris, 1953: 
135) Thus, in the proprietorial English colonies, one can detect a process by 
which the land was granted and gradually re-granted under free and easy terms, 
increasingly ensuring that ownership rights eventually came to be held by the 
settler, the actual occupier of the land, with fewer and fewer reservations. The 
basic logic of this—as was made clear by the headright system, under which 
proprietorial land grants were made in direct proportion to the number of 
settlers—was to ensure land ownership was established on the basis of 
occupation. Nevertheless, this was not so systematic or methodical as the process 
of land distribution under the settlement agencies, and it did not produce the 
homogenous and compact settlements of New England. Rather, it led to a much 
more scattered mode of settlement, but one in which, as in New England, 
occupation came to count for a great deal in establishing ownership rights.
Although Dutch settlement was small compared with British endeavours,
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"In the field of land tenure the contribution of the Dutch was significant."(Harris, 
1953: 208) The patroons, who financed large settlements on-tracts, received 
extensive grants of land from the West India Company which, under the 1629 
Charter of Freedoms and Privileges, came in the form of perpetual leaseholds. As 
in the headright scheme, the patroons' title to the land was contingent on their 
establishing occupation of it. Strictly speaking, this was a feudal kind of fee tail 
estate, but still a very free kind of tenure, which implied practically no feudal 
duties at all.(Nissenson, 1937: 21, 54, 62-63; Rink, 1986: 98-101) In 1641, the 
terms of patroons' holdings were altered, so that the minor restrictions on 
alienation were watered down even more, and "the domain became in effect an 
ordinary allodial holding".(Nissenson, 1937: 331-32) In addition, from the outset 
of Dutch colonisation in New Netherland, "family-sized freeholds were supposed 
to occupy the land not granted to patroons."(Harris, 1953: 94) Again, as with the 
English proprietorial colonies, the patroons' grandiose attempts to establish feudal 
estates proved unworkable in the face of alternative opportunities for settlement 
in North America. Ultimately, ownership of land tended to devolve to those who 
were actually occupiers.
Political institutions in pre-revolutionary North America
Politically and judicially, the New England townships were in a very similar 
position to farming communities in the Netherlands, being characterised by weak 
seigneurial control and a high degree of local self-government with widespread 
popular participation. Indeed, Harris's description of them is reminiscent of the 
Netherlandish system outlined above: "an outstanding example of looseness of 
control from the viewpoint of the colonizing agency and strictness of control by 
the local proprietors".(Harris, 1953: 285) Here the term 'local proprietors' refers 
to the individual settlers in the townships. The ultimate location of sovereignty 
was not particularly clear-cut. The formal title was held by the monarch, but the 
marks of sovereignty—the powers to tax, organise relations with the Indians or 
with other foreign powers, organise military defense of the colony and make 
judicial decisions—were distributed between the Crown, the proprietary agencies
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and the settlers' local institutions. This confused situation was exacerbated by the 
formation of a settlement agency actually based in the colony, the Massachusetts 
Bay Company: "this meant that the colony would be governed, under the 
municipal rights and full legislative authority of the Charter, by the local people 
rather than by a 'foreign' group resident in England."(Harris, 1953: 106) Sovereign 
title was still held by the Crown; but the crucial legal and political question of 
who possessed which marks of sovereignty was much more convoluted, and 
became even more so when the Charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company was 
withdrawn. This confused situation was put to use in the revolt against Governor 
Andros, echoing the resistance theories of Grotius and the Dutch revolt: in a 
celebrated 1691 pamphlet, The Revolution in New England Justified, the rights 
in property through occupation and the marks of sovereignty granted under the 
Charter were both used to justify resistance.(in Force (ed.), 1836-46: iv, 15 & 18)
The proprietary colonies and the estates held by the Dutch patroons 
generally exhibited more feudal, or, perhaps more accurately, 'mock-feudal', 
political and judicial forms. In these cases, an unusually wide range of sovereign 
powers were delegated by the Crown to the proprietors, or by the West India 
Company to the patroon. For instance, Baltimore was "given all the rights of 
government" and so, with a few more reservations (including rights of taxation), 
was Penn.(Harris, 1953: 120-24) The patroons were, in a manner deliberately 
reminiscent of feudal institutions, granted full powers of jurisdiction in the 
colony.(Nissenson, 1937: 24) In short, the proprietors and patroons were formally 
not sovereigns; they held their grants as fiefs. However, they were explicitly 
granted several marks of sovereignty, often far more than was usual under a 
normal feudal arrangement. In itself, this obviously treated sovereignty as 
divisible. Furthermore, attempts by proprietors and patroons to exercise these 
sovereign powers to the detriment of the settlers met much the same fate as 
attempts to settle the land under feudal tenures. It led to the loss of tenants to 
more congenial colonies, and anyway, their "customary attitude was simply to 
disregard this political skeleton in livery and to prosecute their own ends in their 
own way."(Nissenson, 1937: 109) The result in New Netherland, unlike in New
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England, however, was not so much the construction of local institutions of 
governance, but a less formal system similar to "the limited popular participation 
found in the closed-corporate...hamlets of the United Provinces."(Rink, 1986: 228; 
Nissenson, 1937: 153-65)
To sum up: one may say that there was a strong sense in which ownership 
rights to land in the North American colonies depended on occupation, and in 
many cases, the logic of the system of granting land ensured that the actual 
occupiers ended up holding their tenures under the sorts of free and easy terms 
familiar from medieval European settlements on reclaimed land. By making such 
generous grants of land, the political authorities in North America effectively 
discharged their claims on the property of individual settlers. Thus, they 
reproduced the distinction between sovereignty and ownership, in the sense that 
sovereignty became a purely political or juridical matter, and embraced only 
minimal claims on individual property. In this critical sense, the possession of 
sovereignty no longer dominated individual rights derived from ownership, as 
Thomas Jefferson was later to point out. Furthermore, in terms of political 
administration and jurisdiction, the holder of formal sovereign title (the King) 
again gave considerable ground to the colonial agencies, proprietors and, 
ultimately, settlers. However, here we do not witness the fairly clear distinction 
according to which the sovereignty-ownership relation was worked out. Instead, 
we see a confused distribution of the marks of sovereignty: some marks fell to 
local settler self-governance, some were held by the proprietors and colonising 
agencies, some were retained by the Crown. There was no one pattern by which 
this distribution was made. It differed from colony to colony, and it needed a 
revolution, and perhaps even a civil war, to establish any coherence at all in this 
division of the sovereign power.
§4. The Grotian law of nations and modem international society
The best way to make sense of the liberal and republican strands of Grotian 
thought discussed in Chapter 4 is to see them as an attempt to make moral, legal
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and political sense out of the sixteenth and seventeenth-century practice of 
colonisation in the Netherlands, in the East Indies and in North America. It should 
be noted that this is not intended as a comprehensive historical description of the 
ethical system of colonisation as a whole. Rather, it is a selective analysis of a few 
elements of that practice with the specific purpose of identifying the practical 
embodiment of the Grotian principles discussed in the previous Chapter. The 
purpose of this argument is to provide a counter-point to Bull's posited affinity 
between the statist or absolutist elements of the Grotian conception of the law of 
nations and the practice of diplomacy in early modern Europe. What we have 
seen is that the point of Grotius's naturalist, individualist and republican ideas was 
not to express a nostalgic and idealistic affection for the solidarism of medieval 
Christendom. Rather, these aspects of Grotius's account of the law of the nations 
were firm ly grounded in the international relations of his time. Moreover, 
Grotius's ideas did not simply reflect the last, tired vestiges of a soon to be 
outdated medieval practice in continental Europe, but were part of a much more 
dynamic practice beyond Europe, with considerably more implications for 
international relations in the future.
To an extent, this argument was prefigured by Alexandrowicz's account of 
the importance of Grotian concepts in establishing a proper legal framework for 
diplomatic relations between European sovereigns and East Asian rulers. 
Alexandrowicz showed that a very interesting new perspective on Grotian thought 
could be achieved by locating Grotius's ideas in the historical context of 
European-Asian relations, rather than in the specifically European context of the 
emerging society of sovereign states. Unfortunately, Alexandrowicz left several 
key Grotian categories of thought uninvestigated, and consequently failed to 
develop a proper situation for the Grotian law of nations, over-ambitiously 
positing the existence of a 'universal international society' which could easily be 
dismissed by Bull and Gong. W ith the insights into Grotian thought developed in 
the previous Chapter, however, we were able to adapt Alexandrowicz's core 
argument within the context of an extended account of the practice of 
colonisation, examining its European origins and North American development,
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Chapter 6
A Reappraisal of the Expansion of International Society
As we saw in Chapter 3, the 'expansion of international society' is conventionally 
supposed to have involved the conversion of independent non-European societies 
into 'civilised' members of the society of states. In this historical narrative, as set 
out by theorists like Hedley Bull or Gerrit Gong, the legal, diplomatic and military 
imposition of the European 'standard of civilisation' is seen as central to the 
transformation of international society "from a society fashioned in Europe and 
dominated by Europeans into the global international society of today, with its 
nearly two hundred states, the great majority of which are not European."(BuiI & 
Watson, 1984: 1) Of course, this conventional historical treatment does not 
attempt to capture all of the features of the interaction between European and 
non-European societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the 
contrary, it analyses only those aspects of European expansion that are deemed 
to be relevant to the spread of the values, rules and institutions of the European 
society of states, since the society of states is held to define the characteristic 
feature of the element of society in modern world politics. Therefore, other 
features of European expansion are ignored, because they are seen as irrelevant 
to the question of the changing nature and geographical scope of modern 
international society, ex hypothesis.
However, as we saw in the previous two Chapters, the hypothesis on 
which this conventional account is based is questionable. International society in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was both institutionally and normatively 
more complicated than is appreciated by the conventional conception of a society 
of sovereign states. It was argued that, in addition to the 'diplomatic ethic' of 
'internal freedom' and indivisible external sovereignty, international society in the 
seventeenth century included a set of values, rules and institutions consistent with 
the Grotian account of the law of nations and the practice of colonisation: the 
'colonising ethic' of appropriation and divisible sovereignty. Therefore, other 
features of the broad process of European expansion become relevant to the story
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of the expansion of modern international society and the construction of the 
contemporary global international society. In particular, our recognition of the 
importance of the practice of colonisation in the origins of modern international 
society provides us with a framework to integrate nineteenth-century European 
and American colonisation into the historical narrative of the expansion of 
international society.
After a brief preliminary investigation of the concept of 'expansion', 
explaining the historiographical significance of the practice of colonisation in 
European and American expansion, this Chapter w ill examine two theatres of the 
expansion of international society: American westward expansion, and Dutch 
colonial administration in the East Indies. These particular theatres have been 
chosen for two related reasons. First, they carry further the argument of Chapter 
5. Thus, they show how the international society emerging in Dutch colonisation 
in the East Indies and in settlement in North America developed through the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Secondly, they offer the 
clearest possible illustration of the significance of the Grotian concepts of 
appropriation and divisible sovereignty in modern international society. This is not 
to say that other instances of colonial or imperial expansion, like the British in 
India, would not illustrate these points. It is simply to say that American and 
Dutch colonial expansion are exemplary and unusually pure instances of this kind 
of international practice, and therefore have a special heuristic utility. 
Furthermore, this is not to say that all European expansion through colonialism 
or imperialism was oriented partly or exclusively to the Grotian concepts of 
appropriation and divisible sovereignty. The purpose of this Chapter is not to 
develop a general theory of either European expansion or colonialism; the 
purpose of the Chapter is to augment the conventional account of the expansion 
of international society with reference to the values, rules and institutions 
discussed in previous Chapters.
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§1. The historiography of European expansion
Although the spread of the European notion of 'civilised' behaviour through 
international law and diplomacy was undoubtedly part of the process of European 
expansion, it is clear that it was only a part of a wider and more complex whole. 
For example, it is arguable that European expansion was effected, as Justin 
Rosenberg claims, "not through the widening interaction among pre-existent 
sovereignties, but rather through the construction of the greatest colonial empires 
the world had ever seen."(Rosenberg, 1994a: 163, emphasis omitted) Because of 
their focus on legal and diplomatic relations between independent (but unequal) 
political communities, conventional international society theorists almost 
completely disregard the significance of these colonial empires as theatres for the 
internal reconstruction of non-European societies and their incorporation into a 
global international society.
According to Rosenberg, "The dynamo here...was the capitalist 
industrialisation of Europe."(Rosenberg, 1994a: 164) One of the most striking 
features of the capitalist mode of production is the way it generated three different 
kinds of mass population movement of which the expansion of international 
society was one part: within Europe, from the countryside to the cities; from 
Europe to the non-European world; and between non-European societies, under 
European direction.(Rosenberg, 1994a: 161) Each of these population movements 
was evidence of a moment in the "historical process of expropriation which 
reconstitutes [peasants] as propertyless individuals compelled to sell their 
labour."(Rosenberg, 1994a: 160) The expropriation of the peasant leads to the 
emergence of 'free' labour, separated from the means of production; that is to say, 
the relations of production through which modern capitalism is constituted. One 
of the features of this arrangement is a strong formal distinction between the 
political and economic spheres, since the surplus value produced by the labour 
of peasants is extracted by capitalists through purely economic means of 
compulsion: the wage-labour system. This separation between the political and 
the economic is replicated in the power-political form assumed by international
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relations through the purely political realm of the states-system. Thus, Rosenberg 
comes to regard "the world of independent 'nation-states'" as the outcome of "the 
historical movement of 'geopolitical' expropriation (imperialism)".(Rosenberg, 
1994a: 171-72) Accordingly, he regards the concept of 'expansion' as rather 
unhelpful. First, it does not convey the fact that capitalism wrought transformative 
changes in European societies as well as in the non-European world. Secondly, 
the idea of expansion does not quite capture the extent to which "the Europeans 
sought either to transform the social order directly (sometimes by abolishing 
traditional forms of land-ownership and replacing them with private property) or 
at least to reorientate production in order to integrate it directly or indirectly with 
the needs of European industry."(Rosenberg, 1994a: 167)
While Rosenberg's argument calls attention to the significance of the 
imperialist expropriation and proletarianisation of non-European peasants as the 
basis for the formation and expansion of the modern states-system, the 
relationship between capitalism and colonisation is rather more complex. Because 
of the unique circumstances of "true colonies, i.e., virgin soil colonized by free 
immigrants",(Marx, 1976: 931 n) the capitalist project of expropriation is especially 
difficult to bring about. The basic problem posed by colonial societies for 
capitalists can be understood as follows:
The expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil forms the 
basis of the capitalist mode of production. The essence of a free 
colony, on the contrary, consists in this, that the bulk of the soil is 
public property, and every settler on it can therefore turn part of it 
into his private property and his individual means of production, 
without preventing later settlers from performing the same 
operation.(Marx, 1976: 934)
In other words, the peculiar geographical context of colonisation subverts the 
basis of modern capitalism: the separation between the direct producers and 
ownership of the means of production. This is not to say that capitalism plays no 
role in social relations in colonies. On the contrary, because this obstacle stands 
in their way, capitalists must resort to unusually extreme tactics in order to
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establish their exclusive control over the means of production. Consequently, 
unlike in European societies, efforts at expropriation are exhibited with unusual 
clarity and unconcealment in plans for 'systematic colonisation'.
The trick is to kill two birds with one stone. Let the government set 
an artificial price on the virgin soil, a price independent of the law 
of supply and demand, a price that compels the immigrant to work 
for a long time for wages before he can earn enough money to buy 
land and turn himself into an independent farmer. The fund 
resulting from the sale of land at a price relatively prohibitory for 
the wage-labourers, this fund of money extorted from the wages of 
labour by a violation of the sacred law of supply and demand, is to 
be applied by the government...to the importation of paupers from 
Europe into the colonies, so as to keep the wage-labour market full 
for the capitalists.... This is the great secret of 'systematic 
colonisation'.(Marx, 1976: 938-39)
According to Karl Marx, this kind of policy was adopted in Australia, but in North 
America such elaborate plans were overtaken by events: the sheer scale of 
immigration into the United States flooded the labour market (at least in the 
Eastern cities), and the extent of speculative acquisition of land by capitalists 
produced a high land price that nullified the challenge posed to capitalism by the 
colonial land situation.(Marx, 1976: 940)
However, as we w ill see in a moment, what is interesting about the 
instances of colonisation discussed in this Chapter, and American westward 
expansion in particular, is that they violate the capitalistic programme of 
'systematic colonisation' quite dramatically in other ways. Indeed, as a leading 
American historian of western settlement observed in a paper originally published 
in 1905:
those who agree with Mr. Wakefield, the English student of colonial 
questions [and the architect of 'systematic colonisation'], would 
maintain that the terms proposed [for the settlement of the west] 
were too reasonable, that too much land was placed on sale, that 
our country would have been more prosperous if less inducement 
had been offered for the dispersion of our then scanty 
population.(Treat, 1963: 13)
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Accordingly, it seems hard to regard 'systematic colonisation' as an appropriate 
description of the practice of colonisation in the expansion of international 
society. Put bluntly, as w ill become evident later, colonisation does not seem to 
exhibit a capitalist logic, because it violates the fundamental principle of the 
expropriation of direct producers. If we want to understand the practice of 
colonisation in European expansion it may therefore prove to be instructive to 
look at other aspects of colonial historiography, especially the work of members 
of the Leiden Centre for the History of European Expansion and of North 
American 'frontier historians'.
Historians from the Leiden Centre for the History of European Expansion, 
who also base their work on colonial and imperial historiography, see the process 
of expansion in terms much closer to those used by the conventional theorists of 
international society, looking at "the history of the encounters between diverse 
systems of civilisation, their influence on one another and the gradual growth 
towards a global, universal system of civilisation."(Wesseling, 1978: 4) However, 
the Leiden historians depart from conventional international relations theory, in 
that they argue that the 'encounter between civilisations' should be seen not 
simply in terms of diplomatic bargaining between independent political entities, 
but rather as "a process of...internal expansion. The key to the understanding of 
this process lies in the relationship between colony and coloniser and not in the 
rivalry between the colonial powers themselves."(Wesseling, 1978: 6, emphasis 
added) Nor, one might add, does it lie in diplomatic relations between European 
and non-European independent political communities. Consequently, the Leiden 
historians look more at the development of legal and political institutions in the 
specific context of particular colonial societies, rather than purely at the writings 
of international lawyers and diplomatic relations between independent states. This 
then provides an opportunity to re-frame the English school's idea of the 
expansion of international society, to take into account the 'internal expansion' 
within colonial societies in the sense of the process of legal and political change 
in those societies.
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It is interesting to note that, like Justin Rosenberg, the Leiden historians 
identify a problem with the concept of 'expansion': "the simple pattern of Western 
penetration and...[non-Western] reaction is lost...in a multiplicity of complete and 
partial influences".(Zurcher, 1978: 77) J.C. Heesterman's study of Indian history 
comes to a similar conclusion about the "fragmentation inherent in the expansion- 
reaction paradigm."(Heesterman, 1978: 32) For this reason, the Leiden historians 
toyed with a broader concept of 'overseas history', which "deals not only with the 
encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans, but also with the economic, 
social, political and cultural systems of the non-Europeans themselves."(Emmer & 
Wesseling, 1979: 3) In other words, we should pay more attention to the internal 
organisation of non-European societies, and their reconstruction not through the 
rather indirect means of extraterritoriality, nor even through the dynamic of 
capitalist expropriation, but through the overall legal, political and economic 
mechanisms of colonial administration.
Another view, mainly put forward by North American historians, focuses 
on the geographical context of 'expansion', in particular through the idea of the 
'frontier'. Here, an interesting observation has been made by Ray Allen Billington, 
which helps to illustrate the difference between this form of expansion and that 
analysed by conventional theorists of the society of states:
the term 'frontier' has been endowed with a new meaning in the 
United States. Suggest the word to a European or Asian or African 
and you conjure up in his mind a vision of customs barriers, 
passport controls, and other troublesome hindrances to his freedom 
of movement. Propose the term to an American and he thinks at 
once of beckoning opportunity.(Billington, 1968: 76)
Expansion is thus understood in direct contrast to the conventional idea of 
diplomatic and legal bargaining between independent political communities. It 
signifies instead "the absorption of contiguous areas."(lrwin, 1983: 64, emphasis 
added) Furthermore, the point of the alternative focus on American westward 
expansion is that, in the particular geographical context created by the American 
frontier, European expansion was transformed into something quite different and
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uniquely American.1
The peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have 
been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an 
expanding people—to the changes involved in crossing a continent, 
in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this 
progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of 
the frontier into the complexity of city life.(Turner, 1986: 2)
The homogenising, absorbing aspect of American expansion is perhaps most 
dramatically encapsulated in the following lines from Walt Whitman's well-known 
poem, By Blue Ontario's Shore: "A Nation announcing itself, I myself make the 
only growth by which I can be appreciated, I reject none, accept all, then 
reproduce all in my own forms."
Now, while it is clear that the conventional history of the 'expansion of 
international society' is inadequate as a story of the broader process of European 
expansion (or 'explosion', as Rosenberg puts it; or 'overseas history' as the Leiden 
Centre prefer), it is nonetheless important to recognise why conventional 
international society theorists limited their historiographical focus in the way that 
they did. They looked at diplomatic and legal interactions because they were 
interested in understanding the changing structure of international law and 
diplomacy as mechansisms that sustain order in world politics, in other words, as 
institutions of modern international society. Therefore, if an alternative history of 
the 'expansion of international society' is to be developed, we need to show how 
these other aspects of the process of European expansion contributed to the 
changing and expanding structure of modern international society. To put this 
another way: if one wants to understand the general process of European 
expansion, it may be necessary to examine imperialism or frontier history; but it 
remains to be demonstrated that these alternative historiographical foci are
1. It should be noted that Justin Rosenberg recognises the significance of North America in the broad 
process of European 'expansion' or 'explosion', commenting that both Max Weber and Karl Marx saw 
North America as the emblematically modern society.(Rosenberg, 1994a: 166-67) However, Rosenberg 
chooses to see American westward expansion not as a distinct process, but rather as the less 
exceptional "child of the industrial-capitalist transformation of Europe."(Rosenberg, 1994a: 166)
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relevant to understanding the specific process of the expansion of international
society.
One problem here is that none of the above accounts attempts to relate its 
historical work on the broad process of European expansion to the changing 
normative content and institutional structure of modern international society. The 
Leiden historians do not offer any insights into the 'global, universal system of 
civilisation', since they remain immersed in the historical study of development 
within colonial societies, unrelated to categories of international law or society. 
The North American 'frontier historians' are dedicated to debating the question 
of American exceptional ism, and therefore have not paid much attention to the 
question of how the unique form of American westward expansion has been a 
part of an integrated global international society. Even Rosenberg, who has come 
closest to this problem, focuses on the "historical path to the modern global 
states-system".(Rosenberg, 1994a: 163, emphasis added) He does not see the 
distinction between a states-system and an international society as having great 
force, and therefore does not offer an historical re-interpretation of the values, 
rules and institutions through which contemporary international society (as 
opposed to the contemporary states-system) operates.2
Here, the argument of the previous Chapter shows its merit. That Chapter
2. A similar criticism can be levelled at the historical materialist analysis presented in Mandy Turner's 
paper on 'Demystifying the Expansion of International Society' (presented to the International Studies 
Association Conference in March 1997). Turner makes four criticisms of the international society 
approach: it has an obscurantist method; its assumption of the domestic-international separation is 
question begging; it contains an inadequate conceptualisation of the state-society nexus; and it 
interprets from an official point of view, but treats its conclusions as objective knowledge. I believe 
that I have answered the first and last of these criticisms earlier in the thesis. Indeed, Turner's criticism 
of the objectivist character of the international society approach works more effectively against her 
historical materialist approach than it does against the international society theorists' admittedly 
incomplete version of verstehen sociology. Furthermore, I would contend that the analysis presented 
in this and the previous Chapter answers Turner's other criticisms. The point is that Turner confuses 
current international society theory with the concept of international society itself. Thus, she provides 
a fair criticism of the actual historical analysis of Bull et a i ,  but she does not then go on to provide 
an alternative account of the values, rules and institutions that comprise contemporary modern 
international society. Like Rosenberg, her historical account merely offers an interpretation of the 
contemporary global states-system and world market. This does not constitute a 'demystification' of 
the expansion of international society; if anything, it is a demystification of the expansion of the states- 
system.
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extended our historical understanding of the origins of modern international 
society to include the practice of colonisation, and it therefore puts us in a 
position to see how the construction of colonial empires and American westward 
expansion might have contributed to the broad process of the expansion of 
modern international society. To be more precise: in the previous Chapter, we 
saw how the values, rules and institutions of early modern international society 
were not just those described by Bull's notion of a European society of 
territorially-defined sovereign states, managing their affairs through positive 
international law and balance of power diplomacy. Rather, we discovered that an 
important part of early modern international society was its incorporation of the 
broadly naturalist account of the law of nations given by Hugo Grotius, which 
included a liberal concept of appropriation and a republican concept of 'divisible 
sovereignty'. These legal ideas were grounded in the practice of late medieval 
reclamation and early modern colonisation, especially in thetenurial and political 
forms of that practice. The historiographical point that European expansion 
involves the extension and consolidation of this practice in the 'internal 
expansion' of the colonial empires of the nineteenth century or American 
westward expansion therefore offers an excellent opportunity to develop the 
account of the origins of modern international society given in the previous 
Chapter into an account of the expansion of international society.
§2. American westward expansion
In general, the process of American westward expansion was marked by a 
continual simplification of cultural, social and political life, as "Highly developed 
political forms gave way to simple associations of settlers or rudimentary 
representative bodies."(Billington, 1950: 2) The complex forms of European 
society were continually broken down into more simple modes of interaction, and 
were then reconstituted in a uniquely American democratic-republican 
formulation. For our purposes, the main point about this process of institutional 
simplification and re-consolidation is the way it continually reasserted two basic 
principles, which lay at the heart of the Jeffersonian vision of the American union:
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the unencumbered nature of individual land tenure; and the division of political 
authority in the western territories between the local, state-level and federal 
institutions. In this respect, for the Jeffersonians, "the West was the foundation of 
the 'Empire of Liberty'. An endless recreation of an agrarian world of independent 
farmers across the North American continent would allow Americans to preserve 
the personal independence and public virtue that the Jeffersonian gentry believed 
was so crucial to the success of republican government."(Cayton, 1986: 12) Thus, 
in the process of American westward expansion, we can see an example of one 
route taken by the expansion of international society: the absorption of territory 
into a republican system of equal states within a relatively centralised federal 
system. Politically, this was organised through a complicated system of divided 
sovereignty, within which individual rights were guaranteed through the local and 
federal states' formal renunciation of their claims over the persons and property 
of individual citizens. Eventually, as Harold Hyman puts it, "By the time the Age 
of Jackson merged into that of Lincoln, Americans boasted with good reason that, 
better than any other, their nation knew how to transform subservient territories 
into equal states".(Hyman, 1986) The following discussion w ill trace the 
development of this process from the post-revolutionary decision about what to 
do with the western territories, through the regulation of the actual process of 
westward expansion, to the beginnings of an extra-continental application of some 
of the core Jeffersonian principles in the Philippines.
The post-revolutionary land ordinances
Jeffersonian principles can be discerned in the founding acts of American policy 
towards the western territories: the ordinances of 1785 and 1787. The 1785 
ordinance established the basic framework within which the public lands were 
to be distributed. The 1787 Northwest ordinance confirmed the allodial character 
of all land tenures derived from the federal government, making "the individual 
absolutely independent of the State".(Donaldson, 1970: 157) It also insisted that 
the western territories should eventually be accepted as equal states within the
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American union, on meeting certain requirements.3
To understand the significance of these ordinances, one must first 
appreciate the nature of the problem of the public lands in the western territories. 
Claims to the western territories had originally been part of the colonial land 
grants to proprietors or colonising agencies, which had seldom posited a western 
boundary. After the revolution, these claims were generally ceded to the federal 
government by the states.(see Hibbard, 1965: 7-14) The public domain was also 
created through purchases by the federal government, such as the Louisiana 
purchase from France in 1803, the Florida purchase from Spain in 1819 or the 
Oregon purchase from Britain in 1846.(see Hibbard, 1965: 14-20) Unlike the 
national domain, over which the government exercised only political jurisdiction, 
in the public domain the federal government actually owned the land as well. 
Thus, "the difference between the public domain and the national domain is one 
of property rights in the land itself and not one of sovereignty."(Hibbard, 1965: 
7)
In ceding the lands to the federal government, the states had insisted that 
they be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States as a whole, and 
"there were two forms of 'bona fide' dispensation which merited 
discussion....should the land be used as a source of revenue, or should it be 
disposed of with especial reference to the proper spread of population?"(Treat, 
1963: 8) As Alexander Hamilton put it at the time:
in the formation of a plan for the disposition of the vacant lands of 
the United States there appear to be two leading objects of 
consideration: one the facility of advantageous sales, according to 
the probable course of circumstances; the other the accommodation 
of individuals now inhabiting the western country, or who may 
hereafter emigrate thither.(cited in Hibbard, 1965: 2)
3. To focus on the Constitution would probably give a rather different story, perhaps with less 
emphasis on Jeffersonian principles, since in the debates about the Constitution the idea of popular 
sovereignty was used to much greater effect to centralise political authority on the federal 
government.(see Onuf, 1983) I would like to thank Nicholas Onuf for drawing my attention to the 
significance of these jurisdictional controversies in the early republic.
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In his characteristic fashion, Hamilton went on to argue that "The former as an 
operation of finance claims primary attention".(cited in Hibbard, 1965: 2) Initially, 
this was also the view of Congress, especially since it was argued that the costs 
of the revolutionary war should be at least partly met by the present and future 
inhabitants of the western territories.
To this end, a Commission was appointed in 1784 to determine the best 
way of disposing of the lands then in the public domain, which included Thomas 
Jefferson among its members. At the time, there were basically two options left 
over from the colonial system of distributing land: the New England township 
system, or the Southern warrant system. The key element of the New England 
system was that
When more land was needed, a township was laid off, generally 6 
miles square, and it was settled as a whole, the land surveyed 
before settlement, and the details of granting left to the town itself.
This resulted in a compact spread of settlement, in a colony of 
townships, in each of which the citizens had small holdings, 
carefully surveyed before settlement.(Treat, 1963: 9)
As we saw in Chapter 5, the Southern system was more haphazard: "Land was 
taken up by warrants. These could be located on any unappropriated land."(Treat, 
1963: 10) In other words, one would simply buy a warrant for so much land, and 
then use that warrant to settle on any tract that had not yet been taken up.
The first report of the Commission on the land question, in 1784, 
suggested "a combination of the survey feature of the New England system with 
the administrative features of the southern system".(Treat, 1963: 10-11) Thus, the 
original plan was to survey the land in townships, but then.allow settlement to 
proceed in a more flexible way, without requiring settlement to fill up one 
township after another. The second Commission report, in 1785, changed the 
plan for the territories slightly in favour of the New England system, proposing 
that the land should be sold off not through individual warrants, but instead as 
complete townships, at $1 per acre. The representatives of Southern states in
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Congress protested this plan, making "repeated attempts to provide for a more 
general sale of small lots. Believing, as they did, in the propriety of the widest 
choice in the selection of land, they attempted to free themselves from the 
compact-settlement idea so stoutly insisted upon by New England."(Treat, 1963: 
12) The final 1785 ordinance moved back slightly in the direction of the Southern 
system, but only slightly: "The New England system triumphed for the time. The 
accurate public surveys, the careful recording, the rectangular townships...were 
all parts of that system.... The most the southern members could secure was a 
provision that in half the townships a person might purchase a [single] 
section—640 acres".(Treat, 1963: 12)
The terms of sale having been established by the 1785 ordinance, the 1787 
Northwest ordinance was largely concerned with defining the form of tenure 
under which public lands would be owned, and with the political status of the 
western territories. On the first point, echoing Jefferson's earlier plans for the State 
Constitution of Virginia,(see Jefferson, from 1950: i, especially 362) the ordinance 
insisted that these sales should result in the ownership of the land passing to 
freeholding occupiers. Tenure in fee simple was mandated, rather than the more 
feudal form of tenure in fee-tail. The plan was that "Fee-simple ownership by large 
numbers of smallholders would transform the frontier, where civilization was at 
risk, into settlements where morality and laws...would be honoured and national 
cohesion maintained."(Hyman, 1986: 23-24) Thus, the 1787 Ordinance made it 
explicit that the government's rights over the public lands would be discharged 
entirely: the lands would be sold in the most unencumbered form of tenure 
possible.(Donaldson, 1970) It is also notable that the idea of fee-simple ownership 
and township settlement was to be "applied to all parts of the national domain -  
those already acquired as well as those to be acquired in the future".(Editorial 
note, in Jefferson, from 1950: vi.582, emphasis added) In effect, then, the 1787 
ordinance extended the principle of private property as a general principle, even 
for territories not yet part of the jurisdiction of the United States.
The intended constitutional and political incorporation of the territories
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into the states-union was originally set out in Jefferson's constitutional and 
legislative plans, and was preserved into the Northwest ordinance. The central 
principle of the ordinance was "that the goal of all territorial acquisition 
eventually was to be Statehood."(Leibowitz, 1989: 6) In essence, this was an 
egalitarian rejection of the doctrine of colonialism. Congress was to assume 
responsibility for and authority over the territories, to carve them up into suitable 
regions, but then not to exploit the territory as a colony but to oversee the process 
of state-formation, determining the moment at which the territory could be 
accepted into the Union as an equal state.
This was partly enacted through the Constitution, Article 4 of which 
allowed Congress to establish governments in territories outside the Union and 
eventually allow the admission of new States into the Union. In the Northwest 
ordinance, this plan was set out in more detail and rested on three planks: the 
establishment of a government in the territories, prior to the latter assuming 
control over their own affairs; the mechanism for creating new states; and the 
provisions for internal governance of those new states. The establishment of 
territorial government rested on the federal appointment of governors who would 
have complete responsibility for the territory. In the first instance, then,
The Northwest Ordinance...attempted to promote the power of the 
United States by establishing a hierarchical government with power 
firmly concentrated in the hands of nationally appointed officials.
The governor, who virtually had dictatorial powers, and three 
judges were to govern the Northwest Territory, a vast region that 
included the present-day states of Ohio, Indiana, 11 lionois, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin, until it achieved a population of five 
thousand free male inhabitants.(Cayton, 1986: 26)
The creation of new states was envisaged to follow a very straightforward 
formula. According to Article 5 of the 1787 Ordinance: "whenever any of the said 
States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be 
admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an equal 
footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever".(Donaldson, 1970:
217
156) Jefferson had intended this to be the culmination of a steady progression of 
forms of constitutional government, from a first temporary constitution made by 
an assembly of all settlers, through a permanent constitution devised when the 
territory's population reached 20,000.(Jefferson, from 1950: vi, 614) One cannot 
but be struck by the simplicity of this cumulative population requirement, 
compared with the requirements of sovereign statehood in European positive 
international law and the standard of 'civilisation', such as an organised 
bureaucracy, capacity for control of territory, self-defence and so on. This was 
largely because, thanks to the broader division of sovereignty, the new states 
would not be required to undertake such activities anyway.
However, although the requirements for qualification as a State were very 
low by the standards of positive international law, the ordinance was much more 
intrusive with regard to the internal constitution of the new states than any 
positive international lawyer would ever have dreamed. In the first place, the right 
of individual private appropriation of the public lands was guaranteed. In spite of 
their supposedly equal and independent status, the new states were not allowed 
to "interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress 
assembled".(Jefferson, from 1950: vi. 614) In other words, the territories were 
allowed to devise even a permanent constitution for themselves without being 
able to make any prescriptions whatsoever concerning the system of tenure on 
their public lands (which was by far the largest part of their territory). It would be 
hard to think of a more gross violation of the indivisible and territorial principle 
of state sovereignty that is conventionally supposed to rest at the heart of modern 
international society. In addition, the inhabitants of the new States were at liberty 
to devise their own Constitution. However, the proviso was added that the 
inhabitants had to be protected by habeas corpus, trial by jury, common law 
procedure, proportionate political representation, no arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty or property (all Article 2); that there be no slavery (Article 6); and that their 
adopted State Constitution be republican.(Article 5; see Donaldson, 1970:155-56) 
In other words, the states formed by the people moving into the Western 
territories were permitted to develop any constitution they liked, so long as it was
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republican. Furthermore, the new states founded in the western territories would 
automatically be equal parts of the American states-union, and would 
consequently become part of the broader constitutional division of powers 
between the individual states and the federal government: for example, the new 
states' relations with foreign powers would be managed by the federal 
government of the United States. The process of state formation set out in the 
1787 ordinance thus presents a clear case of the application of the principle of 
divided sovereignty:
Few Americans advocated full jurisdictional autonomy for the 
states.... On the other hand, most Americans were too attached to 
their states to make any consolidationist scheme possible.... The 
limits of what was politically acceptable as well as theoretically 
conceivable thus pointed to the creation of a 'complicated' 
government for the United States that was, as Madison put it, 
neither an 'absolute consolidation' nor a 'mere confederacy'.(Onuf,
1983: 173)
In general, then, the 1787 ordinance was remarkably unconcerned with the 
positive legal standards according to which international social expansion is 
conventionally supposed to have operated, in the sense of asserting the basic 
requirements for the possession of territorially defined, absolute external 
sovereignty. Instead, it was much more interested in establishing certain 
individual freedoms and republican modes of governance within the states that 
were to be constructed on the Western territories. The manner in which this was 
done replicated the classic normative and institutional features of the practice of 
colonisation, with attention devoted to ensuring that ownership was held by 
private settlers under the most unencumbered forms of tenure possible, and that 
the political institutions that would develop in the new States would harmonise 
with republican ideas about the proper way of organising a political community 
through the division of political authority between local, state-level and inter-state 
(federal) institutions. Now, let us examine the ways in which these two 
themes—the principles of private appropriation by individuals and of the 
establishment of republican state governance—were carried on through the
219
nineteenth century.
The legal regulation of frontier settlement after 1787
In terms of the application of the ordinances, the main problem that arose 
concerned the policy of 'advantageous sales' set out in the 1785 ordinance. The 
trouble with this financial plan was that, as Jefferson himself put it, "By selling 
land you w ill disgust [the settlers] and cause an avulsion of them from the 
common union. They w ill settle the lands in spite of everybody."(cited in 
Hibbard, 1965: 4) The point was that the actual practice of frontier settlement was 
to treat the land as a free good, in which ownership was established through 
occupation. Furthermore, among Jeffersonians and westerners this view was 
reinforced by the belief in the desirability of distributing the land to settler farmers 
on the freest possible terms, partly inspired by the belief in the natural right of 
appropriation, and partly through republican sentiment. A speech from Thomas 
Hart Benton, Senator of Missouri and the leading advocate of the western interest 
in Congress, captures this line of thinking very well:
Tenantry is unfavourable to freedom.... The tenant has, in fact, no 
country, no hearth, no domestic altar, no household god. The 
freeholder, on the contrary, is the national supporter of a free 
government, and it should be the policy of republics to multiply 
their freeholders as it is the policy of monarchies to multiply 
tenants. We are a republic, and we wish to continue so: then 
multiply the class of freeholders; pass the public lands cheaply and 
easily into the hands of the People; sell for a reasonable price to 
those who are able to pay; and give without price to those who are 
not.(cited in Hibbard, 1963: 142-43)
As Daniel Feller puts it, "Benton played brilliantly on the agrarian strain in 
Jeffersonian Republican ideology.... Fairly distributed, the public domain could 
guarantee a farm to every willing settler. And as every good Jeffersonian knew, 
the security of republican government lay in its freehold farmers."(Feller, 1984: 
75 & see also Kulikoff, 1992: 147) This strikes, it hardly needs saying, a 
considerable contrast with the programme of 'systematic colonisation'.
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Driven by the yeoman and republican sensibilities of the Jeffersonians, and 
later assisted by President Andrew Jackson's sympathetic attitude, after 1787 the 
policy towards the western territories developed gradually closer towards freeing 
up the system of allocating land. At first, there was very little movement in the 
government policy before 1812, largely because settlement in the West was not 
particularly extensive and land sales were slow: the indigenous Indian inhabitants 
were seen as a threat to settlements, and there were still good opportunities for 
settlement in the Eastern states.(Hibbard, 1965: 41-42) However, as fears of the 
Indian threat diminished after 1812, there was a sharp increase in Western land 
settlement: "The old Northwest nearly tripled in population in ten years, from 
272,000 in 1810 to 792,000 in 1820."(Feller, 1984: 15) This rapid increase put 
the 1785 system of surveying land into townships and then selling at public 
auction under increasing and eventually unbearable strain.
In addition, as Western migration increased, frontier society was becoming 
complicated far beyond the simple Jeffersonian ideal of yeoman farmers. In 
particular, two new kinds of actor became prominent in westward expansion: the 
squatter and the speculator. Squatters settled on unsurveyed land, making it 
impossible to recognise their claims without breaching the New England system 
of the 1785 ordinance for surveying before sale. Nevertheless, "Congress, 
deciding as in the past to accept what it could not prevent, duly authorized 
squatters to remain as temporary tenants if they secured permission from local 
land officers."(Feller, 1984: 17) The plan of most squatters was simple, they 
would establish themselves on a tract, improve it, and then, when the lands were 
put up for sale by the government:
arrange for the purchase of their lands—made valuable by their 
improvements—before the opening of the auction or run the risk of 
losing them to speculators. Claim clubs and special preemption 
laws gave them protection against speculators only to the date of 
the sale. Squatters were inclined to put their meagre capital into 
stick, housing, fencing, and clearing which seemed the most 
essential for the moment and to hope that the land sale would be 
postponed until they could accumulate money with which to 
purchase their claims.(Gates, 1963b: 356)
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In all of this activity, the key problem was seen as how to keep speculators from 
acquiring ownership of the land, and how instead to ensure that genuine settlers, 
including squatters, could be settled on their land. Nevertheless, although the 
settler-speculator contrast became a staple of policy-making, it was always 
something of a false dichotomy. For example, Paul Wallace Gates cites an English 
view of 1862: "Speculation in real estate...has been the ruling idea and 
occupation of the Western mind.... The people of the West became dealers in 
land, rather than its cultivators."(Gates, 1963b: 351) In other words, to put it 
bluntly, most settlers were speculators as well. As the speculative frenzy 
increased, fuelled by sales of land on credit, a colossal land debt problem 
developed: by 1819 settlers owed no less than $22m to the federal 
government.(Feller, 1984: 22) The land debt crisis forced the federal government 
to allow easier terms of repayment, through the 1821 Relief Act, which rapidly 
reduced the level of debt.(Feller, 1984: 37)
Although it solved the immediate financial crisis, the Relief Act did not end 
the problems. Indeed, it merely increased speculation, to the dismay of the 
Jeffersonians: "Huge tracts were passing not to Western farmers but to Eastern 
capitalists, and for speculation rather than cultivation. Instead of being given away 
to yeomen, the domain was being plundered by financiers."(Feller, 1984: 184) To 
counter-act this problem, President Andrew Jackson introduced his 'specie 
circular' of 1836, which effectively ended (for the time being) the speculative 
boom. The circular allowed only gold or silver for land purchases, and thus 
"brought down the whole bloated structure.... Land purchases by speculators 
stopped immediately; only the business of lending money to squatters 
remained."(Gates, 1963b: 358) For the time being, this led to a "decided lull" in 
speculation, although the activity picked up again in the 1850s.(Hibbard, 1965: 
221) More lastingly, beyond these attempts to manipulate the terms under which 
land was purchased, government also began to legislate more and more rights for 
the actual settlers of the land, the ultimate goal being "to make the public-land 
system function in a democratic way by assuring the small man the right to 
acquire a piece of the national domain."(Gates, 1996: 108) This effort was carried
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on across three issues: pre-emption, graduation and homesteading.
Pre-emption rights were introduced from the 1830s, culminating in the 
1841 Pre-emption Act. Their main purpose was to ensure the rights of settlers and 
squatters against speculation, under a rationale set out by the Public Lands 
Committee in 1828, tantalising close to the practice of reclamation discussed in 
the previous Chapter: "It is right and proper that the first settlers, who have made 
roads and bridges over the public lands at their own expense and with great 
labour and toil, should be allowed a privilege greater than other purchasers."(cited 
in Hibbard, 1965: 151) The essence of the Pre-emption Act was that it "gave 
settlers the right to move upon and improve [160 acres of] surveyed public land 
from which they might...make the necessary funds to purchase it without 
competitive bidding for $1.25 an acre."(Gates, 1996: 104) 'Graduation' refers to 
the graduation of the price of land offered for sale in public auctions. This was 
the focus of Benton's campaign, arguing that "The United States is a great land 
seller, and she should follow the practice of all other sellers; she should apportion 
her price to the quality of her land."(cited in Hibbard, 1965: 291) In essence, it 
was hoped that graduation would make it easier for settlers to acquire cheaper 
cultivable land, below the fixed government price at which land sales had 
hitherto operated. Homesteading was introduced rather later than pre-emption or 
graduation, in the 1862 Homestead Act. Unlike the other two policies, which 
merely favourably altered the position of the settlers within the general framework 
of public auctions for land, homesteading introduced the principle of free land in 
the West. The act offered up a quarter section (160 acres) of public land to any 
who would settle on it and improve it for at least five years.(see Gates, 1996: 41 
& Hibbard, 1965: 347-85)
It must be admitted that the Homestead Act did not comprehensively 
replace the 1785 sales system with a free land system. Indeed, as Gates has 
pointed out: "more government land was sold between 1862 and 1891 than was 
successfully homesteaded and patented between 1862 and 1899."(Gates, 1996: 
42-43) Furthermore, the various pre-emption, graduation and homesteading
223
policies did not eliminate speculation. As was noted earlier, the settler-speculator 
dichotomy was always a false one, and the reforms "in practice...meant an open 
field for speculators and town promoters as well as farmers".(Feller, 1984: 191) 
Nevertheless, despite the possibilities of abuse, these acts unquestionably 
provided opportunities for individual settlers to establish themselves on farms.(see 
Gates, 1996: 46 & 52) Therefore, to put the above analysis in very general terms, 
the development of policy through the nineteenth century revealed a steady 
movement in the direction of a free land system, with rights to land increasingly 
based on occupation, and with such rights increasingly being codified and 
institutionalised through the principles of pre-emption and homesteading.
The political process of the incorporation of the western territories into the 
Union followed the lines of the Northwest ordinance rather more faithfully, but 
even so not without incident. In the first case, the initial assertion of the authority 
of the federal government in the western territories aroused considerable ire. As 
we saw, in the Northwest ordinance, Congress initially assumed absolute political 
authority over the western territories, if only as a temporary measure intended to 
lead to the eventual incorporation of the states as equal members of the Union 
on satisfying a basic population requirement. The extensive, even dictatorial, 
gubernatorial authority permitted by this system of territorial government was the 
object of much anger among settlers in the west. Far from being grateful for the 
relatively minor population requirements laid on them before being granted 
statehood (minor, that is, compared with colonies under European domination), 
the settlers "did not anticipate graduating from some territorial school of 
republicanism; rather, they looked forward to a restoration of rights unjustly taken 
away."(Etcheson, 1996: 20)
The national electoral success of the Jeffersonian democratic-republicans 
in 1801 combined with a strong movement in the Northwest Territory for 
statehood. The aspiration for statehood was bound up with republican sentiment, 
since the governor formed the target of popular criticism, and the territorial 
government attracted hostility for being, as Michael Baldwin claimed in 1802,
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"aristocratic in its principles, and oppressive and partial in its 
administration."(cited in Cayton, 1986: 69) This culminated in the meeting of a 
Convention in November 1802 to draw up a constitution for the proposed new 
state of Ohio, which
reversed the flow of power [to the national government's 
appointees] as it had existed under the Ordinance of 1787. 
Sovereignty now rested with people in local areas and their 
biennially elected representatives in the legislature; the executive 
and appointed officials had been made subject to the w ill of the 
people they governed.(Cayton, 1986: 77-78)
Thus, the abhorred system of territorial government through federally appointed 
governors and officals saw its role dramatically reduced, and a proper republican 
constitution was established in line with Jeffersonian thinking. Congress accepted 
Ohio as a state under this constitution in 1803.
For our purposes, the interesting point to note here concerns the location 
of sovereignty in this new state. The constitution drawn up by the 1802 
Convention had asserted the local sovereignty of the inhabitants of the territory. 
It was, in this sense, a clear statement of the democratic strand of Jeffersonianism, 
presented in opposition to the Federalist assertion of the national prerogative. 
Subsequently, however, this democratic assertion of popular sovereignty was 
tracked back somewhat, both through a stronger assertion of the role of the 
judiciary and through an increasing reliance on schemes for internal 
improvements funded by the federal government.(see Cayton, 1986: especially 
Chapters 7 & 9) Gradually, in other words the more republican sentiments of the 
Jeffersonians and the nationalist ideas of the Federalists began to re-assert 
themselves, partly through an increasing division of sovereign powers between 
institutions within the state, partly through a non-Grotian assertion of popular 
sovereignty, but also through a recognition that some functions were best 
performed by the federal government, and that these areas of sovereign authority 
should consequently be alienated to the federal level. Thus,
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the debates of the early 1820s...revealed a growing consensus 
about government and society which drew from both Jeffersonian 
and Federalist legacies.... The success of the public school and 
canal movements committed the power of the state government to 
guiding Ohio and its citizens into responsible roles as parts of a 
national system. After the 1820s, few could deny for long that the 
residents of Ohio were independent only to the extent that their 
interdependence with the rest of the American and European 
worlds allowed them to be.(Cayton, 1986: 150)
In other words, the establishment of states in the western territories illustrates the 
classic constitutional features of the practice of colonisation, in the sense that the 
marks of sovereignty came to be divided between different institutions at different 
levels. In the specific case of Ohio, the division was both de jure and de facto. 
The state constitution located sovereignty in the people and their elected 
representatives, however, through the US Constitution foreign relations were all 
conducted through the US Congress, and it was even the case that "in the end, 
it was an act of the United States Congress, not an election, that enabled Ohio to 
become a state".(Cayton, 1986: 80) De facto, things were even messier, as the 
need for orderly administration and for federal assistance in certain areas (notably 
education and 'internal improvements') made further qualifications to local 
popular sovereignty inevitable.
Westward expansion beyond America: the case of the Phiiippines
To conclude this analysis of American westward expansion, let us look at the 
attitude of the Americans towards the Philippines. It should be noted at the outset 
that there is something rather suspect about the conventional wisdom that extra­
continental American involvement simply began with the acquisition of the 
Philippines in 1898. James Gould has pointed out that there were a series of 
forceful interventions in the affairs of other countries through the later part of the 
nineteenth century, even though the predominant stance of American policy in 
Southeast Asia was anti-imperialist.(Gould, 1972) It should also be acknowledged 
that colonial intervention in the Philippines was partly a response to policy 
interests that had not played a significant part in the development of land or
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constitutional policy in the western territories. For example, the views of Alfred 
Mahan on the American national interest, or of Benjamin Kidd on the American 
responsibility for economic development in the tropics, were both influential 
among policy-makers.(see McHale, 1962: 30) Nevertheless, it is worth examining 
American activity in the Philippines, not so much as the first example of a new 
American jingoistic imperialism, but rather as a further continuation of American 
westward expansion.
The Americans acquired the Philippines through an odd mixture of 
conquest and purchase. Despite their military successes they paid $20m to Spain 
as part of the final settlement, and were ceded the Philippines in return for this 
cash settlement.(McHale, 1962: 36) As with the post-revolutionary situation in 
America, they immediately faced the problem of the disposal of the newly- 
acquired public domain (the Spanish crown lands in the Philippines), over which 
the United States government had now acquired direct property rights. In 
addition, in a census carried out in 1903, they discovered that the Philippine 
population was very unevenly distributed across the country, and that "In the 
densely settled areas...an agrarian structure of large haciendas farmed in small lots 
by impoverished tenants had created endemic unrest, expressed in sporadic 
revolts and millenarian movements.... Since farming techniques were poor and 
productivity low, these areas too exhibited extreme poverty."(Krinks, 1974: 2)
The solution the Americans adopted reflected the developments their own 
policy had undergone through the process of westward expansion. Thus, the 1903 
Philippine Public Land Law
introduced the homestead system into the Philippines, prescribed 
regulations for the sale and lease of public lands, and provided for 
the confirmation of the titles that were still unestablished and the 
granting of free patents to occupants and cultivators of public land 
who had cultivated its land for a certain length of time.(Pelzer,
1945: 106)
In addition, considerable assistance was leant to colonising projects to establish
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settlement in the sparsely-populated regions. Admittedly, the homestead system 
in the Philippines was not a great success. In the first instance, the intention of 
improving the lot of indigenous Filipinos was jeopardised by an influx of capital 
and speculators, although it is debatable how extensive this was.(see May, 1980: 
153-54) Nevertheless, in 1919, the United States responded to worries about 
speculation by making it "virtually impossible for aliens to acquire public lands 
legally",(Pelzer, 1945: 107) and individual Filipinos were allowed to take up 
larger personal homesteads, of up to 24 hectares, the 1903 Act having allowed 
for homesteads of only 16 hectares.(Krinks, 1974: 2)
More generally, however, the system was undermined by the existing 
customs of land tenure and economic distribution. As Peter Krinks observes, in 
a detailed study of new settlements on the island of Mindanao:
The operation of lowland Filipino customs, together with Spanish 
codification of landholding, had previously led to subdivision of 
farms and to the unequal, oligarchic conditions of Luzon and the 
Visayas [well settled areas]. There was no reason to assume that the 
provision of homesteads would alone lead to a new agrarian 
structure in the areas of colonisation.... Even without the early 
mistakes, the long term result would have been the same—namely, 
the twin processes of subdivision and concentration.(Krinks, 1974:
16)
Furthermore, "the populace showed relatively little interest in acquiring 
homestead land. Most of the public land was located in remote regions, and 
Filipinos proved to be unwilling to leave the surroundings with which they were 
familiar and to sever ties with their families."(May, 1980: 155) In short, then, the 
homesteading programme in the Phi 11 ipines did not produce results similar to the 
western United States, largely because the broad tenurial framework created by 
the 1787 ordinance was not replicated in the Philippines, and because the 
practice of colonisation was not carried on with enthusiasm by the local 
population.
Politically, one of the most interesting features of American policy was the
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way in which "the Americans placed far greater emphasis on the preparation of 
their subjects for self-government than did European policy-makers."(May, 1980:
17) This relative political benevolence reflects the economically less-exploitative 
attitude of the Americans to the Philippines, for example as compared with the 
Dutch culture policy discussed below.(see Maddison, 1990: 326) However, as 
Glenn May notes, the original political ideas of the Philippines Commission were 
that outright independence would not be the end-goal of this process of self- 
government. Rather, it was envisioned in the typical American sense of 
democratic republican self-government within the broad framework of US 
'sovereignty', although not as a full member of the states-union. According to 
May, President Taft "reasoned that if the United States provided good government, 
Filipinos would eventually recognize the advantages of continued US sovereignty 
(protection against external threats by the US armed forces, stable internal 
conditions, a preferential tariff) outweighed those of independence."(May, 1980: 
14) The Philippines, in other words, were to be integrated into a system of 
divided sovereignty: self-government, implying local popular sovereignty; but with 
certain powers delegated to a more 'appropriate' level. Ultimately, May's 
assessment of the American attitude to the Philippines can stand for westward 
expansion as a whole and recalls Whitman's lines cited earlier: it was "an 
experiment in self-duplication."(May, 1980: 17) This is the essence of Jefferson's 
vision of the American future as an expanding commonwealth of equal, 
republican states, held together by a complicated structure of divided sovereignty 
and guaranteeing individual rights through the state's renunication of its authority 
over individuals' property.
§3. Dutch colonial administration
Like the Americans, the Dutch saw two different kinds of opportunity in their 
territorial possessions. On the one hand, the East Indies offered an immense 
possibility for raising revenue for the Dutch treasury. Consequently, a great many 
Dutch took the view that, as Johannes van den Bosch, the Governor General from 
1828 to 1839, bluntly put it, "The Indies is a Dutch territory of exploitation."(cited
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in Fasseur, 1992: 56) However, the Dutch also acquired a reputation (at least 
among European powers) for prosecuting an exemplary form of high-minded 
'ethical policy' with regard to their colonial dependencies. This was based on a 
deliberate Dutch policy of using their colonial status to offset their rather lowly 
position within European affairs. "This paradox provided Dutch burghers in the 
colonial diaspora...with an urgent sense of mission....many among them saw their 
primary role as one of governing their districts with more anthropological 
learning, greater cultural sensitivity, and better political skills than any other 
imperial power in Asia."(Gouda, 1995: 41) Indeed, some doubted whether the 
'ethical policy' of the Dutch could be considered as 'expansionistic' or 
'imperialistic' in a pejorative sense: "It was said that the borders of the East Indies 
had already been defined internationally before the emergence of modern 
imperialism, and within these borders the Dutch government was bringing order, 
welfare and civilisation."(Kuitenbrouwer, 1991: 19) It is noteworthy that one of 
the leading figures in the attempt to present the Dutch as a leading ethical 
international actor in this respect, C. van Vollenhoven, made an explicit parallel 
between the Dutch and the United States on precisely these grounds. Van 
Vollenhoven observed that the Dutch, like the United States, tried to keep out of 
European balance of power machinations, and instead dedicated themselves to 
the organisation of "a splendid empire of fifty millions of inhabitants".(van 
Vollenhoven, 1919:194) This contrast between the activities of the Dutch and the 
United States on the one hand, and the European great powers on the other is an 
interesting illustration of the broader differences between the 'diplomatic' and 
'colonising ethics'.
It is therefore perhaps not especially surprising that the parallel with the 
Americans should extend also to the tenurial and political features of the way in 
which this 'splendid empire' in the Dutch East Indies was organised. Admittedly, 
since one of the primary goals of Dutch colonial administration was to secure 
revenue from their territories, Dutch colonial policy included projects like the 
infamous system of forced cash-crop cultivation. However, revenue-raising was 
not the only motivation behind Dutch colonial policy through the nineteenth and
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early twentieth centuries. The Dutch were not simply interested in securing as 
much revenue from their colonial possessions as possible; they also had quite 
definite ideas about the right way of organising and administering a colonial 
society, and it is in this respect that the archetypally'Grotian' features of Dutch 
colonial administration in the period can be identified. This feature of Dutch 
colonial policy is evidenced partly in the 'dualistic' system of administration they 
developed, in which political authority was divided between different institutions: 
some in the Netherlands, some in the Batavian colonial government and some 
local popular institutions. It can also be seen in the Dutch attitude to land tenure 
during and after the collapse of 'cultivation system', with their eventual 
demonstration of respect for appropriate customary indigenous practices in 
Indonesian adat law.
The end o f Company rule and the land-rent policy
The East India Company (VOC) Charter was revoked in 1799, and control over 
the VOC's territorial possessions was assumed by the new government of the 
Batavian Republic. After several years of declining profits and influence, however, 
the VOC's assets were considerably diminished: "the greater part of the Indian 
Archipelago was in the power of England....only the posts at Palembang, 
Banjermasin, Makassar, Timor and Java were left to the Dutch."(de Klerck, 1938: 
ii, 1) The situation deteriorated even further through the Napoleonic Wars, as the 
Netherlands came under French sway, with the Batavian Republic being 
transformed by Napoleon into the Kingdom of Holland in 1806. Under this new 
regime, the Governor Generalship of the East Indies passed to Marshall Herman 
Daendels, "invested with almost unlimited power to govern the estate of the late 
Company, and to protect the remainder of the Dutch colonial dominion against 
the threatening assaults of Napoleon's bitterest enemy, England."(de Klerck, 1938: 
ii, 12) To this end, Daendels turned the indigenous system of labour service to his 
own ends, freeing the native Javanese from their obligations to indigenous elites, 
"only to lay still heavier ones upon them in the name of the government."(Day, 
1966: 159) Daendels's rapid programme of military fortification had little success
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in repelling the British, however, who invaded in 1811, bringing Java into their 
imperial system of government centred on Calcutta and formally ruled by Lord 
Minto. The de facto ruler of Java under the British, however, was the Lieutenant 
Governor Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, whose great contribution to subsequent 
colonial policy was his introduction of the land-rent system to Java.
To understand the significance of Raffles's land-rent system, we must first 
look briefly at the alternative ways of securing revenue open to the Dutch, 
Daendels and the British. The expiration of the VOC's Charter had thrown open 
the question of the ends that Dutch administration should serve in its remaining 
colonial possessions, and of the means by which these ends should be pursued. 
The goals of colonial administration had previously been set by the VOC's Charter 
and shareholders, and had more or less revolved around the aim of revenue 
maximisation through the exploitation of traditional Javanese commercial and 
fiscal mechanisms. After the expiration of the Charter, the question was posed 
anew: should the old VOC system of exploitation through traditional Javanese 
mechanisms be preserved; or should a new system of direct Dutch administration 
be introduced, extracting revenue through systematic taxes rather than indigenous 
forms of tribute or service? In other words, should the old VOC 'system of trade' 
be maintained, or should a new 'system of taxation' be introduced?(Day, 1966: 
131-32)
One of the most interesting figures in the debate that emerged around this 
question in the Netherlands immediately after the end of company rule was the 
colonial official Dirk van Hogendorp, who put forward a series of proposals that 
were later to become staple features of the liberal approach to colonial policy­
making in the Netherlands. Van Hogendorp argued that the VOC's old system had 
been based upon a quasi-feudal system of tribute and compulsory service. His 
criticisms primarily concerned the way that the VOC had retained the traditional 
system of local administration, based on a group of Javanese officials called bupati 
who derived their authority largely from control over land. All that the VOC had 
done was rename them in a more Western fashion as regenten, and the only
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change in their status was that "they were made responsible for the cultivation 
and delivery of certain products for the European market."(Kuitenbrouwer, 1986: 
84) In place of the VOC system, van Hogendorp proposed that the status of the 
indigenous regenten should be reduced, a more direct Dutch administration 
system should be established and the Dutch should "transfer the lands to the 
common people, in property or in hereditary lease."(cited in Day, 1966: 135) He 
further argued for "the introduction of assured individual property rights and an 
equitable system of taxation."(Day, 1966:140) The trouble with van Hogendorp's 
proposal was that it raised a simple but devastating question: "who was going to 
attend to the allotment of four hundred thousand pieces of land, scattered over 
an area far exceeding that of the Netherlands; and to that question there was no 
answer."(Day, 1966: 140) The sheer impracticality of van Hogendorp's plan 
appeared to render the question about the different ways of raising revenue null 
and void: the only way to proceed was by working with the existing system of 
revenue collection, simply inserting the Dutch into this system at an appropriate 
point over and above the regenten, much as the VOC had done, "to supervise 
rather than exercise direct control over the people."(Bastin & Benda, 1977: 22)
What the policies of Daendels and Raffles did was to change the 
circumstances surrounding van Hogendorp's original proposal. Although 
Daendels's substantive policy had been quite different from van Hogendorp's 
liberal approach, Daendels had nevertheless demonstrated that it was at least 
possible to adopt a more interventionist and reformist line with regard to 
indigenous systems of rule, and that a European administration system could 
exercise relatively direct control over the Javanese population, even bypassing the 
local regenten if necessary. Raffles took this further, with a sustained attempt to 
enact van Hogendorp's scheme for revenue-raising through a system of taxation. 
The centre-piece of Raffles's policy was a new, Java-wide, systematic land tax 
"which was to absorb all the multiform dues and services paid by the people 
under native rule".(Day, 1966: 174) Raffles began from the proposition that in 
Java the indigenous ruler had always been the owner of the soil, and that the 
Europeans had taken over this right, owning "the sole right of property in the land
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of the island."(Day, 1966: 176) Therefore, while individual farmers would be 
allowed to work the land relatively free of labour services to local elites, they 
nevertheless were tenants of the government, and therefore had to pay a land-rent 
for the use of the lands. In effect, this also allowed the government freely to 
dispose of the uncultivated waste lands, whether to Javanese or Europeans. Thus, 
while claiming that the government enjoyed the sole right of property, Raffles also 
established a commercial relationship directly with the individual settlers, ignoring 
intermediaries in the form of local village chiefs and the regenten. This policy of 
dealing directly with individual farmers was primarily instigated to answer 
political concerns about the arbitrary rule of native elites. As Raffles himself put 
it:
The agency of intermediate renters [i.e., the bupati or regenten] is 
considered as quite unnecessary to be adopted in the future. It is 
deemed that such a plan of settlement w ill leave the bulk of the 
people entirely at the mercy of a numerous set of chiefs, who, 
however well they may have hitherto conducted themselves, would 
certainly, in such case, possess an ability of injury and oppression, 
against which the ruling [European] power would have left itself no 
adequate means of prevention or redress, and which cannot 
therefore be permitted consistently with the principles of good 
government.(cited in Day, 1966: 178-79)
The East Indies were returned to the Dutch following the Treaty of London 
of 1814, and initially the Dutch attempted to make the land-rent system work for 
themselves. Even under Raffles, however, the system had operated under a 
considerable deficit,(Day, 1966: 191) and, despite the intentions of the 
Commissioners from the Netherlands to persevere with a reformed version of the 
system (which involved increasing the colonial administrative personnel 
considerably), they "failed to make Java profitable to the Dutch treasury...in the 
short term, because the Javanese peasant did not have any inclination to cultivate 
export crops like coffee or sugar voluntarily."(Fasseur, 1992: 23) Consequently, 
in an attempt to improve the colonial finances, the heads of the local colonial 
administration, especially the new Governor General Baron van der Capellen and 
his successor van den Bosch, drifted towards the familiar old 'system of trade'
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adopted by the VOC as a way of increasing revenue. What they introduced, from 
the late 1830s, was a system of forced cultivation of designated crops.
The cultivation system, the liberal response and 'adat law'
Despite drawing its inspiration from the old VOC system as a contrast to the land- 
rent system, the new 'cultivation system' was actually a considerable development 
on the old VOC commercial system, being both more elaborate and based on a 
much more active and interventionist role for Dutch colonial administration. The 
thinking behind the cultivation system was that the only way to make Java a 
profitable colony was to increase the production of goods like coffee or sugar that 
could be sold on the European market, and, as van den Bosch argued, "insofar as 
this colony still yields significant produce for transport to Europe, this is wholly 
and exclusively the consequence of forced labour".(cited in Elson, 1994: 42) The 
cultivation system was an attempt to extend and systematise this forced labour to 
ensure the maximisation of the production of suitable crops, which would then 
be sold by the Netherlands Trading Company on behalf of the treasury. 
Essentially, under the cultivation system the Javanese peasants were required to 
produce crops for the Dutch in lieu of payment of land-rent. The peasant-farmers 
would also receive payments for their crops, and even though these were not 
large, in some areas, especially those under sugar cultivation, "most growers 
obtained sufficient by way of crop payments to clear their land rent debts".(Elson, 
1994: 62)
Although it undoubtedly fulfilled its goal of gaining revenue for the Dutch 
treasury, "The system went into decline because it came into conflict with the 
political views which came to dominate in the Netherlands after 1850."(Fasseur, 
1978: 157) The culture system increasingly came under attack from liberals in the 
Dutch parliament, especially after crop failures in 1844 resulted in severe famines 
persisting into 1845 and 1846. Famine struck again in 1849. While it is unclear 
whether these famines can be directly attributed to the burdens on the peasants 
imposed by the cultivation system,(see Elson, 1994: 114-18; & Elson, 1990) it
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certainly presented the Dutch with an uncomfortable paradox. As one of the 
leading spokesmen of the liberals, W.R. van Hoevell, succinctly put it: "we have 
in Java the strange phenomenon that this island annually produces almost 40 
m illion guilders in profit, but that the people of this same island are unable to 
provide for their own needs."(cited in Elson, 1994: 102)
Administrative changes in the Netherlands in 1848 also contributed to the 
liberal backlash against the cultivation system. Prior to 1848, in the Constitutions 
of 1806 and 1815, control over colonial policy had been vested exclusively in the 
monarch; after 1848, the States-General was given a role in colonial policy, 
especially in terms of supervision of the budget. The new role for the Dutch 
legislative body simultaneously increased the liberals' awareness of the acuteness 
of the problems associated with the cultivation system, and also gave them the 
means to do something about them. However, the liberals in the States-General 
faced a dilemma posed by the fiscal success of the cultivation system, which has 
been neatly summarised by Cornelis Fasseur: "The central issue was how the 
system of agricultural enterprise on government account could gradually be 
transformed into a system of free agricultural enterprise for private account, while 
retaining, as much as possible, the Indies millions that were for the time being 
indispensable to the Dutch treasury."(Fasseur, 1992: 160) Therefore Dutch 
colonial policy only gradually began to move in a liberal direction, painfully 
slowly and with considerable qualification, since new ways of raising revenue had 
to be found to replace those secured by the cultivation system.
There were two main strands to the liberal plan. On the one hand, they 
believed that the customary Javanese adat land use practices should be respected, 
and this concern was built into the new Colonial Constitution (Regeerings 
Reglement) of 1854. While it permitted the continuation of the cultivation system, 
it insisted in Article 56 that "so far as the cultures occupy land cleared by the 
native population for its own use, this land be disposed of with justice and with 
respect for existing rights and customs".(cited in Day, 1966: 328; & see also 
Fasseur, 1992: 133-34) On the other hand, the liberals believed that the revenues
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of the cultivation system could be preserved, and more satisfactorily raised, if the 
forced government cultivations were to be replaced by cultivations managed by 
private enterprise and worked by 'free labour'. This policy was included in Article 
62 of the Colonial Constitution, stating that "The Governor General can let land 
according to rules which are to be established by general ordinance."(in de Kat 
Angelino, 1931: ii, 438) However, two principal restrictions were placed on this 
governmental right to dispose of waste lands: only letting was permitted, outright 
sale of the lands was not (for fear of creating quasi-feudal private estates); and, as 
noted above, the adat rights of the Javanese were to be respected. A Royal Decree 
of 1856 extended these restrictions on hiring out waste land to private enterprise, 
capping the leases at 20 years, imposing restrictions on the goods that could be 
produced and mandating the planters not to interfere with indigenous village 
administration.(Fasseur, 1992: 165-67)
The main problem with the liberal plan was that its two components were 
in direct contradiction with each other, and this considerably restricted the 
capacity of the government to establish 'free' cultivations on a liberal market- 
oriented model. As A.D.A. de Kat Angelino points out, "[Article 62] seems...to 
have been intended to exclude from cession all uncultivated land upon which 
Indonesian communities could make any kind of valid claim...[but since] in the 
[eighteen] thirties already an impression had been gained that practically all 
uncultivated soil belonged by Adat law to some community, one was confronted 
here with an apparent contradiction".(de Kat Angelino, 1931: ii, 441) This 
contradiction was also embedded in the 1870 Agrarian Law and Domain 
Declaration, under which
all lands not held in private ownership formed part of the public 
domain.... Under the decree, the Government acquired only such 
rights as remained after the deduction of all native rights to the 
land.... [However] if all the active and dormant rights of the 
population were respected, no free lands would remain for leasing 
to Western entrepreneurs.(Vandenbosch, 1944: 245)
To an extent, this contradiction sprang from a legal uncertainty among Dutch
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colonial experts, reflected in the difference between the Leiden and Utrecht 
school's views of the content of adat law. The former assumed an extensive 
village right of disposal over the waste-lands, in which "the concept of sovereignty 
and of a sovereign right is lacking. The state and its ruler are fitted into the total 
and conflictuous adat order of rights";(Heesterman, 1986:193) on the other hand, 
the latter assumed the 'domain right' of government, meaning that the government 
as sovereign was owner of the land. Raffles's land-rent system, the cultivation 
system and the liberal plan of 'free cultivations' managed by private enterprise 
had all depended on the 'domain right' theory.(Fasseur, 1992: 30-31) However, 
if the Leiden scholars, such as van Vollenhoven, were correct in their assessment 
of adat law, and there was increasing recognition that they were, then the whole 
property right structure of the cultivation and liberal system would be unworkable 
as a system of revenue-raising.(see Slaats, 1994: 105-109)
The result of this uncertainty over land rights was that, as Fasseur notes, 
"under these circumstances, hiring of 'waste' land seldom occurred".(Fasseur, 
1992: 167) Thus, the late nineteenth-century liberal alternative to the cultivation 
system was essentially a failure, the main result of which was a steady budget 
deficit with regard to the Indies from the mid 1880s on with very little progress 
in the establishment of private cultivations worked by 'free' labour.(see Booth, 
1990: 239) For our purposes it is interesting to note that, despite van 
Vollenhoven's recognition of the unique and non-western character of land 
'rights' under adat 'law ', there was a gradual development towards trying to 
codify the basic principles of adat law as a single system. This was largely carried 
on by B. ter Haar at the Law School in Batavia.(Slaats, 1994: 107) This drift 
exacerbated a tendency to treat adat rights to land as if they were communal 
rights on a more western formulation, which had initially arisen as "a rather 
desperate response of the adat to the pressure of the cultivation 
system."(Heesterman, 1986: 196-97) The key point here is that the system that 
emerged in effect acknowledged the property rights o f the indigenous occupants 
o f the land, even at the expense of projects of direct imperial exploitation or of 
liberal private enterprise. What emerged, in short, was a reworked version of adat
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A large amount of legislative authority was granted to the Indies. To 
governmental organs established in the Indies was delegated the 
power to regulate East Indian internal affairs, while to the Crown 
was reserved the right to regulate only such subjects and on such 
occasions as the law might specify. However, the Crown received 
the right to suspend all ordinances passed by East Indian organs 
when judged in conflict with the Constitution, the law, or the 
general interest, while the right of vetoing East Indian ordinances 
on the same grounds was left to the States General, And, finally, 
though Parliament retained the right to legislate on colonial 
subjects, it must first consult the representative body of the territory 
concerned.(Vandenbosch, 1944: 76-77)
Where, then, did 'sovereignty' over the Netherlands Indies lie? Formally, 
of course, sovereign authority lay with the main legislative and executive 
institutions in the Netherlands; but in practice, the authority to decide policy on 
specific issues was increasingly delegated to colonial institutions, both in the 
Batavian administration and in more locally representative bodies.5 An interesting 
further complication to this already bewildering constitutional picture concerns 
the position of the 'Outer Territories': i.e., the other islands in the Indonesian
5. A rather similar question could be asked of the position of the dependencies in the British Empire. 
In a survey of the problem of sovereignty in this context, Arthur Berriedale Keith argued that "it is 
necessary to admit that sovereignty can be divided, and that in any country both internal and external 
sovereignty may be shared by various authorities."(Keith, 1929: 1) Here, it may also prove interesting 
to reflect on Fred Northedge's comments on the doctrinal or theoretical basis of the League Mandates 
system: "who, in reality, was the actual sovereign in the mandated territories?.... The question was 
hardly relevant in the case of A mandates. They would shortly be independent sovereign states in their 
own right.... But sovereignty in the case of B and C mandates was a different matter.... The mandatory 
Powers, especially those responsible for C mandates, tended to argue that they were the sovereign,
or at least that they exercised sovereign powers South Africa, for instance, contended throughout
the League's life that South West Africa was as much part of her domains as Cape Town or 
Johannesburg.... The Mandates Commission repudiated the claim, its chairman, the Marquis Theodoli, 
contending that South Africa merely 'exercised sovereign powers' in the territory.(Northedge, 1986: 
196-97) However, as Northedge continues, no-one really took seriously the possibility that the League 
as a confederation might be in a position to possess sovereignty over a territory or a population. How, 
then, should this peculiar configuration of authority be understood? To this question, Northedge 
effectively admits defeat: "Perhaps the most that could be said about sovereignty within the mandates 
system was that the exact position was never precisely defined. The mandates system was entirely 
unique and old categories of international law did not fit the situation."(Northedge, 1986: 197-98) As 
should be evident from the argument of this Chapter, the situation of the mandates was not especially 
new, and the solution to it was hardly 'unique' or unprecedented. Rather, the structure of sovereignty 
under the mandates system—as described by Northedge—was wholly in line with the already well- 
established way of integrating external territories into the international society through the application 
of the principle of divisible sovereignty. Perhaps, echoing James Madison and Peter Onuf (cited 
earlier), one might say that the League was neither an 'absolute consolidation' nor a 'mere 
confederacy'.
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archipelago. Here, the Dutch claimed sovereignty over the various islands, but 
acknowledged the quasi-independent status of the three governments of the 
islands (Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East), and also for those states in areas not 
under established colonial administrative control, which constituted around half 
of the area of the Outer Territories.(Vandenbosch, 1944: 139-40, 147) Here, as 
Charles Alexandrowicz's analysis suggests, an initial relationship of equality had 
gradually given way to a situation wherein these native states were effectively in 
a position of vassalage. However, the process by which this had happened, and 
the current de facto situation, reflected the fact that the native states actually 
enjoyed considerable latitude, and "There were in the Outer Territories a number 
of small states which had not been brought formally under Dutch jurisdiction at 
all."(Vandenbosch, 1944: 148-49)
The decentralisation produced by the 'ethical policy' in the main territories 
of the Dutch East Indies was accompanied by the spread of Dutch authority into 
the Outer Territories, through the 'Short Declarations', by which the rights of the 
local peoples to self-government were granted in exchange for a formal 
recognition of Dutch sovereignty. This allowed the Dutch a justification for direct 
intervention in the affairs of the native states, "But it was soon felt that the process 
of penetration had gone too far; that the native states should be strengthened in 
order that they might be used as priceless historical aids in bringing about a 
sound and much needed decentralisation upon an Indonesian 
basis."(Vandenbosch, 1944: 150) In the 1919 Native States Regulations the 
independence of the self-governing territories was shored up, with three 
restrictions being formally imposed: the self-governing native states had no control 
over foreign affairs, and some internal issues were delegated to the Dutch colonial 
administration; the native rulers had to accept Dutch administrative guidance; and 
extra-territoriality was introduced for Europeans and Indonesians from areas under 
proper Dutch administration.(Vandenbosch, 1944: 152-53)
In general, then, the system of administration in the Dutch East Indies had 
always been 'dualistic', in the sense that the Dutch had worked with native
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systems of rule. Hence, it was always a constitutionally more ambiguous structure 
than prevailed in, for example, British India. It is telling that the only sustained 
attempt to replace the indigenous system with a comprehensive Dutch system of 
colonial administration had been introduced not by the Dutch themselves, but by 
the British during the interregnum. As the ethical policy developed, this dualism 
became more and pronounced, especially as ideas of local self-government began 
to play a more prominent role in Dutch notions of the purpose of colonial 
administration. These were not, as in the case of the United States, developed into 
a theory of eventual equality within an overall federal system, although such ideas 
were mooted. Rather, the Dutch tried to operate a system of delegated authority 
across different issues, parcelling out authority between the Netherlands, Batavia, 
Indonesian and 'native state' institutions. What emerged was a classic illustration 
of the Grotian colonial principle of divisible sovereignty, although perhaps with 
a more paternalistic-developmental sheen to it, compared with the more 
egalitarian democratic-republicanism of the American approach.
§4. The dualistic character of the emerging global international society
To sum up thus far: the expansion of international society in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries did not simply depend on the conversion of independent 
political communities into 'civilised' states, on the terms laid down by European 
diplomats and international lawyers. In addition, the expansion of international 
society involved the increasingly widespread application of the classical Grotian 
principles of appropriation and divisible sovereignty. In the United States of 
America, this was made quite explicit in the original ordinances designed to 
regulate expansion and became even more pronounced through the nineteenth 
century. Individuals were accorded certain rights in the process of territorial 
expansion to appropriate property through pre-emption and homesteading. 
Furthermore, the new states were worked into a constitutional scheme of divided 
sovereignty, in the context of a relatively (and increasingly) centralised federal 
system. In the Netherlands Indies, the process was complicated by other factors 
of imperialistic and capitalistic exploitation, but the basic features of appropriation
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and divisible sovereignty came through very strongly once again. This can be seen 
in a variety of ways, especially through the reconstruction of Indonesian 'adat 
law' by scholars like van Vollenhoven, and the decentralising political reforms 
introduced under the rubric of the 'ethical policy'. These developments point to 
the expanding scope of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
international society centred on the practice of colonisation.
Thus, just as we had two stories of the origins of modern international 
society, so we now have two stories of the expansion of international society to 
global extension. Because the conventional account given in Bull's 'anarchical 
society thesis' sees international society as a society of states, it concentrates on 
the way in which more and more independent entities came to acquire 
recognition as members of the society of states. The alternative conception, 
however, saw the element of society in world politics as residing primarily in the 
way in which the practice of colonisation shaped individuals' rights under natural 
law and the law of nations, and the way in which complex consitutional 
structures developed in colonial societies, with authority being divided between 
different institutions, overlapping the boundaries of states which were only ever 
quasi-independent. Its expansion corresponds to the increasing territorial scope 
of these acts of appropriation and the spread of the constitutional arrangements 
characteristic of divisible sovereignty, conducted in an exemplary manner in 
Northwest America and the Dutch East Indies.
If we were to look back at the argument of this and the previous two 
Chapters, we would see that we have a direct counter-point to the 'anarchical 
society thesis' discussed in Chapter 3. Bull's argument offered an absolutist and 
legal positivist interpretation of the Grotian tradition of thought, which was 
juxtaposed with an historical account of the emergence of the society of states in 
Europe and its expansion to worldwide extension. Against this, we have seen how 
the two concepts of appropriation and divisible sovereignty were central to 
Grotius's thought and were carried forward in a Grotian tradition extending to the 
American revolutionaries. This more liberal and republican interpretation of
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Grotius was juxtaposed with the practice qf colonisation, as conducted by the 
Dutch in the East Indies and the British and Dutch in North America. The initial 
formation of these colonial societies was therefore posited as an alternative 
moment of the origin of modern international society. The expansion of 
international society was then depicted in terms of the process of Internal 
expansion' in the Dutch East Indies, and 'absorption' of the western territories into 
the American states-union.
In the next, and final, Chapter, the interpretive implications of this new 
conception or ideal type of modern international society w ill be discussed. To 
conclude this Chapter, however, we might note that the emerging global 
international society was therefore not simply given over to the positivist legal 
orthodoxy of state sovereignty and the standard of civilisation. Instead, the process 
of the expansion of international society—like the origins of modern international 
society—involved a complex combination of phenomena that corresponds to the 
existence of different broad systems of values, rules and institutions in modern 
world politics, and includes the 'colonising ethic', as well as those features 
highlighted by conventional theorists like Bull or Gong. Thus, it seems 
appropriate to treat the emerging global international society as having a dualistic 
structure, some aspects of which are accentuated by Bull's ideal type. However, 
Bull's ideal type does not, indeed should not be expected to, capture the entire 
structure of this bifurcated international society. Therefore, to make sense of 
contemporary international society, we also need to use the ideal type developed 
here, from a solidarist evaluative perspective and based on the historical 
interpretation of the 'colonising ethic' given in the preceding Chapters.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: The Spirit of Modern Solidarism
This thesis has set out an evaluative and historical interpretation of the special 
kind of sociability and order that exists in world politics. The evaluative 
interpretation was initially drawn from the solidarist elements within the Grotian 
tradition, as defended, for example, by Hersch Lauterpacht or Herbert Butterfield, 
and stated in opposition to Hedley Bull's more pluralist interpretation of the 
nature of international society. Bull's assertion of the ontological priority of the 
pluralist conception of international society was challenged through a theoretical 
demonstration of the contested nature of the concept, and through an historical 
account of the normative and institutional complexity of the modern international 
society. The historical interpretation outlined the principal features of the 
'colonising ethic' contained in Hugo Grotius's conception of the law of nations 
and in the practice of the colonisation of 'vacant' lands, the 'absorption' of the 
western territories by the American states-union and the 'internal expansion' of 
Dutch colonial administration in Indonesia. Thus, with regard to the central 
purpose of this thesis, we now have a new answer to the question of international 
society, working within the context of the Grotian tradition, but transcending the 
limitations that have restricted that tradition because of the narrow philosophical 
and historiographical assumptions on which the research programme of the 
'English school' was based.
By way of a conclusion, it might be interesting to see how this solidarist 
ideal type of modern international society would suggest new interpretive insights 
into certain phenomena in contemporary world politics. First, let us recall Max 
Weber's use of his 'Protestant ethic' thesis to redescribe the spirit of modern 
capitalism. Weber's enquiry begins by identifying a significant feature of the 
unique modern Western form of capitalism: it is "sober bourgeois capitalism with 
its rational organization of free labour."(Weber, 1930: 24) Weber's task is to 
explain how and why Western capitalism assumes this peculiar cultural form. He 
does so by showing how capitalist economic conduct is related to the ascetic
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Protestant conception of vocation or 'calling', since "the religious valuation of 
restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means 
to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth 
and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the 
expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of 
capitalism."(Weber, 1930: 172) Thus, he concludes, "One of the fundamental 
elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern 
culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born...from 
the spirit of Christian asceticism."(Weber, 1930: 180)
In a similar way, some significant features of contemporary world politics 
exhibit an affinity with the 'colonising ethic', and especially with Grotius's ideas 
of appropriation and divisible sovereignty, as well as his theory of resistance. In 
particular, the three aspects of the contemporary international legal order that 
were noted in the introduction to Part 2 can be given a new interpretation in 
terms of the 'colonising ethic': the tension between external and internal self- 
determination, or between state sovereignty and human rights; the partial 
centralisation of authority in the United Nations and through regional integration; 
and the justification of resistance by international norms as part of the process of 
decolonisation. Let us now look at each of these features of contemporary world 
political order in turn.
§1. External and internal conceptions of self-determination
On the issue of the tension between external and internal self-determination, or 
between state .sovereignty and human rights, we might begin by noting that it is 
already well-established that international personality can be seen as part of a 
broader theory of property. For example, as Lauterpacht observed, positive 
international lawyers like Emerich de Vattel "assimilated state territory to private 
ownership of land".(Lauterpacht, 1946: 29) In positive international law, this was 
part of the broader process of constructing the state as the primary bearer of rights 
and personality in international society through the analogy between the public
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persona of the state and the 'natural person' of the individual.(see Dickinson, 
1916-17 & Hughes, 1995) However, we are now in a position to offer a different, 
and more nuanced, account of the relationship between property and 
international personality.
As we saw in Chapter 4, Grotius operated with a dualistic understanding 
of property, based on the distinction between dominium and occupatio. 
Dominium  refers to the civil societal institution of property, while occupatio is the 
basis of ownership in the state of nature or in areas where no civil society has 
been constituted. In the main, Grotius saw the civil institution of dominium  as 
having superseded the natural practice of occupatio, although the former 
generally confirmed the latter since "it is to be supposed that all agreed, that 
whatever each one had taken possession of should be his property."(Grotius, 
1925: 190) Thus, occupatio is a rather awkward, limited way of gaining property 
rights, despite the extensions made to the idea of appropriation by theorists like 
John Locke or Thomas Jefferson. However, it remains important, especially in the 
context of the existence of lands within which no civil society has yet been 
constituted and which are consequently regarded as available for occupation 
through appropriation.
This dualistic theory of property therefore offers two different ways of 
obtaining international personality: through reciprocal agreement, or through 
'natural' occupation. The former seems appropriate to the international personality 
of states, since that arises from a reciprocal agreement between states to treat each 
other as sovereign members of international society. The latter seems more closely 
related to the way in which individuals claim personality and rights in 
international society, in the sense that individual human rights are grounded in 
natural features of humanity: for example, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights begins by asserting that "All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."(Brownlie, ed., 1995: 257) To put 
this into the terms of the dualistic Grotian theory of property, states enjoy
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international personality through the concept of property as dominium, while 
individuals enjoy international personality through the concept of property as 
occupatio, and this latter concept may in practice mean that individuals' rights 
extend only to that over which they have 'natural' property rights, meaning, 
usually, their persons.
Two points follow from this account of the relationship between 
international personality and property. First, international lawyers like W. Michael 
Reisman are incorrect to see human rights as resting on a constitutional principle 
of international legal order that is fundamentally at odds with the principle of 
sovereign statehood, and which "[shifts] the fulcrum of the system from the 
protection of sovereigns to the protection of people".(Reisman, 1990: 872) The 
kind of international personality that individuals enjoy under the UN Charter 
system and the kind of international personality that states enjoy under the 
Westphalian system of legal order are both parts of a single, albeit dualistic, 
theory of property, which was articulated in Grotius's original conception of the 
law of nations. This explains, even if it does not entirely defuse, the tension 
within the UN Charter itself between the equal sovereign rights of states and the 
universal human rights of individuals. The Charter is, in this respect, reflecting a 
long-standing feature of modern international society and is implicitly invoking 
a dualistic theory of property and international personality. The question of the 
status of human rights is therefore no more than a question of the relative scope 
of the reciprocal agreement on the dominium  of states as a supersession of the 
rights of occupatio enjoyed by individuals.
Secondly, this explains why individuals enjoy a rather limited and fragile 
kind of personality and set of rights in international society: in the Grotian 
conception of the law of nations occupatio is inherently limited and can always 
be over-ridden by dominium. This goes against the widely-held view that the 
limited nature of human rights is attributable to the relative novelty of such rights 
in international society, as expressed, for example, in Jack Donnelly's view that 
"Today...human rights provide a standard of moral legitimacy that has been
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partially (although very incompletely) incorporated into the rules of the 
international society of states."(Donnelly, 1993: 30) However, we have seen that 
there is nothing especially new about attributing rights to individuals in 
international law and society. Rather, the principal reason why human rights look 
weak or undeveloped in comparison with states' rights is that the justification of 
individual rights in international law is inherently restricted in comparison with 
the more robust and extensive institution of dominium, on which states' rights are 
based. Arguably, what is new in contemporary international human rights law is 
a movement from the Grotian idea that the civil institution of dominium simply 
supersedes occupatio, to the more Lockean idea that natural rights of 
appropriation continue to exist even in spite of the subsequent construction of a 
civil societal institution of property. O f course, this does not mean that human 
rights are not worth pursuing or developing in international society. However, it 
does indicate that it might be necessary to find a different account of international 
personality, perhaps one that does not depend on a theory of property at all, if 
any further development in international humanitarian law is to be effected, in 
order to provide a surer foundation for individual rights and make further inroads 
into the sovereign independence of states. It may be the case that rights language 
w ill not be an appropriate forum for such an extension of the personality of 
individuals as members of international society.
§2. The partial centralisation of authority in international society
Authority in international society is partially centralised in two different respects: 
through global institutions that exercise authority over a few issues, in a rather 
limited way; and through regional institutions that exercise a more robust kind of 
authority over a wider range of issues, but within geographical limits. The UN is 
an example of the former, enjoying a limited kind of authority with respect to a 
particular set of issues, such as "defusing regional conflicts, advocating self- 
determination, assisting decolonization, codifying international law, protecting 
human rights, and providing a possible framework for social and economic 
improvement, even for redistribution of wealth on a global scale."(Roberts &
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Kingsbury, 1993: 19) In general, the key issue here concerns the ability of the UN 
to determine the scope of domestic jurisdiction, and to assert that certain issues 
are properly dealt with at the international level, rather than simply being 
questions that must be left up to the state in question. In so far as this involves a 
contest over the meaning of Article 2(7), as Rosalyn Higgins observes, 
"interpretation should be in favour of the efficacy of the Organization, and in 
favour of rendering states accountable for their behaviour in areas of international 
concern. It must therefore be a cardinal principle that a state may not judge for 
itself what falls within its own domestic jurisdiction."(Higgins, 1963: 62) 
Especially, this relates to 'Chapter VII' activities, where the UN takes "action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression".(Brownlie, ed., 1995: 14) However, it also relates more broadly to 
questions where an 'international concern' is involved, and while the scope of 
this is not clear, at the least "the practice of the UN does indicate that states may 
be concerned about events happening within another state even if their own 
interests are not directly involved or jeopardized".(Higgins, 1963: 81)
The most developed example of an authoritative regional organisation is 
the European Union. In the context of the EU, we are primarily interested in the 
principle of subsidiarity, which "implies a need to determine the decision-making 
tier on which each problem can be tackled most effectively, the possibilities 
ranging from local, regional, or national through to the European or world 
level."(European Parliament, 1996: 5, emphasis original) This is clearly a much 
more far-reaching way of conceiving of the authority of different institutions, even 
if its rationale is essentially the same as that by which the authority of global 
institutions is justified. In the European Union competence has been extended to 
community-wide institutions on a number of issues. The Single European Act was 
especially important in extending community competence on economic issues and 
other areas of 'low  politics', while the 'three pillar' structure introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union has developed rather weaker 
intergovernmental regimes with regard to 'high politics' issues of foreign and 
security policy and justice and home affairs.(see Wallace, 1996: 52-57) One of the
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central purposes of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference has been to develop 
these two pillars of European Union policy-making and generally encourage a 
more systematic application of the subsidiarity principle, which view has been 
especially evident in German contributions to the Conference. In addition, the 
TEU introduced an idea of 'European citizenship', which the Intergovernmental 
Conference has sought to develop further.(see European Commission, 1995: 
Chapter 1)
As we saw in Chapter 1, Bull saw these developments as questionable 
evidence of the emergence of a 'neo-medieval' form of international order, which 
has some similarities with the solidarist conception of international society. 
Perhaps more specifically, as Andrew Linklater comments, "What is at issue here 
is the unitary conception of sovereignty developed by Bodin and bolstered in the 
subsequent literature."(Linklater, 1996b: 95) The new configurations of authority 
emerging through the centralisation of authority and new forms of citizenship 
violate the principle of the absolute external sovereignty of states. They seem to 
suggest that sovereignty actually consists of authority over a series of distinct 
areas, and that these 'marks of sovereignty' are therefore in principle capable of 
being distributed between different institutions. Thus, international institutions can 
play limited roles in international society, taking on authoritative functions 
without violating the authority of states in other areas.
In other words, in challenging the 'unitary conception of sovereignty', the 
partial centralisation of authority in international society seems to be invoking a 
divisible conception of sovereignty. However, as we saw in Chapters 5 and 6, this 
idea of divisible sovereignty was not medieval, and it was not eclipsed by the 
emergence of absolutist political discourse following Bodin: not all the 
'subsequent literature' bolstered Bodin's unitary conception of sovereignty; some 
thinkers, like Grotius, strove to keep other conceptions of sovereignty alive and 
to re-work them in an appropriate modern context. Their efforts were grounded 
in modern world politics in the context of federal and colonial societies like the 
United States of America or the Dutch East Indies. Thus the idea of the divisibility
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of sovereignty is a salient feature of the normative and institutional structure of 
both modern and contemporary international society. It is a mistake to see its 
contemporary expression as the re-emergence of a medieval form of international 
order; divided sovereignty, like the poor, is always with us.
To understand how and why this is connected to the 'democratic 
entitlement' (Franck, 1992) and ideas of democratic citizenship in contemporary 
international organisation, it is instructive to recall that the idea of divisible 
sovereignty is intimately related to a classical republican conception of political 
community, and that this is the ground upon which solidarists reject reason of 
state as the basis for international morality. Lauterpacht noted that De Jure Belli 
ac Pads was marked by a significant lack of engagement with the key reason of 
state authors like MachiavelIi,(Lauterpacht, 1946: 30-35) but he did not go on to 
explore how Grotius was not simply making an idealistic objection to Realpolitk, 
but was rather concerned with preserving a republican conception of politics, as 
had been the case more generally in the Dutch revolt. As we saw in Chapter 4, 
this distinction between republicanism and reason of state is all about different 
ways of conceiving of political community: as a commonwealth, which exists for 
the welfare of individual people; or as a state, control of which is the goal of 
competition between self-interested individuals and groups.(see Viroli, 1992) By 
seeing solidarism as concerned with collective action between essentially self- 
interested states, and hence as contingent on the existence of a consensus 
between those states, Bull is mixing up these two different conceptions of politics 
and political community. However, properly understood, solidarism is inseparable 
from the idea that the international society is a res publica: a public space in 
which people work out how best to pursue their collective and individual welfare. 
The idea of divisible sovereignty is an expression of this, since it asserts that the 
authority to govern with respect to different issues is contingent on the 
effectiveness of different institutions—state, non-state and international—in 
contributing to the general welfare of the members of the res publica. This is one 
reason why there is an individualist and democratic focus built into contemporary 
international institutions, evidenced both in the UN's concern with human rights
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and democratic governance or in the EU's concern with accountability and 
citizenship rights. These institutions do not simply consist of agreements between 
states that share democratic regimes; rather, they embody a distribution of 
sovereignty, the rationale for which is inseparable from the idea of maximising 
individual welfare within an international society conceived as a res publica. It 
would therefore be hard to conceive of a way in which institutions like the UN 
or the EU could not primarily be concerned with a conception of politics that is 
fundamentally republican, rather than statist.
Another point worth noting concerns the way in which this idea of 
divisible sovereignty and the partial centralisation of authority in international 
society need not necessarily imply a fundamental attack on the role of the state 
in international society. This most obviously relates to concerns about the possible 
emergence of a European 'super-state7, which are especially pronounced in the 
debate about European integration in the United Kingdom. Seeing the institutions 
of the EU as part of a broader system of divisible sovereignty suggests that these 
fears are to some extent misconceived, since they rely on the assumption that 
authority in international society can only be expressed through a unitary 
conception of sovereignty, either located in a nation-state or in a supra-national 
institution. One is reminded here of Martin Wight's comment (cited in Chapter 
1) about "the intellectual prejudice imposed by the sovereign state", such that 
"Practical problems in international politics are often described in terms of 
building a bigger and better state".(Wight, 1966a: 20, 22) The state, however, has 
typically been a part of broader structures of authority, within which the key 
question concerns the effective level at which the welfare of members of the res 
publica can be served. Rather ironically, the UK has either been part of such a 
system for some time itself or has expected other states to submit themselves to 
such a system, in the context of the Act of Union, the British Empire and the 
British Commonwealth. When we realise how global and regional institutions 
depend on a divisible conception of sovereignty which echoes these earlier, but 
hardly medieval, structures of authority in international society, it is harder to see 
them as either threatening or promising some eventual replacement of the state
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with new absolutely sovereign international institutions.
§3. Justifying resistance in international society
One of the other salient features of the post-1945 international legal order has 
been the degree to which resistance movements have been able to seek 
legitimation through appeal to international norms. This was an important part of 
the broader process of decolonisation, and the new ideal type of international 
society developed in this thesis allows us to add a nuance to Bull's account of the 
meaning of this process in terms of the 'revolt against the West'.(see Bull, 1983 
& 1984b)
First, however, it should be noted that Bull's discussion of the revolt 
against the West is already very carefully qualified and contains a rather subtle 
mediation between the issues of change and continuity in international society. 
Bull's main contention is that the entry of non-European societies into 
international society challenged European dominance and thus enlarged the 
agenda of normative issues in international society. While European countries 
established a normative framework for international society consisting of positive 
international law and the 'standard of civilisation', the norms of contemporary 
international society now comprise a wider range of issues including equal 
sovereignty, decolonisation, racial equality, economic justice and cultural 
liberation.(Bull, 1984b: 220-22) These issues have now been put on the agenda 
of world political order within the society of states itself, such that, for example, 
"distributive justice...has now become established as a theme of international 
debate that may be expected to endure."(Bull, 1983:16) Although these issues are 
still the object of struggle and have certainly not become uncontested or primary 
goals of the international society, they have nevertheless come to constitute part 
of the normative content of the order that currently exists in world politics.
However, Bull also argues that this change in the norms, rules and 
institutions of international society has not completely erased the traditional norms
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supported by European countries or positive international law. That much is 
obvious from the fact that he includes equal sovereignty on the list of the 
concerns of non-European states. In a sense, the revolt against the West reinforces 
the traditional mechanisms of the society of states since, as Bull observes, while 
arguing for economic redistribution, non-European states "have demonstrated their 
adherence to the international society and...cooperate in the working of its 
institutions".(Bull, 1983: 33) Indeed, they often actually use the traditional 
mechanisms of international society to advance their cause.
One way of thinking about this blend of change and continuity has been 
suggested by Robert Jackson: the meaning and implication of the norm of equal 
sovereignty has changed with the emergence of a new category of 'quasi­
states'.Qackson, 1990a) According to Jackson, decolonisation called into question 
the classic tests of state sovereignty: "a delimited territory, a stable population, 
and most importantly, a reliable government with the w ill and capacity to carry 
out international obligations."(Jackson, 1990a: 61) Instead, colonial, or rather ex­
colonial, political entities that would have failed these tests nevertheless 
successfully claimed sovereign status as of right, and began to articulate a new set 
of interests as members of the society of states. This changed the rules of the 
'sovereignty game', introducing "two normative innovations: self-determination of 
ex-colonies, and development entitlements of impoverished countries."(Jackson, 
1990a: 40) The result is, on the one hand, "a strong democratic desire to 
incorporate all ex-colonies as sovereign states regardless of their level of empirical 
statehood", by extending the traditional doctrine of external self-determination to 
colonies.(Jackson, 1990a: 48) On the other hand, it also generates a tension 
between the traditional negative rights of sovereign independence (i.e., the right 
to be free from foreign intervention) and new positive rights derived from 
principles of distributive justice.(Jackson, 1990a: 180) For Jackson, in essence 
"Quasi-statesmen do not desire something radically new. They merely want what 
others already possess: positive sovereignty."(Jackson, 1990a: 180) What is new 
is that they use this traditional attribute to secure goals like economic 
redistribution. In this way, the revolt against the West has broadened the agenda
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of international society to include new issues. It may therefore threaten to weaken 
the international society, to the extent that it disrupts the agreement between 
states on common interests and values that Bull saw as essential to the existence 
of an international society in the first place. In this sense, the revolt against the 
West may have made contemporary international society more pluralistic and less 
solidaristic, in comparison with the relatively more cohesive European society of 
states.
Using our new ideal type of modern international society, we are now in 
a position to add two further points to Bull's analysis, which suggest that certain 
revisions need to be made to his interpretive conclusions about contemporary 
international order. First, we can now more readily appreciate how the idea of 
legitimate resistance was itself embedded in the modern international society, and 
therefore how and why decolonisation was supported by international norms and 
institutions. The point here is that, as we saw in Chapter 4, the original Grotian 
conception of the law of nations was oriented to the question of the conditions 
for legitimate resistance, understood not in the classically liberal form of the 
natural rights of individuals to resist the state, but rather as the right of political 
institutions to engage in a just public war. Grotius's re-working of the 
monarchomachic idea that 'inferior magistrates' could legitimately carry on 
resistance was cast in terms of the republican idea of divided sovereignty and the 
consequent possibility of there being a just public war between different bearers 
of sovereign rights within a res publica.
This poses an interesting conundrum, in the sense that it suggests that 
decolonisation has been supported by the 'colonising ethic' in international 
society. This represents a different way of dealing with the issue of the 
relationship between change and continuity in international society, which Bull 
explained in terms of the decolonisers' use of the principle of equal sovereignty 
in positive international law. Instead, it would suggest that decolonisers were able 
to use a wider range of normative and legal principles embedded in the more 
complex structure of modern international society, some of which had actually
257
been part of the practice of colonisation itself. Thus, as Bull argues, 
decolonisation was not a process of over-turning the European international 
society; it was a process by which non-European states entered into the European 
international society and partly changed the norms, rules and institutions of that 
society, often in ways that made use of other traditional components of the 
European society of states. With a more solidarist understanding of the normative 
and institutional structure of the European international society, it is possible to 
see how this dynamic was played out across a wider range of aspects of the 
process of decolonisation, including the actual legitimation of acts of resistance 
in the first place. Furthermore, this insight into the norm of resistance in modern 
international society provides a possible reason why the new states were prepared 
to accept certain limitations on their external sovereignty, while simultaneously 
arguing for their independence with respect to imperial authorities. In carrying on 
anti-colonial resistance, they were not simply asserting their rights to be 
independent sovereign states and hence completely free from intervention by 
other states. Rather, they were asserting their sovereign rights within a broader 
international res publica. This is one sense in which decolonisation was not an 
activity carried on in opposition to international law, but was rather an activity 
that used and upheld international legal rules to its own advantage, thereby 
offering a rather solidarist conception of the place of international law in 
international society. It would also indicate how ex-colonial states can 
simultaneously assert positive rights of economic re-distribution and negative 
rights of sovereign independence.
Secondly, this suggests that we should not necessarily conclude that the 
revolt against the West has rendered international society relatively more pluralist 
and less solidarist. Certainly, the degree of consensus on common purposes may 
have been eroded by the decline of European dominance. However, European 
dominance in the nineteenth century, at least as expressed in positive 
international law, was primarily oriented towards maintaining pluralist values, 
rules and institutions in international society. If solidarism is understood as a 
specific set of Grotian values, rules and institutions, rather than simply as a
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consensus between states, then it seems to be the case that the actions of non- 
European states may have upheld and reinforced a solidarist conception of 
international society, rather than the other way around. The problem with Bull's 
interpretation is that it does not pay sufficient attention to the specific normative 
meaning of the solidarist conception of international society, preferring to 
emphasise its procedural element in terms of the strength of the agreement that 
is possible between states. If, however, there are distinctively solidarist norms, 
rules and institutions in international society, which may be advanced in 
opposition to pluralist ones, consensus itself is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
indicator of whether or not a given structure of international relationships is either 
pluralist or solidarist. The fact that some non-European states, the United States 
of America being a prime example, are advocates of a broadly solidarist 
conception of international society, makes it hard to see their relatively more 
influential role as evidence of a decline in the solidarist nature of international 
society.
§4. Concluding remarks
A great deal more could be said about all three of these interpretive conclusions 
and it would undoubtedly be necessary to qualify them with regard to other 
possible interpretations of these various phenomena. However, the above 
comments are sufficient to illustrate how changing our conception of modern 
international society might lead to changes in our understanding of sociability and 
order in contemporary world politics. They can therefore stand as hypotheses 
suggested by the argument of this thesis, which would hopefully provide fruitful 
and interesting questions for future research. It is not the intention of this thesis 
to carry out this research and provide a detailed account of these various 
contemporary phenomena. Rather, the goal of the thesis has been to show how 
the Grotian tradition, conceived in a less-restricted way, may help us to think 
about these different aspects of world politics. In other words, the Grotian 
tradition can still be a 'living tradition' of speculation about international relations, 
and these illustrations of possible new interpretations of contemporary
259
phenomena are intended to do no more than show what kinds of insights might 
be possible within the reconstructed tradition.
In this respect, it is necessary to clarify an important point about the status 
of the ideal type developed in this thesis. While having argued for a new version 
of the solidarist conception of international society, this thesis has also argued that 
the concept of international society is 'essentially contested'. Therefore, the ideal 
type presented here cannot claim to be the definitive description of the normative 
and institutional structure of modern or contemporary international society. 
Indeed, it is not the intention of the thesis to replace the pluralist conception with 
a solidarist conception as the only available description of society and order in 
international relations. Rather, the intention is to show that the pluralist 
conception is only one conception of modern international society, the solidarist 
conception is another, and there may be many other reasonable conceptions of 
international society. It is hoped that by showing how the ontological priority of 
the pluralist conception rested on questionable historiographical assumptions, this 
thesis w ill have indirectly assisted in the development of other reasonable 
conceptions of international society. It has therefore invited others to develop 
their own accounts of the nature of society and order in world politics, conceived 
from their own evaluative perspectives.
Finally, this raises the question of the status of Bull's own efforts to give 
an answer to the question of international society, and of the work of theorists 
like R.J. Vincent or Linklater who have sought to re-work Bull's conception. Here, 
it is important to note that, while this thesis has been critical of many aspects of 
Bull's argument, it recognised that Bull's work is an exemplary treatment of the 
question of the nature of international society. No part of this thesis has suggested 
that Bull's conception of the values, rules and institutions of modern international 
society is worthless and can be forgotten or ignored. On the contrary, by seeking 
to match Bull's defence of his conception of international society, this thesis has 
implicitly accepted the strength and utility of his account of the nature of 
international society; imitation is, after all, the sincerest form of flattery. Certainly,
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Furthermore, interesting and important interpretive insights into contemporary 
world politics can be gained through an engagement with Bull's conception of 
international society, as both Vincent and Linklater have shown. The point is not 
to dismiss these insights, but rather to locate them within a broader, and 
agonistically conceived, tradition of speculation about international relations.
This why it is so important to emphasise how Bull's conception of modern 
international society is limited in certain respects, and thus serves to prevent us 
from gaining a proper grasp of some important features of modern international 
society. This is in the nature of the selective abstraction involved in constructing 
an ideal type. There is nothing wrong with the selectiveness of Bull's conception 
of international society. The only mistake is to ignore its selectiveness and treat 
it as if it were a comprehensive description of the world, or as a definition of the 
meaning of the core concept of international society. O f course, precisely the 
same caveat should be applied to the ideal type of modern international society 
presented in this thesis. Nevertheless, it is hoped that it w ill still serve a useful 
heuristic function in illuminating certain features of contemporary international 
relations, and that, by challenging some of the assumptions which underpin Bull's 
conception, this thesis w ill have made it easier for alternative conceptions of 
international society to be developed in the future. Echoing Weber, we might 
conclude by observing that this thesis has no intention to substitute a one-sided 
solidarism for a one-sided pluralist conception of society and order in world 
politics: "Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the preparation, 
but as the conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the 
interest of historical truth."(Weber, 1930: 183)
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